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In this article, Professor A. Michael Froomkin takes a
comprehensive look at federal government corporations, focus-
ing on the legal implications arising from their character as
both public and private entities. Federal government corpora-
tions often enjoy public advantages, including national estab-
lishment, tax and securities law exemptions, sovereign immu-
nity, and privileged access to capital. As a result, they face
diminished market discipline and may not be as efficient as their
proponents claim unless they have similarly situated competi-
tors. Because some federal government corporations are owned
wholly or partly by private parties, yet maintain control over
public funds and functions, their legal status raises important
constitutional questions concerning accountability, separation of
powers, and nondelegation.
In his 1993 Reinventing Government program, Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore encouraged the proliferation of federal government
corporations, obscure government devices whose legal status re-
mains unclear even after 200 years as part of our national life.
Professor Froomkin suggests that some regulatory reform is
needed before this suggestion is adopted. After a critical analy-
sis of existing proposals, he offers alternatives designed to in-
crease accountability to both government and market discipline,
thus ensuring that private parties do not profit at public ex-
pense, and limiting taxpayer liability in the event of insolvency.
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American concern about inefficiency in government dates back to
the First Continental Congress.' In the 200 years since then, reorgani-
zation plans have come and gone, but the fundamental structures of
government departments have changed only infrequently, although
their jurisdictions have changed constantly, and usually have grown.
Vice President Al Gore's Reinventing Government program ' is only
the latest in a long series of plans to reorganize or reinvigorate the
federal government.
One of the many devices proposed by the Vice President to create
a "government that works better and costs less" is an often tried yet
little-known type of government entity called a federal government
corporation (FGC). Congress has created a new government corpora-
tion every year or so since World War II. It created the United States
Enrichment Corporation in 1992, s and the Corporation for National
and Community Service (AmeriCorps) in 1993." Congress recently
has considered new federal corporations for everything from aid to
small businesses5 to the regulation of boxing,6 and is now considering
proposals for a Technology Transfer and Commercialization Financ-
ing Corporation.7 Reinventing Government would add to the list by
semiprivatizing much of the Federal Aviation Administration into the
U.S. Air Traffic Services Corporation, an FGC that would, the ad-
ministration hopes, borrow funds (which would not be counted to-
wards the national debt) to modernize air traffic control.'
1. Indeed, one of the first resolutions passed by the Continental Congress established an
Inspector General to root out "abuses which prevail in the different departments." PAUL C. LIGHT,
MONITORING GOVERNMENT 25 (1993).
2. ALBERT GORE, CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (1993)
[hereinafter NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW]. For a skeptical analysis of the program, see
Ronald C. Moe, The Reinventing Government Exercise: Misinterpreting the Problem, Misjudging
the Consequences, 54 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 111 (1994).
3. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1993); cf. Sheila
Kaplan, Uranium-Enrichment Firm Enriches Lawyers, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at 2 ("big-
gest beneficiaries . . . have been the law firms and consulting firms that received lucrative
contracts").
4. See National and Community Service Trust Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-82, 107 Stat.
785.
5. Small Business Credit Availability Act of 1993, H.R. 660, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993)
(proposing creation of Venture Enhancement and Loan Development Administration for Smaller
Undercapitalized Enterprises ("Velda Sue")).
6. Professional Boxing Corporation Act of 1993, H.R. 2607, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
7. Federal Technology Commercialization and Credit Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 80,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
8. See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 2, at 149; GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, MANAGEMENT REFORM: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW'S
RECOMMENDATIONS 288-89 (1994) [hereinafter NPR II] (noting that the administration is draft-
ing legislation to respond to congressional objections); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR TRAF-
FIC CONTROL: OBSERVATIONS ON PROPOSED CORPORATION (1994) (criticizing proposal); Air Con-
trol System Needs Reform, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 5, 1994, at A14 (reporting that
corporation will be named U.S. Air Traffic Services Corp. and "be free of red tape"); Greg
Gordon, Air Safety System Still on the Ground; New Proposals May Fuel FAA Overhaul That
Never Took Off, STAR TRIB., Jan. 24, 1995, at 4A (suggesting that proposal's popularity is in-
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Although federal corporations have been a part of the national
life for 200 years,9 they remain obscure-a status they no doubt find
convenient. Today more federal corporations exist than ever before in
peacetime, and the number keeps growing. While toiling in obscurity,
they manage communication satellites, museums, railroads, and power
generation. They provide specialized credit and insurance for housing
and agriculture. They exist as accounting devices to hide the true size
of the budget deficit, as nonprofit organizations, and as highly profit-
able and highly leveraged economic colossi. The most profitable cor-
porations, which provided a total of about $5 trillion in credit and
insurance in 1995, also have approximately $1.5 trillion in securities
and other debt outstanding. These organizations are capable of squir-
reling away $2 billion for a rainy day, while pleading poverty to
Congress. 0
This article seeks to shed some light on these organizations and
asks some hard questions about whether these bodies are properly ac-
countable for the vast sums they borrow, lend, and spend, and for the
public power and benefits they enjoy. More is at stake than just
money. Left to run loose, government corporations threaten to in-
fringe basic principles of democratic accountability.
Some federal government corporations are wholly owned by the
government and are clearly state actors, resembling ordinary agencies
in many ways." Others, however, are owned wholly or partly by pri-
vate persons."2 These mixed-ownership and private corporations enjoy
creasing); Richard M. Weintraub & John Burgess, U.S. to Shake Up Air Traffic Bureaucracy,
WASH. POST, May 2, 1994, at Al (describing proposal). But see BNA Management Briefing,
Mineta Says House Transportation Panel to Reject Air Traffic Control Corporation (Mar. 10,
1995) (describing opposition from Congress); Clyde Linsley, Holding Pattern, Gov'T EXECUTIVE,
January 1994, at 32 (describing administration's second thoughts after opposition from users of
general aviation).
9. The first national government corporation predates the Constitution. The Continental
Congress chartered the Bank of North America in 1781, and the Superintendent of Finance pur-
chased about 60% of the stock. See LAWRENCE LEWIS, JR., A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NORTH
AMERICA (1882). The United States established its first federal government corporation, the Bank
of the United States, in 1791, but made relatively infrequent use of the device until the 20th
century.
10. See UNITED STATES GOV'T, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1996: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 121 (1995) (totalling loans, loan guarantees, and insur-
ance); Stephen Labaton, Bailout Agency Squirrels Away Over $2 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
1992, § 1, at I (describing how Resolution Trust Corporation hid $2 billion fund from Congress in
order to be able to plead for extra appropriations). "I hate to say it, but $2 billion is not a lot of
mqney," a spokesman said. Id.
11. The Supreme Court recently removed whatever doubt there may have been on this point
by holding that Amtrak, a wholly owned and federally controlled government corporation, is sub-
ject to the same First Amendment restrictions as any other federal actor. See Lebron v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
12. Public as used in this article means traditionally and frequently entrusted to govern-
ment in the United States. Although courts sometimes suggest that certain functions are inher-
ently governmental or inherently private, the use of the terms public and private in this article is
intended only to denote their traditional usages, or the result of an exercise in classification, and
not to assert any inherent status. See generally David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Govern-
No. 3]
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a combination of federal and private powers and obligations, and
therefore may not be state actors in a constitutional sense. Thus, they
may be less accountable for their actions even though they are crea-
tures of a national policy.
By allowing private ownership and private control of publicly
funded and ostensibly publicly directed activities, the structure of
some federal government corporations weakens accountability. The
powers granted to privately controlled federal government corpora-
tions are usually economic, but a few federal government corporations
have more public functions. The uncertain legal status of some federal
government corporations also raises separation of powers and nondele-gation concerns because it weakens presidential, as well as congres-
sional, control over the federal administrative machinery and over im-
portant sectors of the national economy. Placing public funds, public
monopolies, or public power, in the hands of unelected, unappointed,
almost certainly unimpeachable, and largely unaccountable private
parties poses a serious and largely unexplored challenge to account-
able, efficient, democratic national government.
The Vice President's report suggests that a government corpora-
tion can harness the efficiency of the private sector for the service of
the public. Neither a privatized existing program, nor an ordinary
government department, the corporation is supposed to combine the
flexibility of a business with the public purpose and public duties of
government. Reality is not always that simple. Federal government
corporations enjoy public advantages unavailable to state-chartered
firms, including national establishment, exemption from state taxes
and from portions of the securities laws, privileged access to capital,
and even sovereign immunity. These advantages effectively free some
federal corporations from market discipline. In addition, uncertainty
as to whether to characterize federal government corporations as pri-
vate bodies or coordinate departments hampers federal regulation and
bureaucratic control. Similarly, otherwise simple civil cases become
complicated, as courts struggle to determine whether an entity is a
private party, a state actor, or part of the state itself.13
This article concentrates on federal government corporations in
which the federal government owns shares or appoints directors. 4 It
mental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 647 n.l (1986) (collecting cases and regulations attempting to
define "traditional governmental functions").
13. See, e.g., American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1992) (holding, by
only five to four, that federal charter conferred original "arising under" jurisdiction on the federal
courts over all matters relating to that corporation).
14. Thus, this article does not discuss national banks, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 35, 40, 41, 215c,
377, 501a, 1440, 1467a, 1817, 2254, 3102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which have federal charters
but no government ownership or directors. In addition to the entities discussed in this article, there
are also a large number of patriotic and charitable nonprofit organizations, such as the Red Cross,
see 36 U.S.C. §§ 1-9, 13 (1988) (National Red Cross charter), and Veterans of Foreign Wars, see
[Vol. 1995
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begins with a brief description of the creation and powers of federal
government corporations. The article then explains how some federal
government corporations operate under a legal regime that enables
them to escape accountability to Congress, the President, and the pri-
vate market. As a result, their private investors, shareholders, and
managers may benefit more than the public they are intended to
serve. The article concludes with a critical analysis of previous regula-
tory reform proposals and offers alternative proposals designed to in-
crease accountability to government discipline and market discipline,
ensure that private parties do not profit at public expense, and none-
theless limit taxpayers' contingent liability if a federal corporation be-
comes insolvent.
I. CREATION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
Today, more than forty 15 FGCs are directly chartered by Con-
36 U.S.C. §§ 111-20 (1988) (Veterans of Foreign Wars charter), that have federal charters but
receive no government funds, exercise no federal powers, and are entirely responsible for manag-
ing their own affairs, See 36 U.S.C. §§ 1-4815 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (containing charters of 80
federal private nonprofit organizations, including National Academy of Sciences and Veterans of
Foreign Wars of the United States); see also Pearl v. United States, 230 F.2d 243 (10th Cir.
1956) (holding Civil Air Patrol, charter codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1988), is not a federal
agency and its pilots are not federal employees). Otherwise private societies that participate as the
U.S. representative in international organizations, such as the U.S. arm of the Red Cross and the
U.S. Olympic Committee, are borderline cases not considered in detail in this article. See, e.g.,
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543-45
(1987) (holding that neither the U.S. Olympic Committee's federal charter nor the fact that it
represented U.S. in international athletic competitions made it a state actor). But see id. at 548-
49 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reaching opposite result). Further, the federal government owns,
controls, or has caused to be established a small number of corporations not chartered directly by
Congress, including the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 47 U.S.C. §§ 396-99b (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), and the American Institute in Taiwan, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-10 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). The American Institute in Taiwan substitutes for a U.S. Embassy since the United States
no longer recognizes the government of the Republic of China.
This article also does not discuss the 40-plus federally funded research and development cen-
ters (FFRDCs), such as Rand Corporation and the Jet Propulsion Laboratories, although they are
worthy of scrutiny. Together these entities have annual obligations of over $6 billion, and "experi-
ence . . . illustrates that institutions initially created to fulfill valid needs may be utilized for
questionable purposes." Harold Seidman, Government Corporations in the United States, 22 OP-
TIMUM 40, 43 (1991); cf. 48 C.F.R. § 35.017 (1994) (setting out policy and basic rules for
FFRDCs).
15. The Government Corporation Control Act (GCCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-10 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) includes a list of wholly owned and mixed-ownership government corporations, but
this list is not exhaustive. Some government corporations not subject to the GCCA have federal
charters, which are found in various parts of the U.S. Code. Others are incorporated in the Dis-
trict of Columbia or in a state, and thus their existence is not always reflected in the GCCA. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 00TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROFILES OF EXISTING GOVERNMENT CORPO-
RATIONS 232 (Comm. Print 1989) [hereinafter GAO PROFILES] contains a relatively inclusive list
of 45 corporations including entities such as the U.S. Postal Service, which is officially "an inde-
pendent establishment in the executive branch of the Government," 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1988), may
sue and be sued in its own name, but does not have a corporate charter. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-
5605 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The GAO list does not include some corporations owned or con-
trolled by the federal government that lack federal statutory charters.
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gress, 16 including such diverse bodies as the Federal National Mort-
gage Association (Fannie Mae), 1 7 the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC),18 the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA),19 the National En-
dowment for Democracy,20 the Commodity Credit Corporation,2" the
Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), 22 and the Commu-
nications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT). 23 The recently created
Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCORP),2 ' charged with bor-
rowing funds for the use of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
which is recapitalizing insolvent savings and loans, is only the latest in
a line of FGCs created to channel funds to a specific sector of the
economy. Indeed, from 1965 to 1988, the outstanding credit assis-
tance and insurance provided by FGCs grew by over 1000%, to about
$5 trillion.25 The General Accounting Office (GAO) has warned that
much of the hundreds of billions in direct loans by FGCs is at risk,
although the Treasury takes a more nuanced view.26
16. Congress is used frequently in this article as a convenient shorthand for the various
actors who make up the legislative process. Obviously, there is not a simple entity called Congress
that can "think" something; in any case, Congress is not the only institution that decides national
policy nor, arguably, even the most important one. Legislation originates in many places: the
White House, the agencies, organized constituencies, and even Congress itself. See generally WIL-
LIAM ESKRIDGE & PHILLIP FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY (1988).
17. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716b-23i (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-96k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-3ldd (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
20. National Endowment for Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 4411-15 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (incorporating National Endowment for Democracy in 1983).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2(a)-(g) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
23. 47 U.S.C. §§ 731-44 (1988).
24. REFCORP was created by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1441b (Supp. V 1993)). For a description of REFCORP's powers and duties see
Marirose K. Lescher & Merwin A. Mace III, Financing the Bailout of the Thrift Crisis: Work-
ings of the Financing Corporation and the Resolution Funding Corporation, 46 Bus. LAW. 507,
521-28 (1991).
25. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL CREDIT AND INSURANCE 16, 22-23 (1989)
[hereinafter GAO CREDIT STUDY].
26. GAO CREDIT STUDY, supra note 25, at 25-27. Compare THOMAS H. STANTON, A
STATE OF RISK (1991) (arguing that certain major government corporations could soon create
federal losses on the order of the savings and loan (S&L) crisis) with SECRETARY OF THE TREA-
SURY, REPORT ON GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 6 (1991) [hereinafter TREASURY GSE
STUDY] (stating "there is no imminent financial threat" from the activities of five large FGCs
surveyed) and UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FY 1990 BUDGET at 11-227 [hereinafter 1990 U.S.
BUDGET] (concluding direct risk to taxpayers is not large). See also UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES FY 1995 134
[hereinafter 1995 BUDGET ANALYSIS] (estimating present value of losses from five largest GSE's
at between zero and $1 billion, with variation depending on performance of Farm Credit System).
Recently, the Office of Federal Housing and Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), part of HUD,
announced that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. and the Federal National Mortgage
Association were well capitalized. BNA's Banking Report, Freddie, Fannie Receive High Marks
from Safety and Soundness Regulator (Feb. 4, 1994).
Meanwhile, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget has conducted individualized risk
assessments for all federal agencies, including wholly owned FGCs, which it considers "high risk,"
rating them on a scale of 1 to 3. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (with $100 million at
[Vol. 1995
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A. Federal Power to Create Corporations
The federal government's authority to charter corporations de-
rives from the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution,2" as
expounded in Chief Justice Marshall's decisions in McCulloch v.
Maryland8 and Osborn v. Bank of the United States." McCulloch
established that, despite the lack of an applicable enumerated federal
power, the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution allows
the federal government to charter and use a private entity for the
public purpose of banking. The Second Bank of the United States, the
subject of both cases, was a federally chartered corporation with 80%
of its stock owned by private persons and 20% by the United States.
The Bank had twenty-five directors, five of whom were appointed by
the President from among the stockholders, subject to Senate confir-
mation. The remaining twenty directors were elected by the other
shareholders.30 The Second Bank, like its precursor, had extensive
power over the money supply and, consequently, over the monetary
risk) was rated "1," meaning that the FGC has a "corrective action plan [in place and showing
results which] . . . will either eliminate the risk or reduce the risk to an acceptable level." Rated
"2," meaning the FGC has a plan but it is too new to be evaluated, or to show results yet, were
the Farm Credit Administration (including the Farm Credit Insurance Corporation), criticized for
lack of control over improper expenditures and an internal control system that "cannot be sal-
vaged," and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, criticized for "serious weaknesses ... in
all major financial systems and subsystems" putting premium collection at risk. No FGC was
Rated "3," a category meaning "OMB has reservations" about the department's actions. In addi-
tion OMB noted that Ginnie Mae's oversight of its contractors was inadequate, but did not at-
tempt to quantify the risk. 1995 BUDGET ANALYSIS, supra, at 275-98.
There are grounds for some concern about the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC). According to one GAO report, although the PBGC faces no appreciable short-term risk
of insolvency, its long-term prospects are more uncertain. In particular, the PBGC faces $12 bil-
lion to $20 billion in unfunded liabilities in single-employer plans which may result in future
losses. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL AUDIT: PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPO-
RATION'S 1992 AND 1991 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 7 (1993).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
28. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409-12 (1819) (upholding constitu-
tionality of Second Bank of the United States).
29. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 859-60 (1824). Congress
also based its authority on the Coinage Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. See HOUSE WAYS &
MEANS COMM., REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, REGISTER OF DEBATES, app. at 104
(1830), reprinted in 1 PAUL SAMUELSON & HERMAN E. KROOSS, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 660 (1969). See generally RALPH C.H. CAT-
TERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES (1903); BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLIT-
ICS IN AMERICA (1957). More modern cases revisiting this issue include Federal Land Bank v.
Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1941) (holding Necessary and Proper Clause allows
Congress to immunize corporation from state taxation) and Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan
Corp., 308 U.S. 21, 33 (1939) (same).
30. Act of Apr. 10, 1816, 3 Stat. 266, 269 (chartering the Second Bank of the United
States), reprinted in 1 SAMUELSON & KROOSS, supra note 29, at 460, 466. The President was
forbidden to nominate any person who was already the director of another bank. Id. The proce-
dure for weighing votes was complex and progressive among those wealthy enough to find the
$100 per share offering price. Each individual's first share got one vote, the next eight got a half
vote, the next twenty got a quarter vote, the next thirty got a sixth, and so on. Every share above
100 got a tenth of a vote, but no person could cast more than thirty votes regardless of the number
of shares they hold. Id. § 11, 1.
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policy of the United States.31 Although the President could remove
any of the five directors he appointed, he had no such power over the
privately elected directors who constituted a comfortable majority.
The Bank, therefore, ensured that monetary policy remained in the
control of the wealthy citizens and private banks, who could afford to
purchase shares. 82 Neither McCulloch nor Osborn stated that Con-
gress has a general power to create corporations for any purpose. In-
stead, those cases held that Congress's power to create a Bank derives
from, and exists in order to effectuate, its power to manage the fiscal
affairs of the United States.33
Today, as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, FGCs are
separate legal persons chartered directly by an act of Congress or by
persons acting pursuant to congressional authorization. The statute
creating the corporation may provide a federal charter or may specify
incorporation under the laws of the District of Columbia.. 4 Every
FGC, however created and governed, enjoys a separate legal personal-
ity, 5 and, unless there is legislation to the contrary, its investors, in-
31. The Second Bank was structurally similar to its predecessor, the first Bank of the
United States, established in 1791. See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, 1 Stat. 191. However, the first
Bank's directors were elected by all the stockholders,,and the President had no special power of
appointment.
32. See Act of Apr. 10, 1816, 3 Stat. 266 (chartering the Second Bank of the United
States), reprinted in 1 SAMUELSON & KROOSS, supra note 29, at 460, 466.
33. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). "Let the end be legiti-
mate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." Similarly,
the bank is not considered as a private corporation, whose principal object is individual trade
and individual profit; but as a public corporation, created for public and national purposes.
That the mere business of banking is, in its own nature, a private business, and may be
carried on by individuals or companies having no political connection with the government, is
admitted; but the bank is not such an individual or company. It was not created for its own
sake, or for private purposes. It has never been supposed that congress could create such a
corporation.
Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 859-60.
The Supreme Court later relied on a similar reasoning, if weaker facts, when upholding the
creation of the Federal Land Banks system in which the federal government held stock. Following
McCulloch and Osborn, the Supreme Court stressed the Land Banks' function as "depositaries of
public moneys and purchasers of Government bonds" to bring them within Congress's Necessary
and Proper Clause power. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 211 (1921).
Neither of these objects were among the chief purposes of the act, and the banks had not actually
been used as public depositaries. JOHN THURSTON, GOVERNMENT PROPRIETARY CORPORATIONS IN
THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES 27 (1937).
34. Although a federal statute of incorporation preempts the D.C. corporate law, incorpora-
tion in Washington, D.C. can give a corporation powers that may extend beyond what a well-
informed Congress would desire, e.g., powers to make loans to employees and others, and dis-
tribute assets upon dissolution. See RONALD C. MOE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., ADMINIS-
TERING PUBLIC FUNCTIONS AT THE MARGIN OF GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF FEDERAL CORPORA-
TIONS 35-36 (1983).
35. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824)
(Second Bank of the United States); see also United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v.
McCarl, 275 U.S. 1, 11 (1927) (United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.); Olson v.
United States Spruce Prod. Corp., 267 U.S. 462, 462-63 (1925) (describing the FGC as "a dis-
tinct corporate entity [that] may be sued as any private corporation"); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v.
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cluding the United States, presumably enjoy limited liability. 6 There-
fore, the United States is not legally responsible for the debts of even
a wholly owned FGC unless there is a constitutional, statutory, or fed-
eral common-law rule to the contrary.
B. Types of Federal Government Corporations
Congress ordinarily charters a federal corporation by legislation
rather than delegating the power to an executive branch official. If the
legislation specifies incorporators, they are usually government offi-
cials. The legislation incorporating an FGC ordinarily sets out its pur-
poses, powers, structure, and obligations.87
Although the exact mix of powers granted to FGCs varies, al-
most every FGC has permanent succession and the following capaci-
ties: to sue and be sued 8 (and to settle cases without Justice Depart-
ment authorization"9 ), to make contracts, to hold property, and to
borrow.4 ° Almost all FGCs are governed by a board of directors
elected by the shareholders or appointed by the President, sometimes
subject to Senate confirmation."1 In keeping with the long-held theory
that FGCs should be run on "business-like" principles, many FGCs
are exempted from civil service rules regarding pay,4 2 employee ten-
United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922) (Fleet Corp.); United
States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491, 493 (1921) (same); Panama R.R. v. Bosse, 249 U.S. 41 (1919).
Separate legal personality does not, however, necessarily imply that the corporation may be
subject to a Bivens action. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996 (1994) (hold-
ing that Bivens action cannot be brought against FDIC).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 56, 60, 276-85 (discussing implicit guarantee).
37. E.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-1723i (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing Fannie Mae).
38. See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1000-04 (reading FSLIC sue-and-be-sued clause as "broad"
waiver of sovereign immunity); United States v. Nordiz Village, 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (same);
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 85 (1941) (deciding on equitable
grounds to read sue-and-be-sued clause in corporate charter as broad waiver of sovereign immu-
nity); Federal Housing Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940) (stating that effect of sue-and-
be-sued clause is to make agency "not less amenable to judicial process than a private enterprise
under like circumstances would be"). In addition, the power of a government corporation to sue
and be sued has been implied in the absence of a specific legislative enactment. Keifer & Keifer v.
Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 389-93 (1939). However, many wholly owned govern-
ment corporations rely on the Justice Department to conduct their litigation. See GAO PROFILES,
supra note 16.
39. Ordinarily, only the Attorney General may represent the United States in court unless a
statute provides otherwise. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 5 U.S.C. § 3106
(1988).
40. The power to borrow is usually subject to the limits in the GCCA. See supra note 15.
41. Some FGCs that are wholly owned by the federal government have a board of directors
composed of federal officials who serve ex officio. For example, the Neighborhood Reinvestment
Corporation, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8101-07 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), has six directors, all ex officio. Ex
officio FGC directors sometimes delegate the task of sitting on the board to their subordinates. See
6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 257, Delegation of Cabinet Members' Functions as Ex Officio Members
of the Board of Directors of the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank (1982).
42. David E. Lilienthal & Robert H. Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the
Federal Government, 54 HARv. L. REv. 545, 566, 576 (1941) (Lilienthal was then director and
vice-chairman of the TVA).
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ure, 43 and other rules such as the Freedom of Information Act.
Indeed, some FGCs are exempted from the Government Contract
Control Act which is supposed to regulate how federal corporations
are created and supervised." From a bureaucratic point of view, most
government corporations enjoy budgetary freedoms denied to ordinary
federal agencies." Unless limited by specific provisions in its statute,
an FGC is not subject to the "use it or lose it" rule that requires most
agencies to return unexpended funds to the Treasury at the end of a
fiscal year.4 6 Similarly, FGCs, unlike agencies, can enter into multi-
year commitments, conduct long-term planning,4 7 and buy or sell as-
sets without complying with federal procurement and disposal regula-
tions. Some FGCs may ignore government personnel ceilings, and, in
general, escape federal budget restraints while retaining some of the
advantages of this government link.'8
Many, but by no means all, FGCs issue stock, some or all of
which is owned by legal or natural private (nongovernmental) persons.
Congress usually defines an FGC as "wholly owned," "mixed-owner-
ship," or "private," although Congress has chartered a number of cor-
porations without specifying their status.'9
In wholly owned federal corporations, such as the Commodity
Credit Corporation, the federal government holds 100% of the equity
and exercises 100% of the votes on the board of directors or other
governing body.50 Several statutes creating wholly owned government
43. Id. at 549-50 (corporate form attractive due to autonomous character). Employees of
wholly owned FGCs ordinarily do not have the right to strike. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUB. AD-
MIN., CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTABLISHING THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE AS A GOVERN-
MENT CORPORATION 16 (1989). For a discussion of the complex issue of labor relations in govern-
ment corporations, see Eric J. Pelton, Privatization of the Public Sector: A Look at Which Labor
Laws Should Apply to Private Firms Contracted to Perform Public Services, 3 DET. C.L. REV.
805 (1986).
44. 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-10 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
45. 1 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., REPORT ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 24-
25 (1981) [hereinafter NAPA].
46. Lilienthal & Marquis, supra note 42, at 564.
47. Id. at 562.
48. For a chart summarizing the FGC's own views of which rules apply to them, see GAO
PROFILES, supra note 15, at 236-51. A comparison of the FGC's views summarized in this chart
with the statutes themselves reveals some puzzling anomalies. For example, the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), applies to fed-
eral agencies, see id. § 472(a), subject to the exceptions in id. § 474. Nevertheless, the GAO
survey demonstrates that of the 45 federal corporations responding, 30 do not consider themselves
subject to the act, and an additional 5 adopted the act's requirements administratively, thus finess-
ing the issue of whether it applied directly.
49. The GAO identifies 16 FGCs as not classified by Congress. See GAO PROFILES, supra
note 15, at 15.
50. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(A) (1988) (identifying Commodity Credit Corp. as a
wholly owned government corporation); see also 15 U.S.C. § 714e (1988) (stock subscription by
federal government); id. § 714g (composition of board of directors); JOHN MCDIARMID, GOVERN-
MENT CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL FUNDS 39 (1938).
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corporations identify the body as an "agency,"'" and most wholly
owned FGCs are subject to large portions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.52
In mixed-ownership federal corporations,"a such as the RTC and
REFCORP,"4 the United States may own some or none of the equity.
A mixed-ownership FGC's charter often guarantees that the President
will appoint at least a minority of the directors even if the federal
government does not own shares. The market ordinarily assumes that
securities and other debt instruments issued by mixed-ownership
FGCs carry an implicit guarantee from the Treasury, and prices them
accordingly.
In private federal corporations, such as COMSAT, the federal
government holds no stock but may have a statutory right to select
members of the board of directors. 55 A private federal corporation is,
formally, little different from a corporation chartered by a state al-
though it may have publicly appointed directors and tax advantages,
and its debts may carry an implicit guarantee from the federal
government.
Approximately one-fifth of the FGCs in existence 5 benefit from
specialized lending powers coupled with an explicit or implicit federal
guarantee which allows them to provide subsidized credit to, or for
the use of, a target group. These FGCs, collectively known as Govern-
51. E.g., the Rural Telephone Bank, 7 U.S.C. §§ 941-50b (1988); the Export-Import Bank
of the United States, 12 U.S.C. § 635(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("There is created a corpora-
tion with the name Export-Import Bank of the United States, which shall be an agency of the
United States of America."); the Inter-American Foundation, 22 U.S.C. § 290f(a) (1988)
("There is created as an agency of the United States of America a body corporate to be known as
Inter-American Foundation.").
Some FGCs are not defined as an "agency" but have a board of directors made up entirely of
government officials (often serving ex officio). For example, the Federal Financing Bank is defined
as "a body corporate" and as "an instrumentality of the United States Government." 12 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1988). Its five directors consist of the Secretary of the Treasury and four presidential
appointees "from among the officers or employees of the Bank or of any Federal agency." Id.
§ 2284(a); see also id. § 24 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (corporate powers of federally chartered
financial institutions); id. § 2281ff (1988) (Federal Financing Bank declaration of purpose). Other
wholly owned FGCs issue no stock and are run by officials appointed by the President or a Cabi-
net member. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 831a (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing that three directors of
the TVA shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate).
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988) (defining agency for APA as "each authority of the Govern-
ment of United States"); id. §§ 103(1), 105 ("Executive agency" includes a corporation "owned
or controlled by the Government of the United States"); id. § 552(0 (applying public records
provision to "government controlled corporations," id. § 103(2), as well as "government corpora-
tions," id. § 103(1)).
53. 31 U.S.C. § 9101(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (listing "mixed-ownership" FGCs).
54. Id. § 9101(2)(L)-(M) (identifying RTC and REFCORP as "mixed-ownership" FGCs).
55. Although all shares in COMSAT are now privately held, the President retains the right
to appoint 3 of the 15 directors. See 47 U.S.C. § 733 (1988).
56. These are (1) the Central Bank for Cooperatives, (2) Farm Credit System Banks (com-
prised of the Farm Credit Banks and the Banks for Cooperatives), (3) the Federal Home Loan
Banks (FHLBanks), (4) Fannie Mae, (5) Freddie Mac, (6) Sallie Mae, (7) Connie Lee, (8)
Farmer Mac, (9) FICO, (10) FAC, and (11) REFCORP. See GAO CREDIT STUDY, supra note
25, at 39.
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ment Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), 57 are limited by Congress to
lending to a particular constituency (farmers, students, homeowners),
or for a particular purpose (such as recapitalizing insolvent savings
and loans). Because some of these constituencies are very large, the
GSEs designed to serve them play a dominant role in certain primary
and secondary credit markets. Together, the eleven GSEs have about
$1 trillion in obligations outstanding, with two-thirds of it concen-
trated in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.5 8 In 1989 alone,
the GSEs collectively raised about $114.5 billion in the credit mar-
kets-about 12% of all funds raised in the credit markets that year.,9
In the same year, the GSEs collectively disbursed about $531 bil-
lion-about 40% of the amount disbursed by all on-budget federal
agencies. 60 Five GSEs are dedicated to some aspect of home lending:
the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), 61 Fannie Mae,62 the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)," s the Fi-
nancial Assistance Corporation (FICO), 6" and the Resolution Funding
57. The term government sponsored enterprise is itself malleable. For example, in a 1990
report the GAO identified the 11 GSEs listed in note 56, supra. By contrast, in an excellent
publication, the Congressional Budget Office chose a narrow definition: "a GSE is a privately
owned, federally chartered financial institution that has nationwide operations and specialized
lending powers and that benefits from an implicit federal guarantee that enhances its ability to
borrow" and found that only five entities (the Farm Credit System, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
the Federal Home Loan Banks, and Sallie Mae) met this definition. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, CONTROLLING THE RISKS OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 2 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter CBO STUDY].
The definition used in this article, that a GSE is an FGC that has specialized lending powers
coupled with an implicit (or, in some cases, explicit) federal guarantee, is most consistent with the
definition used in THOMAS H. STANTON, ASSOCIATION OF RESERVE CITY BANKERS, GOVERNMENT
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: THEIR BENEFITS AND COSTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF FEDERAL POLICY 14-
17 (1988). It is slightly broader than that used in 2 U.S.C. § 622(8) (1988 & Supp. V 1993),
which defines GSE for purposes of budget process as a corporate entity created by federal law,
with private stockholders, at least a majority of private directors, employees whose salaries it pays
and who are not federal employees, and which is a financial institution with power to make or
guarantee loans for limited purposes, raise funds by borrowing without full faith and credit, but
which exercises no sovereign powers.
58. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, JOINT REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES MARKET 1-6 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 JOINT REPORT] (stating six GSEs had $1 tril-
lion in obligations outstanding as of December, 1990, of which $616 million was in mortgage-
backed securities); STANTON, supra note 26, at 34, Figure 2-1 (1991 estimate). Most of these
obligations are held by banks, savings and loans or credit unions. CBO STUDY, supra note 57,
at 7.
59. See TREASURY GSE STUDY, supra note 26, at 4, tbl. 3.
60. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE STAFF STUDY, BUDGET ISSUES: PROFILES OF GOV-
ERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 8 (1991) [hereinafter GAO STAFF STUDY].
61. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
62. The Federal National Mortgage Association, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-23h (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
63. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-59 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Freddie Mac now advertises itself as
"Steady FreddiesM-The Idea Behind One In Eight American Homes." See, e.g., Advertisement,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992, at 36.
64. See infra note 367. For a concise description of FICO's powers and duties, see Lescher
& Mace, supra note 24, at 510-20.
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Corporation (REFCORP).65 Four GSEs are agricultural lenders: the
Farm Credit Banks,6" the Central and Regional Banks for Coopera-
tives,67 the Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation
(FAC), 68  and the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation
(Farmer Mac). 9 Two GSEs are primarily involved in higher educa-
tion lending: the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), 7 0
and the College Construction Loan Insurance Corporation (Connie
Lee). 71  Congress ordinarily identifies GSEs as mixed-ownership
FGCs, but the degree of private ownership varies from 0 to 100%.
C. Federal Government Corporations as a Policy Choice
Since 1945 Congress has usually created FGCs for one of four
reasons: efficiency, political insulation, subsidy, and subterfuge. 2
1. Efficiency
The classic reason given for creating an FGC instead of an
agency, one echoed in the Vice President's proposals, is that an FGC
will be more efficient at achieving a specific national goal, especially if
the program envisioned involves market transactions. The national
goal is ordinarily stated in the FGC's charter. Thus, the Farm Credit
System, for example, exists to improve "the income and well-being of
American farmers and ranchers by furnishing sound, adequate and
constructive credit and closely related services."173 One of Sallie Mae's
65. See infra text following note 369.
66. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2279aa-14 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
67. Id. §§ 2121-34, 2151-60.
68. See infra note 368.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 2279aa-1 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). Unlike other GSEs Farmer Mac is not
authorized to purchase mortgages or otherwise make direct loans. STANTON, supra note 57, at 3.
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
71. Connie Lee deserves an article of its own. Created in 1986, Connie Lee is a mixed-
ownership, for-profit joint venture of the Department of Education and Sallie Mae, which owns
75% of Connie Lee's stock. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 15, 246. Connie Lee cannot borrow
from the Treasury, and the CBO has concluded that it is not perceived to have an implicit guaran-
tee of its obligations. Id. at 2, 15-16. It has not been uncontroversial. See, e.g., Aaron L. Task,
Connie Lee Defends Expansion, Feels Abandoned by Industry, THE BOND BUYER, Nov. 30, 1993,
at I (describing political fight with bond insurance agency).
As this article went to press, House Republicans introduced legislation proposing to fully
privatize Connie Lee. The proposals also would remove existing restraints on its ability to diversify
its business. The government would be required to sell its common stock, currently 14% of the
outstanding shares, within one year of the proposal's enactment. See House Economic and Educa-
tional Opportunities Committee Summary of Careers Act, Daily Labor Report, May 12. 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
72. There have been other motives for the creation of FGCs. The government created large
numbers of FGCs to cope with national emergencies such as the Depression and both World
Wars. Another motive for an FGC may be to regulate a so-called natural monopoly. The govern-
ment may decide to become the rentier, or to produce at other than the profit-maximum, rather
than regulating a private monopolist. See Lilienthal & Marquis, supra note 42, at 553.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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public purposes is to assure nationwide liquidity and insurance for stu-
dent loans. 4 In the abstract, FGCs seem to promise an alternative
that everyone, from fiscal conservatives to democratic socialists, might
find attractive.75 FGCs conjure up an image of business efficiency as
opposed to the traditional bureaucratic cabinet department. Propo-
nents of small government may welcome the introduction of an ele-
ment of private control into most realms of public administration as a
means of preparing for the privatization of federal functions. Demo-
cratic socialists may view wholly or even partly owned government
corporations as a means of capturing the rents and profits from public
activities or natural monopolies for the benefit of the public fisc.
2. Political Insulation
Like independent agencies, FGCs allow Congress to insulate a
program from the cabinet department that would normally have juris-
diction over it. Congress may feel that a small single-mission agency
will be more zealous in furthering a given goal than a department in a
multimission agency.76 Because FGCs may have more independence
from Congress, the executive, and the public than comparable public
or private institutions, an FGC may be the vehicle of choice for coali-
tions seeking to insure a political victory against the vicissitudes of
electoral politics.7
3. Subsidy
An FGC may be designed to create a captive agency for a con-
stituency.7 8 How better to capture an agency than to own it? The
eight privately owned GSEs are a particularly effective means of de-
livering subsidies through the credit markets.79 They borrow at lower
74. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
75. It also seems to appeal to neo-liberals. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1992); NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 2.
76. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: THE
GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO RISKS 127 (1990) [hereinafter GAO GSE STUDY] (letter from two
executives of Farm Credit System, noting that "Congress wanted a single-purpose entity devoted
to making credit available to farmers" because this is perceived as a risky activity); see also
Letter of James C. Cruse, Vice President for Policy Analysis, Export-Import Bank of the United
States, to Erasmus H. Kloman, National Institute for Policy Administration (Aug. 7, 1981), re-
printed in NAPA, supra note 45, at app. 3 at 1.
77. Cf. Edward Mortimer, NGOs Rule OK, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, at 20 (criticizing
use of similar organizations, called "quangos" [QUAsi-Non-Governmental Organizations], in the
United Kingdom).
78. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335 (1974);
NAPA, supra note 45, at 31.
79. The three publicly owned GSEs-FICO, REFCORP, and FAC-are really little more




rates than private corporations, even though little GSE debt carries a
formal federal guarantee.80 GSEs that are not backed by the full faith
and credit of the United States are nonetheless widely believed to
have an implicit guarantee, if only because some of them are too big
to be allowed to fail.
4. Subterfuge
FGCs classified as either mixed-ownership or private tend to be
given "off budget" status.81 Once excluded from the national ac-
counts, their borrowing is not counted as part of the official measure
of the federal deficit. When Congress operates under spending caps or
deficit reduction targets, pursuant to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
budget reduction process for example, off-budget items are usually ex-
cluded from the official total "spent" by the government.8 2 As a re-
sult, a few GSEs were created as little more than accounting devices
designed to allow the federal government to borrow funds without ap-
pearing to increase the deficit.83
80. FAC's debt is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. FAC had more
than $1 billion in obligations outstanding in 1994. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FY 1996
BUDGET, App. 973 [hereinafter 1996 BUDGET APPENDIX]. The United States has also guaranteed
the payment of the interest on certain REFCORP obligations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441b (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
81. Off budget spending and debt are not part of the official federal total and do not count
towards the federal spending and debt limits which, if exceeded, trigger the deficit-reduction pro-
cess. STANLEY E. COLLENDER, THE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET: FISCAL 1996, at 12-13 (15th
ed. 1995). Off budget FGCs include FICO, REFCORP, the Federal Financing Bank, the Rural
Telephone Bank, USRA, and the LSC. Debts incurred by these and other federal corporations
usually are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, providing a rationale for
their exclusion from the official national debt. On the other hand, the economic activities of at
least government-controlled FGCs are governmental in the sense that an economist would ordin-
arily use the term. The decision to call debt or expenditure off budget "is almost always political
and can be changed depending on the year and the situation." Id. at 13.
82. See, e.g., Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-119, tit. I, 101 Stat. 754, amended by Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. 1388-1573 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-09 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)). The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets are no longer in effect. See Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312; Budget Enforcement Act
of 1990, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-09 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see generally COLLENDER, supra note 81, at
19-50.
83. The Federal Financing Bank is a good example of the successful use of this technique.
Agencies borrowed money from the bank, then repaid their loans at book value rather than mar-
ket value. Because the Bank had borrowed at market value, this action left it holding a deficit of
$2 billion, which it may be unable to pay. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL AUDIT:
FEDERAL FINANCING BANK'S 1993 AND 1992 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2-3 (1994). The deficit
may be carried on the Treasury's books as an account receivable, id. at 3, but because the Bank is
off budget, see supra note 81, this sum is not considered part of the national debt-instead the
"1asset" reduces the national debt.
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II. THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP
Whether an FGC is characterized public or private affects its
legal relationship with the rest of the world: the President, Congress,
the public, and even its own directors. Its status as a public or private
body shapes the rights and remedies of any person who has a legal or
commercial relationship with the corporation, whether she is em-
ployed by it, transacts with it, competes with it, makes a contract with
it, is injured by it, or commits a fraud upon it. Either way, an FGC's
liberty to abuse its powers faces fewer practical or even theoretical
constraints than comparable institutions. Because FGCs are federal,
they are not subject to regulation by the states. Because they are gov-
ernmental, and often have special powers or access to cheaper capital,
they are largely immune from market forces. Because they are corpo-
rations, they are exempt from most constraints ordinarily applied to
federal agencies. Self-financing FGCs can even evade Congress's
power of the purse. A self-funding, self-perpetuating, profit-making
corporation enjoys a degree of potential, and perpetual, independence
undreamed of in most agencies. 84
Different accountability mechanisms appear appropriate depend-
ing on whether an FGC is treated as public, as private, or as a hybrid.
Ordinary state-chartered corporations exist to further privately se-
lected goals, often the quest for private profit. Their liberty to abuse
their powers is curbed by market forces and by public and private
laws enacted by both the state and federal governments. Ordinary
federal agencies are established to further publicly selected goals, de-
fined, in at least a general fashion, by Congress and the President.
The federal agencies' liberty to abuse their powers is curbed by politi-
cal forces, federal statutes, and the Constitution. In practice, neither
public nor private accountability mechanisms are necessarily effective
when applied to many FGCs.85 FGCs in which the President appoints
only a minority of the directors or that are financially self-sustaining
are structured in a way that attenuates their accountability to elected
officials.
Currently, there are few litmus tests to distinguish a public FGC
from a private one in order to determine which accountability system
84. An illustration of the independence available to a self-financing corporation can be
found in Lt. Col. Oliver North's plan to create a "stand-alone" entity that would channel funds
from foreign governments to the contras and elsewhere. The plan contemplated the creation of a
covert, self-financing, federally owned corporation, albeit with a state charter, in order to immu-
nize its activities from congressional interference or control. See H.R. REP. No. 100-433, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 327, 332 (1987).
85. Wholly owned FGCs that are in effect part of a cabinet department, such as the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC), which is under the direction of the Department of Labor, are as
accountable as any other unit in a department. See 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(I) (1988) (identifying
PBGC as a wholly owned government corporation); 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1988) (characterizing
PBGC as "a body corporate" within the Department of Labor).
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is appropriate. Nor are there any visible limits on the powers that
may be granted to private FGCs. The courts have had few occasions
to consider whether private or public FGCs undermine the separation
of powers or whether the Appointments Clause of the Constitution
applies to directors of an FGC. Similarly, because no laws set out the
duties of FGC directors appointed by the President, whether they
have the same duties as FGC directors elected by shareholders is un-
clear. In practice, because both market discipline and federal regula-
tory activity are limited, many FGCs remain free to operate as they
wish, regardless of how they are classified.
A. Limited Constitutional Constraints
McCulloch and Osborn remain the starting points for any mod-
ern inquiry into the constitutional status of FGCs, whether an FGC is
viewed as public, private, or both. These two cases, together with fed-
eral government practices before World War I, establish three clear
principles concerning FGCs. First, the federal government may char-
ter private corporations." Second, the presence of a minority of direc-
tors appointed by the President, or federal ownership of a minority of
shares, does not necessarily make an otherwise private corporation an
agency. Third, the federal government may give special advantages
and powers, such as state and federal tax exemptions or control of the
money supply, to a private federal corporation. No subsequent court
decision has seriously questioned any of these general principles. The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Lebron v. National Railroad Pas-
senger Corp.87 adds a fourth principle to the list: A corporation cre-
ated for public purposes over which the government retains permanent
control is a federal actor.8
Constitutional limits can apply to FGCs in either of two ways. If
an FGC is considered public, then it shares a number of features with
traditional agencies. A public FGC must be part of the executive
branch of government. Therefore, a public FGC has to comply with
rules imposed by the separation of powers that shape the executive
86. Writing almost 75 years after McCulloch, the Supreme Court described the creation of
a federal corporation chartered to build a bridge as resting "upon principles of constitutional law,
now established beyond dispute." Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529 (1894);
see also Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 208-09 (1920) (relying on Mc-
Culloch and Osborn to conclude that Congress enjoyed constitutional power to create Federal
Land Banks and Joint Stock Land Banks). Any doubt as to the federal government's authority to
charter public corporations was removed in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
338-39 (1936) (rejecting challenge to congressional chartering of TVA).
87. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
88. In Lebron the Court held: "We hold that where, as here, the Government creates a
corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself
permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is
part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment." Id. at 974-75.
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branch's relationship with the legislative branch. Similar rules also
may affect a public FGC's relationship with private stockholders.
Thus, although a public FGC presumably must observe due process,89
it is unlikely to face a shareholder derivative suit.
On the other hand, if an FGC is considered private, then the
Constitution does not apply to most of its activities, unless Congress
has exceeded its powers in creating the FGC. Otherwise, the Constitu-
tion applies as it would to any other private transaction.9" Thus, for
example, although the federal government must observe procedural
and substantive due process,9 the conduct of private persons is not
subject to such restraint, "no matter how unfair that conduct may
be." 92
1. State, State Actor, or Private Actor?
A congressional declaration that a body is an "agency" or a "pri-
vate" body may be entitled to great weight, but it cannot be the final
word on the subject. Even if Congress can make a heretofore private
activity public, it certainly cannot label a public agency private, thus
taking it and its employees outside due process and other constitu-
tional restraints. 93 In addition, a congressional declaration that a body
is of "mixed-ownership" indicates that even Congress is uncertain as
to its character and offers little guidance as to the entity's constitu-
tional status.
The Supreme Court has addressed the specific legal status of gov-
ernment corporations several times, starting with McCulloch and Os-
born. Five years after Osborn, the Supreme Court confronted the fol-
lowing argument: A suit against a bank owned solely by a state
government was, in fact, a suit against the state government itself
and, therefore, forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment. Holding that
the Eleventh Amendment did not apply, the Court ruled that the pres-
ident and directors of the corporation "alone constitute[d] the body
89. But see Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 358-60 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
that Fannie Mae is not required to observe Fifth Amendment due process). The validity of the
Roberts decision, which was dubious on general principles, is very doubtful in light of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Lebron. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
90. Almost all of the Constitution concerns governmental powers; only the 13th Amendment
directly regulates private behavior.
91. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (regarding due process require-
ments for termination of social security benefits).
92. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
93. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 971-72 (1995) (rejecting
Amtrak's argument that the congressional charter's disclaimer of federal status determined its
constitutional status and holding that Amtrak is a federal actor for the purpose of individual
rights guaranteed against the government by the Constitution).
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corporate, the metaphysical person liable to suit." ' 4 The presence of a
(state) government among the incorporators or shareholders of a bank
did not give the bank corporation immunity from suit and did not
pierce the veil and transform the suit into one against the
government. 5
Some guidance as to when an FGC is public can be gained from
the state/federal action doctrine." Under the state action doctrine,
the actions of a putatively private party can be ascribed to the state
when there is "a sufficiently close nexus between the [government]
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the [government] itself. '9 7
The current test focuses on three factors: the extent to which the actor
94. Bank of Ky. v. Wister, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 318, 323 (1829). The view that a corporation
remained a private entity even when harnessed to a public end, put strongly by Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-37 (1819), and again in Os-
born v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866-67 (1824), dovetailed well with
the fiction-concession theory of corporate existence that continued to dominate 19th century legal
thinking. Under the fiction-concession theory, the state alone can create business corporations and
endow them with the capacity to act as legal entities. As a result, the state can condition its grant
of the corporate "privilege" in whatever manner best serves the interests of all. See Sutton's Hosp.
Case, 10 Co. Rep. 23a (1613); see also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 544-45 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting in part):
Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld is always a matter of state
policy. If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to achieve an end which the State deems
desirable.... Similarly, if the privilege is denied, it is denied because incidents of like corpo-
rate enterprise are deemed inimical to the public welfare ....
For a statement of the contrary view that corporations are merely private arrangements among
individuals with whose structure the state has little business interfering, see Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Robert Hessen, A
New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1327 (1979). The resulting entity is an independent legal person. Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
95. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 906 (1824)
(Marshall, C.J.).
96. The federal action doctrine is the state action doctrine applied at the federal level. Both
due process and equal protection restraints are the same. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636, 638 n.2 (1975) (noting that federal action under the Fifth Amendment is tested under the
same equal protection standard as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the Fifth Amendment equal protection require-
ments apply to the federal government); Warren v. Government Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 611 F.2d
1229, 1232 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding Ginnie Mae foreclosure not government action under the
Fifth Amendment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980); Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated
Mortgage Invs., 504 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1974); see also LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1688 & n.2 (2d ed. 1988) (equating state and federal action).
97. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.); see also
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (describing a two-part "fair attribution"
analysis for the requisite nexus). More recently, the Court has described this inquiry in the follow-
ing terms:
In the typical case ...the question is whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat
[the] decisive conduct as state action. This may occur if the State creates the legal frame-
work governing the conduct; if it delegates its authority to the private actor; or sometimes if
it knowingly accepts the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior. Thus, in the usual
case we ask whether the State provided a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the
harm-causing individual actor.
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988) (citations omitted).
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relies on government assistance and benefits; whether the actor is per-
forming a traditional government function; and, whether the injury
caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmen-
tal authority.9 8
FGCs present a threshold problem that is usually absent from
state action cases. The issue is not simply whether the FGC's conduct
can be traced to the government, but more fundamentally whether the
FGC is part of the government. 9 An FGC owes its existence to an act
of Congress. In some cases it owes its funding to Congress as well. In
other cases, some or all of its directors are appointed by the President.
An FGC thus may fit the profile of "state"-not just "state ac-
tor"-much better than, say, a private parking lot operated on munic-
ipal property. 100 Federal incorporation alone, however, does not make
an FGC a state actor.101
Although the recent Lebron decision has clarified some questions,
the Supreme Court's decisions relating to FGCs do not follow a con-
sistent pattern except that most of the decisions have been brief and,
when taken as a group, contradictory. As a result, although the fed-
eral government's power to create private corporations and to own
shares or bonds in such corporations remains unquestioned, 00 the le-
gal status of many FGCs remains unclear. For example, the Court
held that the Fleet Corporation, a wholly owned FGC,1 03 was legally
98. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614 (1991). Previously, the Supreme Court stated that state action will be found in private
activities only when they are traditionally and "exclusively" governmental, Jackson, 419 U.S. at
352-53 (private utility with franchise not public function). But see Central Hudson Gas v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 587 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("for purposes of First
Amendment analysis, a utility is far closer to a state-controlled enterprise than is an ordinary
corporation"). See generally Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist
Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587 (1991) (arguing that the Rehnquist court has, in practice,
adopted a "restrictive" view of state action, characterizing much arguably state conduct as private
conduct). If nothing else, it is clear that the Court has no intention of adopting the Berle thesis
that all corporate activities should be regarded as "state action" because a corporation owes its
existence to the state. Adolf A. Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activ-
ity-Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV.
933 (1952).
99. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 542 (1987).
100. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
101. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., the Supreme Court decided that federal in-
corporation and subsidy, absent any federal control, did not transform a private nonprofit federally
chartered corporation into a federal actor. 483 U.S. at 542-45. The U.S. Olympic Committee's
charter appears at 36 U.S.C. § 375 (1988). See also supra note 14 (discussing similar corpora-
tions). Because the Court held that the U.S. Olympic Committee did not exercise any functions
that were traditionally exclusively governmental, and because the U.S. Olympic Committee has no
publicly appointed directors, the decision leaves open the status of the FGCs discussed in this
article.
102. See supra note 86.
103. The United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, incorporated by the
President in the District of Columbia pursuant to executive order, built and acquired ships for use
in World War I and, after the war was over, sold its ships to the Merchant Marine. See Act of
June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-23, 40 Stat. 182; United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v.
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independent from the United States in United States v. Strang,04
Sloan Shipyards,'"5 and in United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy
Corp. v. McCarl.10 6 Yet the Court held that, despite the technicality
of incorporation, the Fleet Corporation and other wholly owned FGCs
were functionally identical to the United States in United States
Grain Corp. v. Phillips,"'7 United States v. Walter,"0 8 Emergency
McCarl, 275 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1927) (describing history of Fleet Corporation); Sloan Shipyards Corp.
v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 564-65 (1922) (same).
104. United States v. Strang, 254 U.S. 491, 493 (1921) (McReynolds, J.) (holding that
Fleet Corporation employee was not agent of government within the meaning of federal criminal
code prohibition of conflicts of interest). A related statute, 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1988 & Supp. V
1993), and somewhat similar facts arose in Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990)
(holding that a prohibition on receiving payments as a contribution, or supplement, to a salary for
service in the federal government did not apply to large bonus payments made to senior employees
about to enter government service).
105. Sloan Shipyards, 258 U.S. at 569-70 (citing Fleet Corporation's separate corporate
identity as the reason that claims against it should be heard in state court or federal district court
rather than the Court of Claims; and holding under the same reasoning that the shipping corpora-
tion's claims in bankruptcy were not entitled to preference as a claim of the United States).
106. 275 U.S. 1, 11 (1927). The Court held that even though the United States was the
owner, either as principal or as assignee, of all the assets of Fleet Corporation, the corporation's
separate personality meant that contracts to which it was a party generally were not subject to
federal audit or control except for the amorphous category of contracts entered into pursuant to
power delegated by the President. Id. The issue of audit and control arose as a petition for a writ
of mandamus against the Comptroller General, who had disclaimed jurisdiction over the Fleet
Corporation. Skinner & Eddy Corporation wished to set off credits it believed the corporation
owed it in a lawsuit threatened by the United States regarding transactions with the corporation.
The applicable statute required that potential setoffs of this type be presented to the appropriate
federal official. Id. at 2.
107. 261 U.S. 106, 113 (1923). The Court stated that the Grain Corporation's corporate
structure, "although in form a private corporation" was "an agency for public service" and hence
so "clothed with such a public interest" that a Navy officer who transported gold for it should not
receive the extra pay permitted and specified for commanding officers taking charge of private (as
opposed to government) valuables. Id. at 111, 113. The fact that the gold was payment for emer-
gency food aid, and that the Navy officer in question would have been entitled to $52,000 if he
prevailed, may have influenced the result.
The corporate charter of the U.S. Grain Corporation was for relevant purposes indistinguish-
able from that of the Fleet Corporation, see supra note 103. The U.S. Grain Corporation was
formed pursuant to an Executive Order dated August 14, 1917. United States Grain Corp., 261
U.S. at 110. Even the shares necessary to qualify the directors were held by the United States,
endorsed by the federal government. Id. A second Executive Order, dated June 21, 1918, desig-
nated it an agency of the United States. Id.
108. 263 U.S. 15, 17-18 (1923) (Holmes, J.). In flagrant contradiction to Strang, the Court
held that because fraud against the shipping corporation would have diminished the value of the
United States's investment and "impaired the efficiency of its very important instrument[,]" id. at
18, conspiracy to commit fraud against the corporation was within a statute punishing conspiracy
"to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose." Id. at 17; cf. Westfall v. United
States, 274 U.S. 256, 259 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (holding that Congress may make fraud against
state banks that are members of Federal Reserve system a federal crime, and also that "Congress
may employ state corporations with their consent as instrumentalities of the United States").
The Supreme Court later held that a criminal statute originally passed in 1884 that made it a
federal crime to defraud while impersonating officers or employees of the United States did not
extend to fraud committed while impersonating a TVA employee because no government corpora-
tions existed in 1884. Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 310-11 (1941). Pierce distinguished
Walter, 263 U.S. 15, on the unconvincing grounds that the statute in the Walter case concerned
frauds that interfered with the successful operation of the government, whereas the antifraud
statute at issue in Pierce did not. Pierce, 314 U.S. at 312-13.
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Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,10 9 Inland Waterways
Corp. v. Young,11 Cherry Cotton Mills v. United States,"' and now
again in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp."1 2 Moreover,
all the parties to Ashwander v. TVA apparently assumed the identity
of interest between the United States and the wholly owned nonstock
TVA. 113
Most recently, in Lebron, the Supreme Court relied on the con-
fluence of a number of factors to conclude that Amtrak, a federally
chartered for-profit corporation, is "part of the government" ' 4 for
"the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government
by the Constitution."' 1 5 Amtrak is wholly owned by the United
States, and the government controls its board of directors.1 16 In incor-
109. 275 U.S. 415, 421-22, 426 (1928) (holding Fleet Corporation, a department of govern-
ment, eligible for discounted telegraph rates under the Post Roads Act).
110. Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 523 (1940) (four-to-three decision).
Inland Waterways Corp. concerned the authority of banks to give security for deposits made by
two wholly owned FGCs. If the deposits were private, the banks had no authority to give security.
The Court's opinion found that banks could give security for all federal deposits, but the dissent
argued that banks could give security only for deposits under the Secretary of the Treasury's
control. Id. at 525-27 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Writing for a four-man majority, Justice Frank-
furter's opinion echoed Phillips, see supra note 107, in displaying no patience for legal fictions as
to separate legal personality when it came to the federal government's agents:
[T]he form which Government takes-whether it appears as the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of War, or the Inland Waterways Corporation-is wholly immaterial .... The
true nature of these modern devices for carrying out governmental functions is recognized in
other legal relations when realities become decisive. The funds of these corporations are, for
all practical purposes, Government funds; the losses, if losses there be, are the Government's
losses.
Inland Waterways Corp., 309 U.S. at 523-24 (citations omitted).
111. 327 U.S. 536, 539 (1946) (Black, J.). In Cherry Cotton Mills, much as in United
States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U.S. 1 (1927), the question was whether a
debt to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), another wholly owned FGC with separate
legal personality, was anything other than a debt to the United States. Cherry Cotton Mills, 327
U.S. at 537-38. If it were a debt to the United States, then the payment could be set off against a
tax refund. Id. at 538. Otherwise, the government would have to pay the refund and the RFC
would, in the case of an insolvent or recalcitrant debtor, have had difficulty collecting its debt. The
Supreme Court ruled that the claim by the RFC was "on the part of the Government" and that
the government could therefore apply the tax refund to the sums owed to the RFC. Id. at 538-39
(explaining that just because Congress calls it a corporation "does not alter its characteristics so
as to make something other than what it actually is, an agency selected by the Government to
accomplish purely governmental purposes"). The Court distinguished Skinner & Eddy as relating
to the authority of the Comptroller General, whereas Cherry Cotton Mills concerned the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Claims. Id. at 538. As for Sloan Shipyards, the Court said that "[n]or is this
congressionally granted power to plead a counterclaim to be reduced because in other situations,
and with relation to other statutes, we have applied the doctrine of governmental immunity or
priority rather strictly." Id. at 539-40. The Cherry Cotton Mills decision agreed with a decision
four years earlier describing the RFC as "a corporate agency of the government, which ... acts as
a governmental agency in performing its functions [albeit with transactions] akin to those of pri-
vate enterprises[,]" for which the government had waived sovereign immunity. Reconstruction
Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 83 (1941).
112. 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
113. See 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
114. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 974.
115. Id. at 972.




porating Amtrak, Congress declared that it "will not be an agency...
or establishment of the United States Government," 117 although it
subjected Amtrak to the Government Corporation Control Act, and
classified it as a mixed-ownership government corporation. 118
Justice Scalia, writing for eight members of the Court,"' began
his analysis of Amtrak's legal status by rejecting the contention that
Congress's designation of Amtrak as a private body controls.120 After
canvassing the Court's own precedents, Justice Scalia found that the
test for determining an FGC's status remained open.12' Finding no
controlling statute or precedent, Justice Scalia turned to what he
termed the "public and judicial understanding of the nature of Gov-
ernment-created and -controlled corporations over the years."' 22 The
opinion characterized the prevailing view among post-Depression
political scientists as one in which wholly owned government corpora-
tions such as Amtrak were ordinarily part of the government;2 3 a
view that, according to Justice Scalia, also accorded with congres-
[Amtrak has] a board of nine members, six of whom are appointed directly by the President
of the United States. The Secretary of Transportation, or his designee, sits ex officio. [45
U.S.C.] § 543(a)(1)(A) [(1988 & Supp. V 1993)]. The President appoints three more direc-
tors with the advice and consent of the Senate, § 543(a)(1)(C), selecting one from a list of
individuals recommended by the Railway Labor Executives Association, § 543(a)(1)(C)(i),
one "from among the Governors of States with an interest in rail transportation,"
§ 543(a)(1)(C)(ii), and one as a "representative of business with an interest in rail transpor-
tation," § 543(a)(1)(C)(iii). These directors serve 4-year terms. § 543(a)(2)(A). The Presi-
dent appoints two additional directors without the involvement of the Senate, choosing them
from a list of names submitted by various commuter rail authorities. § 543(a)(1)(D). These
directors serve 2-year terms. § 543(a)(2)(B). The holders of Amtrak's preferred stock select
two more directors, who serve 1-year terms. § 543(a)(1)(E). Since the United States pres-
ently holds all of Amtrak's preferred stock, which it received (and still receives) in exchange
for its subsidization of Amtrak's perennial losses, § 544(c), the Secretary of Transportation
selects these two directors. The ninth member of the board is Amtrak's president,
§ 543(a)(l)(B), who serves as the chairman of the board, § 543(a)(4), is selected by the
other eight directors, and serves at their pleasure, § 543(d). Amtrak's four private sharehold-
ers have not been entitled to vote in selecting the board of directors since 1981.
Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 967-68.
117. 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
118. 31 U.S.C. § 9101(2)(A) (1988).
119. Justice O'Connor dissented on the grounds that Lebron had disclaimed the argument
that Amtrak was a government entity and that if one accepted that Amtrak was a private entity,
its action should not be imputed to the Government. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 975.
120. Id. at 971.
121. See id. at 972. Justice Scalia distinguished National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Bos-
ton & Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1398 (1992) (describing Amtrak as "not an agency or
instrumentality of the United States Government") on the grounds that the remark was the weak-
est dictum. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 971. He also distinguished National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 470 (1985) (stating that contracts at issue were "not
between the railroads and the United States but simply between the railroads and the nongovern-
mental corporation, Amtrak") on grounds that Amtrak's nongovernmental status was not con-
tested by the parties and was not a necessary element of the decision because the result would
have been the same even if Amtrak were considered part of the government. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at
971-72.
122. Id. at 972.
123. Id.
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sional practice until recently. 124 Given the Court's previous decision
that Congress's declaration that Amtrak was private did not resolve
the issue, Justice Scalia did not explain why it mattered that Congress
and the public understood Amtrak to be public.
Once the Court disposed of the congressional declaration that
Amtrak was private, Amtrak's strongest remaining argument for
claiming that it was not a public body rested on one paragraph of the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases.'26 In that paragraph, which
forms part of a much longer discussion of other matters, the Supreme
Court held that the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail),1 26 a
Pennsylvania for-profit corporation, was not a federal instrumentality
despite the federal government's power to appoint a majority of its
directors. 27 Writing for seven members of the Court, Justice Brennan
explained that
Conrail is not a federal instrumentality by reason of the federal
representation on its board of directors. That representation was
provided to protect the United States' important interest in as-
suring payment of the obligations guaranteed by the United
States. Full voting control of Conrail will shift to the sharehold-
ers if federal obligations fall below 50 % of Conrail's indebted-
ness. The responsibilities of the federal directors are not different
from those of the other directors-to operate Conrail at a profit
for the benefit of its shareholders. Thus, Conrail will be basically
a private, not a governmental, enterprise.1 28
Justice Brennan's distinction between a corporation that the govern-
ment controls "as a creditor," as in the case of Conrail, and one that
it controls "as a policymaker," as in the case of Amtrak, permitted
Justice Scalia to distinguish the Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases. Justice Scalia noted that Amtrak's charter, unlike Conrail's,
124. Id. at 973.
125. Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp. (Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases),
419 U.S. 102 (1974).
126. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 741-94 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Conrail was formed in 1976, after
the failure of seven northeastern railroads, in order to provide freight services in the northeast rail
corridor. Conrail suffered major operating losses totalling $1.6 billion by 1980. PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 170
(1988) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION]. Conrail was incorporated as a private state-incorporated en-
tity. 45 U.S.C. § 741(a) (1970 ed. Supp. III); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
at 111. In 1981, Congress passed the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
Subtitle E, 95 Stat. 643-87 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988)), which called for
the privatization of Conrail. Id. § 1133. In order to make Conrail profitable, the act exempted
Conrail from state taxes and certain labor laws. Id. § 1106. Conrail became profitable and the
federal government's 85% share was sold in 1987 for more than $1.6 billion. PRIVATIZATION,
supra, at 162-63; see also 45 U.S.C. §§ 1301-47 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (procedure for privatiza-
tion of Conrail).
127. See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 974 (citing Amtrak's argument based on Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 152).
128. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 153.
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establishes public-interest goals for the railroad, 12 9 and concluded that
"Amtrak is worlds apart from Conrail: the Government exerts its con-
trol not as a creditor but as a policymaker, and no provision exists
that will automatically terminate control upon termination of a tem-
porary financial interest."180
Although Justice Scalia* reached the correct result-Amtrak is
clearly part of the government under the tests advocated in this arti-
cle-his reliance on Justice Brennan's distinction in the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases is unfortunate because Justice Brennan
misapplied his own test.18 A valid distinction exists between a corpo-
ration in which the federal government has taken an active role in
management or control, and a corporation in which the government
finds itself temporarily holding the debt or equity of a going concern
as the result of a civil forfeiture' 2 or the government's action as a
creditor or trustee.133 If the previous management remains in control
for a short time while the government seeks to dispose of the asset, it
is reasonable to conclude that the corporation does not automatically
become a federal actor for the period that the government owns the
company. In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, however,
the government did far more than passively hold Conrail stock. The
federal government created Conrail. 3 4 The incorporators were led by
a government official.3 5 The government named a majority of Con-
129. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 974 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 501a). In fact, this public interest goal
seems irrelevant to the issue of whether Amtrak is a public body. Many nongovernmental corpora-
tions, including most nonprofits, have such goals in their charters.
130. Id. at 974.
131. Reliance on the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases is also unfortunate because
its assertion that Conrail's federally appointed directors have "responsibilities ... [that] are not
different from those of the other directors," Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at
153, shows a limited understanding of the role of those directbrs. It is not at all clear whether any
federally appointed director of any FGC, including Amtrak, has duties that differ from those of
the directors selected by other shareholders; before Lebron there was no reason to believe that the
nature of the public directors' duties turned on whether or not the FGC had public purposes in its
charter. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
132. E.g., Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding that the Excessive Fines
Clause of Constitution applied to seizure of appellant's auto body shop); Robert G. Morvillo,
Forfeiture and Its Constitutional Dimensions, N.Y.L.J., June 1, 1993, at 3 (reporting that U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York obtained warrants to seize 23 supermarkets in a
case involving the redemption of clipped, rather than customer returned, coupons).
133. For example, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), see supra note 54, appears
before the courts in a bewildering variety of guises, including creditor, see, e.g., Resolution Trust
Corp. v. SPR Corp., 45 F.3d 70 (4th Cir. 1995); conservator, see, e.g., Recoveredge L.P. v. Pente-
cost, 44 F.3d 1284 (5th Cir. 1995); receiver, see, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43
F.3d 587 (11 th Cir. 1995); and government beneficiary of the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, see, e.g.,
id. It thus can avail itself of whatever private law or public law remedies best suit its interests
under the circumstances.
134. Conrail was incorporated as a Pennsylvania corporation by a group of incorporators
acting under the direction of the United States Railway Association, itself a federally chartered
wholly owned FGC. See supra note 126.
135. See People and Business, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 21, 1974, at 35, 41 (reporting that Arthur
D. Lewis, Chairman of the United States Railway Association, would chair the incorporators of
Conrail).
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rail's directors, who in turn selected the corporation's management.130
In the case of Conrail, the government really ran the railroad from its
inception until it was privatized in 1987.137
The only potentially significant difference between Conrail while
under federal control and Amtrak today is that the government's con-
trol of Conrail was destined to end if and when Conrail's federal in-
debtedness fell to less than 50% of its total debt;" ' in fact, the gov-
ernment still controlled Conrail when it sold the corporation.139 This,
however, did not mean that the federal government's loss of control
was inevitable; it certainly had no obvious or fixed date. Indeed, Jus-
tice Douglas's dissent in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases
noted that "all the parties concede, that Conrail, though dubbed 'a
for-profit corporation' . . . shows no prospect of being an enterprise
operating on a profitable basis."
As Justice Scalia noted in Lebron:
It surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to
evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by
simply resorting to the corporate form. On that thesis, Plessy v.
Ferguson can be resurrected by the simple device of having the
State of Louisiana operate segregated trains through a state-
owned Amtrak. "'
Had Conrail run segregated trains while a majority of federal appoin-
tees sat on its board, the offense to the Constitution would have been
no less.
Lebron was actually an easier case than the Court made it
seem." 2 The Court previously held, in what is now known as the fed-
eral action doctrine, 4 3 that entities that display "a sufficiently close
nexus" to the government to "be fairly treated as [the actions] of the
government itself" must be considered part of the government. Under
this holding, a wholly owned FGC such as Amtrak (and probably
Conrail despite the contrary holding in the Regional Rail Reorgani-
136. See Spence Named Conrail President, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1975, at 41 (reporting
appointment of Richard Spence as successor to Richard Jordan, the first president, who was also
the president of the United States Railway Association).
137. See supra note 126.
138. 45 U.S.C. § 741(d) (Supp. V 1970).
139. See supra note 126.
140. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 163-64 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); see also Robert E. Bedingfield, Rail-Trackage Plan Criticized by I.C.C., N.Y. TiMES,
May 3, 1974, at 1 (describing regulatory obstacles to formation of Conrail); A. H. Raskin, From
Pennsy To Conrail Is a Long. Hard Trip, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1974, § IV, at 2 (describing how
expected SEC fraud charges against Penn Central Railroad depress Conrail's prospects).
141. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 973 (1995) (citation
omitted).
142. The Supreme Court presumably granted certiorari to reverse the peculiar decision of
the Second Circuit, Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 961 (1995).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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zation Act Cases) is a federal actor because the government owns and
controls it. Indeed, Justice Scalia stated that "reason itself' compelled
the conclusion that the federal government cannot hide behind a cor-
porate form "to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the
Constitution' 1 " for the same reasons the Court previously held that a
state cannot evade constitutional strictures by acting through a pri-
vate trust operated and controlled by state officials." 6
The Brennan-Scalia distinction will be difficult to extend to fu-
ture cases. Other than the rule that permanent control for the foresee-
able future amounts to ownership in the nature of a "policymaker,"'"
it provides no guidance for determining whether the government's
ownership interest is just that of "a creditor," or whether it rises to
the level of "policymaker" as in Amtrak. Lebron thus represents a
missed opportunity to link FGC case law to the federal actor test.
Relying on the federal actor test would not necessarily solve every
problem,' 4' but it would provide a principled distinction between, on
the one hand, cases such as Conrail and Amtrak, and on the other
hand, the RTC's management of an insolvent savings and loan which
is soon to be sold off.
Unfortunately, not every case involving an FGC is likely to be as
simple as Lebron. Neither the state action doctrine nor whatever prin-
ciples that can be extracted from precedent provides a sufficiently
clear standard for determining whether an FGC that is not wholly
owned by the government is public or private. 48
In mixed-ownership FGCs and privately owned FGCs the gov-
ernment appoints only a minority of the directors, causing two valid
public policies to conflict. On one hand, Congress chooses the instru-
ments that are necessary and proper to achieve valid ends. Because
private enterprise is a valid means to valid ends, the fact that the
government facilitates the creation of private enterprise does not
render that enterprise either public or invalid. If an FGC most closely
resembles a private contractor that provides a government service, it
144. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 973.
145. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U.S.
230 (1975) (per curiam)).
146. "[W]here as here, the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the fur--
therance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a major-
ity of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the Government." Lebron, 115 S.
Ct. at 974.
147. See supra text accompanying note 95; see also supra note 133 (describing varying
roles of RTC).
148. Indeed, Justice Scalia distinguished Amtrak, an FGC wholly owned and controlled by
the federal government, from corporations in which the government does not hold a controlling
interest. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 974. In so doing Justice Scalia distinguished Bank of United States
v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824), in which the Supreme Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to a state-chartered bank in which the State of
Georgia held a noncontrolling interest.
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should not be treated as part of the government. 49 The analogy to
private contractors is convincing if one looks only at the primarily
commercial tasks that are most often entrusted to FGCs. Indeed, any
rule requiring FGCs to comply with the constitutional mandates ap-
plicable to federal agencies could easily extend to all other private
corporations. 150
On the other hand, FGCs at least partly controlled by the gov-
ernment are arguably the government's agents. The federal govern-
ment's agents should comply with the Constitution.'6 ' If FGCs that
are partly owned or controlled by the government are private, they
may provide a vehicle for the federal government to hide behind the
corporate veil and escape responsibility for its actions. If the state
action doctrine means anything, it is surely that the government can-
not contract out of the Constitution. 152
2. Mixed-Ownership FGCs
For the same reasons that a wholly owned corporation should be
treated as a federal actor, both Lebron and the state action doctrine
suggest that any mixed-ownership FGC in which the federal govern-
ment owns more than half the shares should be treated as a federal
actor for constitutional purposes. In addition, because the number of
shares required to control a corporation varies with the circumstances,
whether the United States has effective control over a particular
149. A contractor that receives its revenue from the government does not, on that basis
alone, become a state actor. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982).
150. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 543 n.23 (1987).
151. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 973. Thus, the "Government is free . . . to 'privatize' some
functions it would otherwise perform. But such privatization ought not automatically release those
who perform Government functions from constitutional obligations." San Francisco Arts & Ath-
letics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 560 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56
(1988) ("Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty
to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody .... "). But see Blum, 457 U.S. at
1002-12 (rejecting Medicaid patients' claims of entitlement to notice and hearing prior to transfer
to low-treatment category by private state-funded nursing home because nursing home's decisions
were not state action).
152. See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 973. This is not a new concern:
That a state may rightfully evade the prohibitions of the constitution, by acting through the
instrumentality of agents in the evasion, instead of acting in its own direct name, and thus
escape from all its constitutional obligations; is a doctrine to which I can never subscribe: and
which, for the honour of the country, for the good faith and integrity of the states, for the
cause of sound morals, and of political and civil liberty, I hope may never be established.
Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 339-41 (1837) (Story, J.,
dissenting). In Briscoe the bank's charter specified that the State of Kentucky would remain the
sole shareholder and that its officers would be elected by the state legislature. The majority held
that the bank nonetheless remained a legally separate private person, not subject to the Coinage
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, a restriction that applies only to the States. Briscoe, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) at 281-83; see also Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304, 318 (1853) (fact
that state holds 100% of shares not a reason to apply Bills of Credit Clause to bank with private
charter); Darrington v. Bank of Ala., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 12, 15 (1851) (same).
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mixed-ownership FGC in which it owns less than 50 % of the shares is
a factual question, one that should be decided on the same principles
that apply when the existence of control is disputed in the private law
context. If shareholding is very dispersed, no group may have com-
plete control of a mixed-ownership FGC. In such cases, coalitions may
form and shift from issue to issue or year to year. It is anybody's
guess whether a policy that an FGC pursues with the support of the
United States, or with the support of directors appointed by the
United States, has a sufficient nexus to the government that can be
fairly ascribed to it.
These esoteric contingencies illustrate the difficulties that can re-
sult from the unclear status of mixed-ownership FGCs, but they are
largely theoretical at present. Although the government initially took
an equity stake in a large number of mixed-ownership corporations,
the modern trend has been toward requiring the corporations to repur-
chase the government's (often nonvoting) stock. As a result, although
the government retains its statutory directors, it no longer has any
shares in the large majority of "mixed-ownership" government corpo-
rations. Conversely, sometimes Congress designates a corporation as
"mixed-ownership" even when there is no plan to sell any stock to
private investors.'""
3. Private FGCs with Presidentially Appointed Directors
The federal charters of several private FGCs in which the United
States holds no stock provide for the presidential appointment of a
minority of directors. These "public" directors sit alongside the pri-
vate directors elected by the shareholders.' 5 For example, the Presi-
dent appoints five of Fannie Mae's eighteen directors, with the major-
ity elected annually by the common stockholders. 55
The appointment of a minority of directors gives the appointing
authority no more formal control over a corporation than would the
ownership of a minority of the stock. Indeed, the power to appoint a
minority of directors may carry less influence over the corporation's
affairs than the ownership of an equivalent block of stock; although
minority blocks sometimes suffice to control a corporation whose other
shares are widely distributed, the same is rarely true of voting in a
small group like the board of a corporation. In addition, the presence
153. See, e.g., Alan L. Dean, Getting Together on Public Enterprise, NAPA J., Mar. 25,
1987, at 4-5 (United States Railroad Association designated as a "mixed-ownership" by Regional
Rail Reorganization Act when in fact it was wholly owned by the federal government).
154. The government also has statutory directors in a number of "mixed-ownership" corpo-
rations in which it owns no shares. The position of these unmixed ownership corporations is little
different from the "private" corporations discussed in this section.
155. 12 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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of a minority of presidentially appointed directors on the board of an
otherwise private corporation does not make it a state actor and, thus,
does not necessarily undermine the corporation's fundamentally pri-
vate legal character.15
4. Nondelegation of Public Powers to Private Groups
If an FGC is a private body, its establishment can be viewed as a
delegation of public power to a private group, much as authorizing an
administrative agency to regulate is a delegation of legislative power.
Viewed this way, it seems natural to ask whether there is a nondelega-
tion doctrine for private groups akin to the nondelegation doctrine
that prevents Congress from delegating standardless rule-making
power to the executive branch. 67
A delegation of federal power to a private corporation differs
from delegations to an agency in two important respects: what is be-
ing delegated and the natural competence of the delegate. The agency
version of the nondelegation doctrine limits delegations of legislative
power; but the power of the agency to execute the laws is unques-
tioned. When a private body is the delegate, whether it has any right
to exercise government power-legislative or executive-is an issue.1 58
When the federal government delegates power to a small group of
156. Separation of powers cases could suggest an opposite conclusion. The argument would
be that, just as a single congressional director suffices to disqualify a government body from exer-
cising executive powers, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976) (per curiam), so
too does the presence of a single agent of the executive branch among the directors prevent a
corporation from being private. This argument is very appealing; the considerations of ordered and
balanced liberty that animate the Supreme Court's active vigilance against congressional en-
croachments on the executive branch's prerogatives are at least as strong when the government as
a whole may be encroaching on the liberty of the people. However, so long as McCulloch and
Osborn remain valid, the analogy with separation of powers is inapplicable. Both decisions clearly
accepted that the Second Bank, a corporation with 20% of its directors appointed by the Presi-
dent, was a private corporation.
157. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30, 538-40
(1935); see also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (delegation
of regulatory authority permissible where Congress has set forth "intelligible principle[s]" guiding
application of such authority). The agency form of the nondelegation doctrine is not thought to
have much force because the Supreme Court has not used it to strike down a single exercise of
regulatory power since the Depression. See IRA P. ROBBINs, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE
INCARCERATION 9-34 (1988) (collecting cases). But see Industrial Union Dep't v. American Pe-
troleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 673-75, 685-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (intimating revival
of nondelegation doctrine); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It
Substance?, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1223, 1226 (1985) (suggesting doctrine not dead yet).
158. On the other hand, although an agency is fundamentally a creation of statute, one with
no natural powers other than those Congress gives it, a private person-even a legal person-has
independent powers. Thus, one might view the granting of a corporate charter as no more than
giving a convenient legal status to a series of transactions which are, in theory, already within the
private capacities of individuals. Under that view, so long as the power being granted is not some-
thing that only government can do (e.g., make laws or pardon crimes), legislative power is the
only nondelegation issue. This latter view, however, may be less appropriate for a corporation with
a federal charter, because its powers are presumably limited to those enumerated in the statute
that gave it life.
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individuals, it transfers power to a private group that is presumptively
less accountable to the public than are legislators, who must face re-
election, or administrators, who-must report to the President. 15 9
This judicial concern over the delegation of legislative power to
private persons reached its high-water mark in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co. In Carter Coal, the Supreme Court struck down a statute au-
thorizing coal producers and mine workers to vote on a regional basis
to set hours and wages that would bind dissenters. Justice Sutherland
described the statute as "legislative delegation in its most obnoxious
form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body,
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests
may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business." '160 The Carter Coal rationale has not, however, been used to
invalidate any subsequent federal delegation to a private group. 161 In
a world in which private police forces and private prisons are imagin-
able, if not yet commonplace, if a nondelegation rule applies at all, it
probably applies only to legislative powers.
The Carter Coal doctrine is known as a nondelegation doctrine,
but this name is misleading. Unlike the real nondelegation doctrine,
which relies on the separation of powers to prevent Congress from
making standardless delegations to administrative agencies, the
Carter Coal doctrine is in fact a prohibition against self-interested
regulation. The Carter Coal doctrine seeks to prevent private individ-
uals from judging or regulating their own causes. 6 ' Thus, it is not
surprising that the Supreme Court unanimously found it "beyond dis-
pute" that Congress may give a private corporation the power of emi-
nent domain,163 because a government-sponsored taking entitles the
owner to just compensation-secured in court if necessary.
If the President neither appoints nor removes private FGC direc-
tors, there is a strong argument, deriving from separation of powers
cases, that FGCs cannot be given public powers. Settled constitutional
principles prescribe that the only government agencies that may exer-
cise executive powers are those in the executive branch. 6' An agency
that is responsible to Congress or the courts may not execute the laws.
159. But see JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985)
(describing, and criticizing, "conveyor belt" theory of accountability); Richard Stewart, The Ref-
ormation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (same).
160. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
161. See Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and
Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 193 (1989) (arguing that Court aban-
doned doctrine after Carter Coal); Lawrence, supra note 12, at 647-49, 672 (same).
162. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 659.
163. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1894). The corporation's
charter required that it pay "proper compensation . . . ascertained according to the laws of the
State" within which the taken property was located. Id. at 527 n.l.
164. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
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The Carter Coal doctrine can be seen as the private analog of this
limit on congressional delegation.
In Morrison v. Olson,1 5 the Supreme Court distinguished the in-
dependent special prosecutor, who could be removed by the Attorney
General for "good cause," from "a case in which the power to remove
an executive official has been completely stripped from the President,
thus providing no means for the President to ensure the 'faithful exe-
cution' of the laws." 6' Unlike the Carter Coal doctrine, which fo-
cused on excessive delegation of legislative power to private groups,'6 7
the modern separation of powers cases often examine the extent to
which the President's powers have been impermissibly diminished by
congressional action. One way to read these cases, perhaps the most
persuasive way, is to view them as concerned with the balance of
power among the branches. Under this interpretation, the Supreme
Court is primarily concerned with congressional actions that aggran-
dize its own power at the President's expense. Actions that weaken
the President without transferring authority directly to Congress are
less likely to be held unconstitutional. This view provides a simple way
of reconciling Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,'68
Mistretta v. United States,"9 and Morrison,70 with the harsh lan-
guage in other separation of powers cases.'
On the other hand, if one takes the strong language in cases such
as Morrison at face value, then clearly an FGC headed by private
directors may not exercise any public power. Although Morrison did
not concern a delegation of power to a private group, Morrison asserts
that there are core presidential powers with which Congress may not
"interfere impermissibly," including the power to ensure the "faithful
execution" of the laws.172 Today, this restriction seems almost insub-
stantial for two reasons. First, the set of core presidential powers re-
mains indeterminate-Morrison itself found that the President's
powers were permissibly undermined by the independence of the spe-
cial prosecutor. Second, the distinction between public and private
functions is very vague. If either doctrine were made clearer, one side
effect might be to reduce the sphere of action for FGCs.
Assuming that the Carter Coal doctrine is still valid, nonetheless,
it seems very unlikely that any existing FGC would be declared un-
constitutional under it. Although a government corporation competes
165. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
166. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 160-64.
168. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
169. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of U.S. Sentencing Commission).
170. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
171. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV, 1346, 1368-69 (1994).
172. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988).
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with private firms, it cannot regulate its competitors; thus, the central
evil identified in Carter Coal is lacking. Competition alone, even com-
petition by an FGC powerful enough to set the market price, is not a
constitutional violation.1"' Nor do the exclusive lending powers en-
joyed by certain GSEs rise to the level of control over others struck
down in Carter Coal, for it is the legislature that decides who may,
and who may not, have those powers, not the delegates themselves.
Modern FGCs do not legislate and do not ordinarily issue regulations
binding anyone but themselves and their employees. Nor do most
modern FGCs exercise powers traditionally reserved to the state.
B. Limited Market Discipline
FGCs are most commonly created to operate a self-sustaining
bank, insurance, or other commercial activity.174 Ordinarily, the fed-
eral government is involved in the activity either because the goods or
services are deemed of national importance but are not adequately
provided by the private sector or because the commercial opportunity
.is a by-product of some other federal activity. In either case, an FGC
is usually created with the hope that it will be more efficient than a
traditional government department.
Although efficiency is a core justification for the existence of
FGCs, in practice, FGCs are subject to a very limited degree of mar-
ket discipline from bondholders, competitors, and shareholders. The
absence of market discipline suggests that FGCs have little incentive
to be efficient. As a result, FGCs are probably not as efficient as pro-
ponents hoped. Of course, this does not mean that FGCs are inevi-
tably inefficient or that they could not become efficient if confronted
with competitors.
1. Efficiency Claims Made for FGCs
The efficiency claims that have been asserted to justify FGCs are
sufficiently broad to cover almost any contingency. At one time or
another proponents have claimed FGCs are appropriate for both com-
mercial and noncommercial purposes, as the most efficient form of
nationalization, and as preparation for eventual privatization.
a. Commercial Purpose/Market Failure
Congress often turns to an FGC when the mission, often viewed
as necessary to fill a gap in the private sector, is basically commercial.
173. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 139 (1939).
174. See NAPA, supra note 45, at 27-28.
No. 3]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
The theory is that a corporation is more efficient than a traditional
federal bureaucracy."' President Harry S. Truman summed up the
received wisdom-still current today-when he stated, "Experience
indicates that the corporate form of organization is peculiarly adapted
to the administration of governmental programs which are (1) pre-
dominantly of a commercial character; (2) are at least potentially
self-sustaining; and (3) involve a large number of business-type trans-
actions with the public. 176
The market failure justification was particularly applicable to the
FGCs designed to create secondary financial markets during a period
in which intermediation in particular consumer credit markets re-
mained highly regional. When Fannie Mae was established in 1938 it
was the only truly national purchaser of home mortgages. 1 7 Its na-
tional status not only protected it from regional fluctuations in the
housing market, but over time it has also generated economies of
scale. 7  More recently, the General Accounting Office has suggested
that the secondary capital market for multifamily housing loans has
failed to mature due to potential, lenders' difficulties in obtaining in-
formation about loan performance and other costs associated with
these complex loans.'7 9
In general, the private sector produces goods and services more
efficiently than a traditional government department, 80 although
175. See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 655 ("While not all private groups are
nonbureaucratic, it is often true that a private group to which a governmental power is being
delegated is less bureaucratic than the alternative public group, and for that reason it may be
advantageous to make the delegation."). But see ANNMARIE H. WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS
29-30 (1978) (quoting U.S. Chamber of Commerce view that FGCs are never worth having under
any circumstances because of the "built-in inefficiency in government business operations [that]
no amount of reorganization or improvement in accounting technique or in personnel selection
policy can ever overcome.").
176. President Harry S. Truman, 1948 Budget Message, quoted in NAPA, supra note 45,
at 10. For a contemporary restatement of Truman's conclusions, see id. at 7 (arguing an FGC is
appropriate if the government engages in commercial relations with public, users are expected to
pay for the costs of particular goods and services, and expenditures fluctuate with consumer de-
mand and cannot be limited by lags caused by the annual appropriations process).
A special case in this category is a commercial activity that is a side effect of a fundamen-
tally noncommercial project. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4121-29 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (incorporat-
ing Federal Prison Industries to sell goods produced by prisoners); United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940) (selling electric power out of an irrigation project).
177. See PRIVATIZATION, supra note 126, at 33.
178. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 123.
179. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOUSING FINANCE: EXPANDING CAPITAL FOR
AFFORDABLE MULTIFAMILY HOUSING 6 (1993).
180. "The evidence that public provision of a service reduces the efficiency of its provision
seems overwhelming." DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 266 (rev. ed. 1989). Mueller sum-
marizes more than 40 studies comparing public and private provision of services ranging from
airline refuse collection to weather forecasting. Only two studies showed that the public sector was
as efficient as the private sector. Id. at 263-66. James Buchanan has argued that public organiza-
tions are less efficient because their goals are not clear. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1969). But see Hal G. Rainey, Public Agencies and Private Firms:
Incentives, Goals and Individual Roles, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 440-48 (1979) (both public and
private administrators feel equally clear about organization's goals).
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there are exceptions to the rule.181 Unfortunately, whether a publicly
owned corporation is more or less efficient at adding value than a pri-
vate firm is difficult to measure. Return on equity is perhaps the sim-
plest crude measure, but its value is limited. Just because an FGC
produces a high return does not mean that it is efficient. A fair com-
parison with the private sector must account for whether the FGC
operates in a competitive market and whether it has comparable
access to capital.' 82
On the other hand, even if FGCs have a lower return on equity
than comparable private firms, they should not necessarily be written
off as failures. The FGC may have been created to provide other
social outputs, which are external to the FGC, or inherently hard to
measure.' 83 In some cases, federal ownership may be a more efficient
means than regulation to achieve a social goal that interferes with
profit maximization. 184 If, however, the social outputs are internal to
the FGC, e.g., higher wages or better working conditions than in com-
parable private firms, then an ordinary private corporation might be
preferable. 185
The existing empirical evidence provides weak support, at most,
for the hypothesis that government corporations are less efficient than
private corporations. 88 Strong evidence suggests, however, that at
least some profit-oriented FGCs, such as Fannie Mae, have a far
higher return on equity than do most large private firms. 87 The in-
181. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 57-69 (1989) (discussing stud-
ies suggesting that purely competitive solutions may be less efficient than public provision of cer-
tain services).
182. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, Ownership and Performance in Competi-
tive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enter-
prises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8-9 (1989). Capital risk is very low in public enterprises. BARRY BoZE-
MAN, ALL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PUBLIC 52 (1987) (citing Steven N.S. Cheung, Transactions
Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 12 J.L. & ECON. 23 (1969)).
183. In an era in which private corporations are regularly criticized for short-term planning,
it is interesting to consider Barry Bozeman's hypothesis that the more public an organization, the
longer term its planning horizon. BOZEMAN, supra note 182, at 137.
184. See Catherine C. Eckel & Aidan R. Vining, Elements of a Theory of Mixed Enter-
prise, 32 SCOTTISH J. POL. ECON. 82, 85 (1985).
185. Boardman & Vining, supra note 182, at 9.
186. Id. at 1. A further complication is that many FGCs are mixed enterprises with both
public and private directors. The empirical evidence suggests that mixed enterprises (defined as
those in which the government holds stock) tend to be at least as inefficient as state-owned enter-
prises. Id. at 26. "[I]nvestors anticipate that partially nationalized (unregulated) companies
[mixed ownership government corporations] will have significantly lower profitability than" pri-
vate corporations. Id. at 5.
187. Fannie Mae earned approximately $1.6 billion in 1994. 1996 BUDGET APPENDIX,
supra note 80, at 119. Its after-tax return in 1994 was a healthy 24%. See Fannie Mae Expan-
sion Could Boost Political Risk, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1995, at F25 [hereinafter Political Risk].
In 1990 the average return on equity was only 7.8 % for all FDIC-insured commercial banks and
12.0% for the S & P 500 companies. TREASURY GSE STUDY, supra note 26, at 1; see also U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: A FRAMEWORK FOR LIMIT-
ING THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPOSURE TO CAPITALIZE RISKS 81 (1991) [hereinafter GAO FRAME-
WORK] (setting out return on average equity capital of selected GSEs). By 1994, the private
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creasing number of FGCs with an implicit federal guarantee, and the
growth in the size of their liabilities, raise micro- and macroeconomic
concerns. The greatest microeconomic concerns are self-dealing, 188
and management or shareholder enjoyment of a publicly created rent,
free of charge.189 The greatest macroeconomic concern is that the
FGCs may fail, leaving the government with no real alternative but to
deliver on the implicit guarantee. Delivering is likely to be expensive;
refusing to do so is likely to cause severe credit shortages in the rele-
vant markets and to cause a great decline in confidence in the other
FGCs in the credit markets.1 90
b. Noncommercial Purpose
Today, most FGCs are involved in commercial, if not necessarily
competitive, activities. Even if the entity's task is not commercial,
structuring it as a corporation arguably allows it to avoid the ineffi-
ciencies believed characteristic of the federal bureaucracy. Thus, for
example, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, proposing the creation
of the TVA, spoke of "a corporation clothed with the power of gov-
ernment but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private en-
terprise."'' Nonprofit FGCs include the Smithsonian,"92 the U.S. In-
stitute for Peace, 193 and the National Park Foundation. 94
c. Nationalization
Retaining the corporate form simplifies the nationalization of a
private corporation because only the ownership is changed. Moreover,
when assets (such as a railroad) formerly operated by a private corpo-
ration pass into the hands or the effective control of the United States,
they are often managed by a new or existing corporation, whether or
not the transaction is labeled nationalization. The takeover of "essen-
sector had somewhat closed the gap, as FDIC-insured commercial banks achieved a return on
equity of 14.9%, Carl Horowitz, Freeing Banks to Compete More, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Jan.
23, 1995, at Al, while the S & P 500 companies achieved a return of 16.4%. Bernice Napach,
Conservative Glasebook Earns Top Honors, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Nov. 7, 1994, at Al. The
comparison is undoubtedly unfair to the private sector as Fannie Mae has privileged access to
cheap capital.
188. See infra text accompanying note 220.
189. See infra text accompanying note 265.
190. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 16-17.
191. H.R. Doc. No. 15, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); see also Lilienthal & Marquis, supra
note 42, at 559 ("It is only reasonable that the Government, in entering the field of business
enterprise, should closely adapt its administrative procedures and techniques to those which pri-
vate business has found to be the most successful.").
192. 20 U.S.C. §§ 41-42 (1988); see also infra note 401 and accompanying text (arguing
that the Smithsonian is unconstitutionally constituted).
193. 22 U.S.C. § 4603 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
194. 16 U.S.C. § 19e-n (1988).
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tial" assets from corporations threatening to cease providing an un-
economical service prompted the creation of FGCs, including Con-
rail195 and Amtrakl'9 -perhaps the best-known example.
The federal government currently is not reaping significant
profits from its relationship with the FGCs as a group, although it
does collect federal taxes from most of those in which it owns no eq-
uity. Nonetheless, federal ownership of valuable assets, managed for
profit, could be used either to lower taxes or to produce other benefits
for the citizenry. Arguably, some degree of public ownership, particu-
larly if combined with private management with suitable incentives,
might be a more efficient means of funding some government activi-
ties than taxation.
The federal government has never started or taken over a com-
mercial venture solely or primarily to produce revenue.' 97 The profit
motive alone is probably an insufficient constitutional justification for
a government-owned and government-run commercial enterprise1 9
because the applicable federal powers are only incidental to other Ar-
ticle I powers."O The Commerce Clause, however, might justify the
creation of a corporation to provide additional competition in a mar-
ket that Congress reasonably found and declared to be insufficiently
competitive. Or, a profit-making high-technology corporation might
be justified on national security grounds, on the theory that a domes-
tic corporation must retain control over the development and exploita-
tion of a sensitive technology.
In modern practice, however, the federal government has tended
only to take over unprofitable activities, particularly railroads, from
owners who, for bankruptcy or other reasons, did not intend to main-
tain them and who could not find another buyer. If the activities be-
come profitable, they are usually sold off."' Because the government
ends up owning only unprofitable activities that it cannot sell, this
policy has been dubbed "lemon socialism."201
195. See supra note 126 (describing statutory and economic background to federal take-
over of Conrail).
196. See supra notes 116-18 (describing statutory regime governing Amtrak). "Although its
enacting legislation specified that Amtrak is not a federal agency, the U.S. government does in
fact own the railroad." PRIVATIZATION, supra note 126, at 168.
197. In 1955, President Eisenhower approved a policy that "the Federal government will
not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such
product or service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary business channels."
PRIVATIZATION, supra note 126, at 1.
198. The profit motive appears to be a large part of the motivation behind the proposed
Technology Transfer and Commercialization Financing Corporation, see supra note 7.
199. See supra text accompanying note 27.
200. See, e.g., supra note 126 (Conrail sold as soon as it became profitable).
201. See Dean Brackley, The South Bronx: Past Destruction and the Rebuilding Process,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 40 (1987) (Professor Sylvia Law's comments on the presentation).
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d. Preparation for Eventual Privatization
The corporate form is a natural method of organizing enterprises
that are considered candidates for eventual privatization. An enter-
prise that has corporate status can more easily become profit oriented,
if only because employee pay can be linked to performance. In addi-
tion, it is easier to keep business-style accounts which reflect costs
such as office rent, capital depreciation, pensions, and even goodwill,
that would be difficult to assess in a single agency. Such accounts give
potential buyers a clearer idea of the value of the enterprise than is
available to assess an agency. The transfer of a traditional agency
would have to be organized as a sale of physical assets and certain
contracts. But a going concern consists of more than its physical as-
sets and its rights and obligations. For example, because the govern-
ment does not have mechanisms for transferring employees who have
civil service status, i.e., who work for an agency, employees may seek
transfers if their departments are sold. Excluding an FGC's employees
from the civil service system allows transfer of the corporation's asset-
specific human capital as well.202
In theory, "virtually any [government] function is, at least poten-
tially, amenable to 'privatization.' "203 Indeed, during the Reagan ad-
ministration, the Office of Personnel Management proposed spinning
off a large number of government entities as independent, for-profit
companies with the current government employees as shareholders.' "
Congress and the agencies currently are considering several privatiza-
tion proposals.20 5
2. Negligible Bond Market Discipline
The bond market is a potential source of discipline for FGCs that
are regular borrowers because these FGCs have a long-term interest
in keeping the cost of credit as low as possible. However, because
202. The Rural Telephone Bank, a wholly owned FGC that Congress originally classified as
an agency, 7 U.S.C. §§ 941-50b (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing Rural Telephone Bank as
body corporate), is being privatized in this manner. The Rural Telephone Bank has 13 directors, 7
of whom are appointed by the President, id. § 945(b)(1), with the other 6 elected by holders of
Class B and C stock, id. § 945(b)(2)-(3). The federal authority to purchase Class A stock lapsed
at the end of 1991, and the Bank has an obligation to repurchase all the government's stock by
1995. Id. § 946(a), (c). When 51 % of the government's Class A stock has been retired, 5 of the
government's directors will resign, the wholly owned FGC will cease to be an agency of the United
States, and it will become a mixed-ownership FGC. Id. § 950(a).
203. BOZEMAN, supra note 182, at 4. But see Eckel & Vining, supra note 184, at 84 (stat-
ing that optimal level of public ownership is unclear).
204. PRIVATIZATION, supra note 126, at 3. The Office of Personnel Management argued
that by offering existing employees an ownership stake it could "build support within a group
normally opposed to proposals to reduce the federal role." Id. No one took the bait.
205. See, e.g., USEC Privatization Act, H.R. 1216, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (requir-
ing privatizations of United States Enrichment Corporation).
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bond holders have little incentive to carefully monitor GSEs whose
debt benefits from a federal guarantee, the bond market poorly con-
strains FGC activities. There is no doubt that the market's perception
that GSE debt is implicitly guaranteed by the United States govern-
ment, despite disclaimers to the contrary, means that GSE debt trades
at low rates of interest regardless of the actual soundness of their bal-
ance sheets. FICO, for example, continued to sell its obligations at
near-Treasury rates despite a negative net worth.206
Indeed, proponents of increased safety and soundness regulation
for GSEs have argued that the existence of the implicit guarantee
may have a perverse effect: as a GSE approaches insolvency, manage-
ment's access to credit will remain unimpaired; in turn, this access to
relatively cheap credit, arguably, provides an incentive for manage-
ment to engage in excessive risk taking in increasingly desperate
attempts to recoup their losses. In addition, whether an FGC is eligi-
ble to become a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code is unclear. °7
3. Weak Competitive Market Discipline
Few FGCs operate in competitive markets; indeed, many were
created because the market was not able or willing to take on the task
entrusted to them. The Federal Prison Industries" 8 literally has a
captive source of labor209 and sells primarily to the government. The
Tennessee Valley Authority sells power on a competitive market but
enjoys at least the same anticompetitive advantages as any utility with
a monopoly access to a source of hydropower.
A few FGCs do operate in competitive markets. Amtrak com-
petes with other forms of transport. Connie Lee competes directly
with private insurers. 210 Several of the GSEs have private competitors
or sell financial products that are close substitutes for securities sold
by the Treasury, other GSEs, or private institutions. In addition, the
public purposes and financial strategies of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac have converged, effectively making them competitors, 1 or
duopolists.
206. STANTON, supra note 57, at 4.
207. See STANTON, supra note 26, at 206.
208. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4121-29 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Federal Prison Industries is also known
as UNICOR.
209. But see Lariscey v. United States, 949 F.2d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that Fed-
eral Prison Industry's use of prisoner's invention was a taking in contravention of Fifth Amend-
ment), vacated, 962 F.2d 1047 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (granting rehearing en banc). Cf. Lariscey v.
United States, 981 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (contrary ruling by Claims Court af-
firmed by equally divided court), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2997 (1993).
210. GAO FRAMEWORK, supra note 187, at 17.
211. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 122-28.
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Private competitors of the few FGCs that operate in competitive
markets sometimes accuse the FGCs of having unfair advantages. 12
FGCs are ordinarily immune from state tax;213 and sometimes they
have unique abilities to operate on national scale. And, of course, the
large financial GSEs are able to borrow at lower rates than available
to competing private financial institutions. It even has been suggested
that Fannie Mae's entry into the mortgage-backed security market
contributed to the savings and loans crisis because investors preferred
its mortgage-backed securities to certificates of deposit (CD) issued
by S&Ls. An S&L's CD is ultimately backed by its assets, primarily
its portfolio of mortgages, making the certificate of deposit, arguably,
a close substitute for a Fannie Mae mortgage-backed security. In ad-
dition, the mortgage-backed security enjoyed an implicit government
guarantee at no charge, while an S&L was required to purchase its
guarantee, further lowering the rate of return it was able to offer.
Finally, S&Ls had much stiffer capital requirements than Fannie
Mae, increasing their relative costs. 21 4 In defense of the GSEs, how-
ever, it should be noted that their charters usually restrict them to a
narrow line of business, depriving them of the ability to diversify.
The aftermath of the recent scandal concerning price fixing in
the government bond market provides a striking example of a GSE's
market power.2 15 Freddie Mac's contracts with its original dealers are
terminable at will. When it learned that more than a third of its orig-
inal dealers had provided misleading information designed to secure
excessive allocations of Freddie Mac securities, Freddie Mac informed
the responsible dealers that it believed their activities constituted
breach of contract. Subsequently, the dealers had a choice between
paying a fine equal to twenty percent of their commissions earned in
1990 and 1991, or having their contracts terminated. Many dealers
chose to pay fines totalling over $1 million. 1 6
212. For a striking example, albeit on a small scale, see Joseph Radigan, Fannie Mae Cre-
ates a Stir, U.S. BANKER, Dec. 1993, at 54 (quoting allegations that Fannie Mae's decision to give
away its "Desktop Trader" loan origination software in order to link in brokers with its systems
undermined commercial vendors of similar software).
213. Fannie Mae has proved particularly adept at preserving its exemption from local taxes
in the District of Columbia despite being the city's largest and most profitable company. See
Political Risk, supra note 187; see also Lilienthal & Marquis, supra note 42, at 596 n.134 (col-
lecting cases). The FHL Banks, FICO, REFCORP, Farmer Mac, and the Farm Credit Banks are
also immune from federal income taxes. Thomas H. Stanton, Federal Supervision of Safety and
Soundness of Government-Sponsored Enterprises, 5 ADMIN. L.J. 395, 402 (1991).
214. See George Melloan, Was Fannie Mae a Factor in the Thrifts Crisis?, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 4, 1989, at A23; see also CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 139 (describing crowding out of
S&Ls from holding fixed rate mortgages).
215. A terse description of the affair can be found in 1992 JOINT REPORT, supra note 58,
at 1-6.
216. See Steven Boehm & Mark Stabile, A Low-Key Market Makeover, LEGAL TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1992, at 22 ("approximately" 18 dealers paid fines totalling over $1 million); Statement




The generally unsettled nature of the law relating to FGCs is
reflected in the remarkably small number of clear rules regulating
their internal governance and their relations with their shareholders.
1. Limited Shareholder Discipline
Any privately owned or mixed-ownership for-profit FGC that is-
sues shares faces two theoretical types of discipline from shareholders.
First, shareholders, including the government if it owns shares, may
vote their shares to replace the management, or they may sell their
shares to a predator seeking to take over the company. Second, if the
FGC contemplates returning to the market for additional capital it
will want to act in a manner that tends to increase its share price.
How much control shareholders actually have over the ordinary
corporations in which they hold shares has been the subject of a great
deal of legal and economic analysis, particularly in the literature de-
riving from the property rights theory of the firm. 17 Corporate man-
agements are greatly concerned with corporate control, or at least
with the acquisition and retention of it. A normative desire that man-
agers remain accountable to owners, i.e. shareholders, often combines
with the positive assertions that this is what shareholders desire and
that this is in their interest. Shareholders are presumed to be most
interested in the maximization of the value of their investment, albeit
with varying time-preferences for money. Protecting one's corporate
control, it is argued, supplies salutary market discipline to owners and
managers alike by forcing directors to maximize value of shares or
face hostile takeover (and loss of employment for managers) by
predators better able to put assets to remunerative use.2 8
prepared for Subcomm. on Oversight, House Comm. on Ways and Means (Sept. 26, 1991) (copy
on file with author) (describing contractual relationships). For a general description of the market
in GSE securities, see 1992 JOINT REPORT, supra note 58, at D-1 to D-6.
217. See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm,
33 J. EcoN. HIST. 16 (1973); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347 (1967). But see ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
218. Although the classic view of agencies accountable to the President and Congress and
the property rights theory of the firm apply different premises to different problems, the legal rules
they both analyze and influence address a similar problem: in both cases a diffuse group of princi-
pals (the voting public, the shareholders) seek legal means to control a bureaucratic agent (agen-
cies, corporations). The parallel is not exact because "the people" must act through agents, the
President and Congress, whereas stockholders can in theory act directly by voting their shares; the
parallel may be stronger in fact, however, because stockholders too often act through institutional
agents. Further, politicians may have their own legitimate personal and institutional interests and
prerogatives, whereas, arguably, the board of directors of a corporation does not.
Having addressed similar problems, the two lines of analysis also have come up with a similar
solution: a principal's control over an agent depends upon the power to hire and fire the agent.
Writers on both administrative and corporate law agree that the essence of control over an organi-
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The federal government is not an ordinary shareholder.2 19 Its in-
terests are more likely to be political than profit maximizing. Majority
control by the federal government provides takeover insurance that
can only be dented by privatization. Any federal corporation in which
the federal government has a majority stake thus gains unusual insu-
lation from the chief source of discipline on which the property rights
theory of the firm relies.
Some FGCs are wholly or partly owned by persons whom the
FGCs were designed to benefit. Vesting ownership in the targeted
beneficiaries has the advantage of greatly increasing the chances that
any profits generated by the FGCs' activities will go to those groups.
Unfortunately, vesting ownership in the target group also can create
significant conflicts of interest and moral hazard, and certainly gives
the owners a special interest in retaining control. The insolvency of
the Farm Credit System, the only FGC to become insolvent since
World War II, has been attributed to lax loan standards due to coop-
erative ownership by its borrowers. 2 °
The peculiar structure of the boards of privately owned FGCs
also may serve to insulate them from shareholder discipline. For ex-
ample, for many years Sallie Mae's twenty-one-member board of di-
rectors was divided into three groups, with seven directors appointed
by the President, seven elected by educational institutions holding vot-
ing stock, and seven by financial institutions holding voting stock.2 12
In this scheme, no private individual or individual institution could
zation is the power to appoint and remove its top officials, be they cabinet officers or the board of
directors.
Of course, from a political viewpoint there is more to control than the power to fire. A strong
and popular cabinet official can act with relative impunity if the President does not dare fire her.
Conversely "independent" officials may feel duty-bound to follow administration policy, or may be
selected for their views in conformity with it; the desire for future preferment also may reduce
independence. Writers on administrative and corporate law also agree that the absence of clear
control can create legal and policy difficulties. Thus, the extent and legitimacy of the freedom
enjoyed by independent agencies and "managerial" firms have been continuing sources of debate.
219. See Lilienthal & Marquis, supra note 42, at 570.
220. See UNITED STATES GOV'T, FY 1991 BUDGET 240 [hereinafter 1991 U.S. BUDGET].
221. 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2(c)(2) (1988). Amendments, however, ameliorated this situation.
Although the quota system governing who can be on the board has not changed, every share now
gets an equal vote on all 14 private directors. Id. § 1087-2(c)(1)(A), 2(f)(4) (creating a single
class of voting common stock).
It did not take long for the change in voting structure to have an effect: In June 1995, Sallie
Mae became the first GSE to undergo a proxy fight. A dissident slate of eight directors, including
a former CEO, won seats on the board in a bitterly contested election sparked by dipping share
prices, and disagreements about Sallie Mae's response to proposed privatization legislation, H.R.
1720, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See Albert B. Crenshaw, Sallie Mae Dropping Proxy Fight;
Company to Seat All 8 Dissidents, WASH. POST, June 27, 1995, at D2 (noting that Sallie was
abandoning court challenge to election of dissident directors); Maggie Urry, Sallie Mae Rebels
Win Board Row, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1995, at 29.
As this article went to press, the Clinton administration announced that it planned to intro-
duce its own privatization legislation, differing from H.R. 1720, that would affect both Sallie Mae
and Connie Lee. Sallie Mae's management described the administration's bill as "unacceptable"
because it would require Sallie Mae to disband if its shareholders voted against privatization. See
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control Sallie Mae; a takeover would have required coordinated action
among, say, seven financial institutions and four universities. Sallie
Mae's longstanding (but now greatly lessened) insulation from market
discipline may explain why, until recently, Sallie Mae's management
pursued surprisingly risk-averse policies.22 The need to take risks in
order to increase earnings is greatly reduced if a firm faces no danger
of a hostile takeover.
2. Unclear Directors' Duties
The privately elected directors of a private or mixed-ownership
FGC are presumably subject to the same duties as the directors of an
ordinary corporation. Precisely what law governs these duties is, how-
ever, unclear. There is no federal corporate code, essentially no rele-
vant federal common law outside the context of the Securities Acts,
and most FGCs are exempt from registration requirements."" If a
court were asked to find an applicable law, presumably it would have
to fashion federal common law.224
Very little law governs the duties of presidentially appointed di-
rectors in a mixed-ownership or private federal corporation. At the
turn of the century, the Supreme Court considered the status of
Union Pacific, a private railroad which had a minority of directors
appointed by the President. The Court held that, although the direc-
tors appointed by the President were required to make reports to the
Secretary of the Interior in addition to their ordinary duties, "[tihey
had the same powers as the other directors and no more" because
"Congress did not vest in the government directors any peculiar pow-
ers." '225 The Court emphasized that the presence of the directors ap-
pointed by the President did not alter either the internal governance
of the corporation or its relations with others.2 26
Administration Will Introduce Bill to Privatize Sallie Mae, Connie Lee, Banking Rep. (BNA),
No. 26, at 1231 (June 26, 1995), available in LEXIS, Banking Library, Bnabnk File.
222. See, e.g., CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 260 (expressing puzzlement that unregulated
Sallie Mae has followed low-risk policies that would have been required by a "well-informed and
motivated regulator").
223. The Bush administration proposed legislation that would have removed this exemption.
See 1992 JOINT REPORT, supra note 58, at 33-34.
224. The rule that federal courts construing federal statutes touching corporate law should
borrow state corporate law rules when possible, recently restated in Kamen v. Kemper Financial
Services, 500 U.S. 90 (1991), would not necessarily apply because that rule rests on the fact that
state law defines the powers and duties of a state-chartered corporation. See Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
225. Union Pac. Ry. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 163 U.S. 564, 599 (1896).
226. Id. at 600 ("We regard the position as wholly untenable that this provision for govern-
ment directors took the corporation out of the general rule that except in cases where the charter
imposes a limitation the stockholders are the proper parties to take final action in the management
of the corporate affairs.").
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The Union Pacific case could be read to suggest that so-called
public directors do not have special duties to the public at large. This
simply cannot be right. Requiring presidentially appointed directors
would be pointless, especially in FGCs in which the government owns
no shares, unless the government's directors represented the national
interest in some way. What remains unclear is to what extent these
public directors have special responsibilities and to what extent their
duties are the same as ordinary directors whose fiduciary duties in-
clude the traditional duties of diligence and loyalty to the corporation
and its shareholders. More troubling, no body of law exists to guide
the directors themselves in reconciling the two sets of duties should
they conflict.
The issue has been further confused by Justice Scalia's recent
opinion in Lebron. He distinguishes between so-called nongovernmen-
tal, albeit government-controlled, corporations such as Conrail, in
which the "responsibilities of the federal directors are not different
from those of the other directors-to operate [the corporation] at a
profit for the benefit of its shareholders, ' 22 7 from governmental, gov-
ernment-controlled, corporations such as Amtrak, in which the public
directors have other duties besides profit, as set forth in the corpora-
tion's charter.2  Justice Scalia's distinction is unfortunate not only
because it relies on a case that wrongly determined whether Conrail
was part of the government,22 9 but also because it mistakenly implies
that private directors might not share in the duty to give effect to the
public purpose specified in an FGC's charter.
Although the duties owed by executive and nonexecutive direc-
tors sometimes differ, the fiduciary duties to which they are subject
are basically the same. A government director, whose role resembles
that of a nonexecutive director in an ordinary corporation, may
feel-and should feel-a duty to represent the public interest. 3 0 It is
not obvious, however, how government directors are supposed to act
on this feeling. Further, even if government directors are expected to
use their votes and influence to promote the public interest, their in-
fluence may not be equal to the task when they are in the minority.231
227. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 974 (1995) (quoting Re-
gional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 152 (1974)).
228. Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. § 501a).
229. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
230. Dianne Hobbs, Personal Liability of Directors of Federal Government Corporations,
30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 733, 740-41 (1980). A few authors have suggested that public directors
should be required in all large private corporations. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation
of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional
Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1981); see also Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate
Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1984) (surveying a wide variety of reform proposals).
231. Herman Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors in a Private Corporation:
The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARV. L. REV. 350, 353-54, 358-59 (1965); see
also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
[Vol. 1995
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
(Suppose, for example, that the corporation is considering trade-offs
between profit maximization and nonpecuniary social interests such as
environmental quality or compliance with current government policy.)
On the other hand, if the presidentially appointed directors primarily
function as the eyes, ears, and mouthpieces of the President and the
federal bureaucracy, then numbers are less important, although there
may be a conflict with duties of confidentiality owed to the corpora-
tion. The conflicts are likely to be particularly acute if the director is
privy to corporate secrets concerning litigious or contractual relation-
ships with the government. Some evidence suggests that the private
directors of more than one FGC, not blind to the potentially dual loy-
alties of the directors appointed by the President, have cut them out
of key decisions. 2
In addition to the duties resulting from their public status, the
government directors of a corporation may share the personal liability
that emanates from acceptance of an ordinary directorship. Directors
are often insured against their personal liability for negligence. Gov-
ernment officials do not always enjoy similar protection; some types of
liability for official wrongs may be uninsurable as against public
policy.",
Directors appointed by the President may sometimes find them-
selves in anomalous positions. For example, the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) served for about a year as an ex
officio member of Freddie Mac's board of directors. HUD was also
Freddie Mac's regulator. As a result, HUD issued no regulations af-
fecting Freddie Mac, fearing that regulations would be inappropriate
while the Secretary served in this dual capacity.23 4
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991) (discussing shortcomings of monitoring cur-
rently performed by (private) outside directors). Note also that the other shareholders' right to
complain about the public directors' disloyalty is likely to be limited: shareholders, after all, were
on notice as to the presence of the directors appointed by the President when they bought their
shares. Further, if the directors appointed by the President are seen as officers of the United
States, they may enjoy governmental immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982);
Butz v. Economu, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978) (describing qualified immunity granted to execu-
tive officials).
232. See Schwartz, supra note 231, at 354-63 (describing mistreatment of government di-
rectors by private directors, e.g., not inviting government representatives to directors meetings and
committee meetings, failing to consult them on mergers, dividends, and debt); see also Union Pac.
Ry. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 163 U.S. 564, 598 (1896) (railroad delegated all authority to
executive committee, thereby freezing out public directors).
233. PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 85 (1983); see also Hobbs, supra note 230, at
742 (discussing liability of federal officials).
234. See Treasury, CBO and GAO Reports on FNMA, FHLMC and the Federal Home
Loan Bank System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of
the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1991) [here-
inafter HUD Hearings] (statement of Alfred Dellibovi, Deputy Secretary, HUD).
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3. Voting the Government's Stock
Voting the government's shares in a corporation is either an act
of appointment (when electing directors), or an act that can affect the
rights, duties, and responsibilities of a person outside the legislative
branch (when voting on any other type of shareholder's resolution). In
the case of the latter, it is either an executive act or one that Congress
can only exercise in conformity with the bicameralism and present-
ment requirement of the Constitution.3 5
No statute or case determines how the government's shares
should be voted on shareholder's resolutions.23 ' Immigration & Natu-
ralization Services v. Chadha suggests that Congress could pass legis-
lation, duly presented to the President, that would mandate that the
directors appointed by the President submit a particular resolution or
that the nation's shares be voted for or against a particular share-
holder initiative.23 7 In the absence of legislation, the President, or his
delegate, is presumably the nation's proxy-holder. The alternative is to
share the nation's proxies among the publicly appointed directors.
4. Private Shareholders' Rights
Shareholders in an FGC have few obvious rights.2"8 If a corpora-
tion is private enough to avoid being subjected to constitutional
prohibitions,239 but still a creature of federal law, then the only appar-
ent source for shareholders rights, beyond the few provisions con-
tained in the corporation's charter, is federal common law. Federal
charters ordinarily set out the voting rights that attach to a share of
stock. Such provisions probably suffice to create a private right of ac-
tion if the right to vote such a share is somehow impaired. Other
traditional corporate claims, such as waste and acting ultra vires, ei-
ther do not exist or, if they do exist, must arise from the federal com-
mon law of corporations or from federal common law regulating the
235. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. See generally Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens
for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding that participation of
members of Congress in committee with power to veto decisions regarding local airports violated
separation of powers); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51
(1983).
236. In 1834, however, the Attorney General opined that the U.S.'s dividends from the
Bank of the United States were federal property and could not be withheld or set off by the Bank.
See 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 663 (1834).
237. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 & n.19.
238. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934). But see Fahey v. O'Melveny &
Myers, 200 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1952) (holding that Due Process Clause does not apply to relations
between FHLBank and its shareholders), cert. denied sub nom. Mallonee, Bucklin & Fergus v.
Fahey, 345 U.S. 952 (1953). For an analysis concluding that shareholders in Fannie Mae have
practically no rights at all, see Comment, FNMA and the Rights of Private Investors: Her Heart
Still Belongs to Daddy, 59 GEO. L.J. 369, 376-85 (1970).
239. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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(implicit) contract formed when an investor purchases a share. If the
courts have the authority to make such federal common law, they
have yet to do so. Thus, any discussion of shareholders' rights in
FGCs is fundamentally speculative. Apparently, no shareholder ac-
tion, derivative or otherwise, has succeeded against any federally
chartered corporation in this century.240 Until this year, no federal
corporation has been the subject of a takeover or even a proxy fight.
One reason for the lack of reported cases may be that private share-
holders in a private or mixed-ownership corporation chartered by
Congress face a daunting task in making a claim against the corpora-
tion or its directors unless Congress has subjected the corporation to
the laws of the District of Columbia. Or, it may be that shareholders
in the for-profit FGCs that issue stock lack the motive to bring a
claim because they make sufficiently high returns on their investment.
D. Sovereign Immunity and the Merrill Doctrine
The greater an FGC's entitlement to sovereign immunity, the
more it enjoys an advantage over private competitors. If an FGC is
private, then it has no right to sovereign immunity unless Congress,
by statute, chooses to grant that immunity. If an FGC is public,
whether it has sovereign immunity is a question of statutory construc-
tion involving both the FGC's charter and the various limited statu-
tory waivers of the United States's immunity. Courts have found two
types of immunity that apply to FGCs: sovereign immunity from tort
claims and protection from estoppel claims based on employee con-
duct. The interplay between these two areas has not only given many
FGCs an advantage over private competitors, but it has given some
FGCs greater immunity from suit than is available to ordinary federal
agencies.
1. Sovereign Immunity
As a general rule, when a federal incorporated (or even unincor-
porated) entity is "launched into the commercial world" 24 ' the gov-
ernment is assumed to have "accepted the ordinary incidents of suits
in such business," '242 unless there are statutory grounds for a different
240. The odds of success are remote. See First Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Student
Loan Mktg. Ass'n, No. 84-1014 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 16, 1985) (order granting motion to dismiss)
(S&L that held shares in Sallie Mae failed to state claim when it filed shareholder suit seeking to
block Sallie Mae's acquisition of state S&L as ultra vires under Sallie Mae charter).
241. Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 520 (1984).
242. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U.S. 76, 79 (1925); see also cases cited supra
note 38.
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conclusion. Torts are one area where courts have found grounds for an
exception.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)243  provides a limited
waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain
torts of federal agency employees. The FTCA defines federal agencies
as including "the executive departments, . . . independent establish-
ments of the United States, and corporations [other than contractors]
primarily acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States
...." If the FTCA applies, it ordinarily provides the exclusive
monetary remedy for the tort-even if the federal agency employing
the tortfeasor has a sue-and-be-sued clause in its charter.24 5
Courts seeking to determine whether the FTCA applies usually
examine five factors: (1) the federal government's ownership interest
in the entity; (2) the federal government's control over the entity's
activities; (3) the entity's structure; (4) government involvement in
the entity's finances; and (5) the entity's function or mission. 24 '6 Thus,
the Seventh Circuit recently held that the FTCA did not apply to
Freddie Mac because it was not one of the "corporations primarily
acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States '2 47 con-
templated by that act.248 The Seventh Circuit did not explain why
Freddie Mac, which is a mixed-ownership GSE in which the govern-
243. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
244. Id. § 2671.
245. Id. § 2679(a): "The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own
name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are
cognizable under [28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)]." In the FTCA Congress "wished to 'place torts of
"suable" agencies of the United States upon precisely the same footing as torts of "nonsuable"
agencies.'" Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 562 (1988) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945)).
246. See Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1992) (collecting
cases); see also United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976) (Community Action Agency, cre-
ated pursuant to Economic Opportunity Act, not federal agency for FTCA); Logue v. United
States, 412 U.S. 521 (1973) (private contractor exception to FTCA); FDIC v. Citizens Bank
Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 829 (1979) (holding FDIC is federal
agency within FTCA); Safeway Portland Employees' Federal Credit Union v. FDIC, 506 F.2d
1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1974) (same); Freeling v. FDIC, 221 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Okla. 1962), afid
per curiam, 326 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1963) (same). But see Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239
(9th Cir. 1982) (Federal Reserve Bank not federal agency under FTCA because federal govern-
ment does not control it); Pearl v. United States, 230 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1956) (Civil Air Patrol
not controlled by United States).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
248. Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that the government (1) has no ownership interest in Freddie Mac, (2) does not control
it, (3) appoints only a minority of its directors, and (4) makes no appropriations to it. Id. at 1138.
These factors outweighed the fact that Freddie Mac "furthers an important federal mission, and
does act as a federal agency or instrumentality in this sense," id. at 1139. The court found that
this factor was "not dispositive when weighed against the other four factors." Id.
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ment holds no stock, was entitled to sovereign immunity at all,249 and
this seems to be the minority rule. 50
2. The Merrill Doctrine
The Merrill doctrine holds that estoppel generally cannot be ap-
plied, at least offensively, against the government.2 51 Although origi-
nally based on principles of sovereign immunity, the doctrine also has
been justified as deriving from separation of powers and public
policy.2 52
The Merrill case concerned the Crop Insurance Corporation, a
wholly owned FGC that the Supreme Court equated with "the Gov-
ernment. '25 s The doctrine is routinely applied to actions against fed-
eral agencies .2 The Seventh and D.C. Circuits have held that, be-
cause Freddie Mac has a public mission, it too should be entitled to
Merrill doctrine protection. 55 Because of this protection, in the Sev-
enth Circuit and D.C. Circuit at least, FGCs like Freddie Mac enjoy
the best of both worlds. Like federal agencies, they have sovereign
immunity and Merrill doctrine protection. Yet, unlike federal agen-
249. The Seventh Circuit alluded to this problem in a footnote, Mendrala, 955 F.2d at 1134
n.3.
Had Freddie Mac been a foreign corporation it would not have been entitled to foreign sover-
eign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1988) (limiting foreign sovereign immunity to corpora-
tions that are organs of a foreign state or are at least 50% owned by foreign government); id.
§ 1605(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (commercial activity exception to immunity).
250. The D.C. Circuit appears to be the only circuit with a similar rule. Construing the
FTCA, the D.C. Circuit found the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency immune to
suit "in spite of its name and its limited area of operation," because "[r]edevelopment of the
Nation's capital is 'the policy of the United States' " and the "Agency receives direct appropria-
tions from the Congress," and "acquires land 'for the use of the United States.' " Goddard v.
District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 287 F.2d 343, 345 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 910 (1961).
A more common result is that found in, for example, the Ninth Circuit. In Lewis v. United
States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982), the Court found that Federal Reserve Banks are not im-
mune from suit under the FTCA because (1) the government does not have control over their day-
to-day operations, (2) the banks are not listed as wholly owned or mixed-ownership government
corporations in 31 U.S.C. § 846 or 31 U.S.C. § 856, (3) they are privately owned and receive no
congressional monies, and (4) the banks are empowered to sue and be sued in 12 U.S.C. § 341. Id.
at 1240-42.
251. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). Recent reaffirmations include
Office of Personnel Management v. Richmon, 496 U.S. 414 (1990), and Heckler v. Community
Health Services, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 63 (1984).
252. See Richmon, 496 U.S. 414; Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1158-60 (7th
Cir. 1982).
253. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384-85. The plaintiff sought compensation for an employee's mis-
information regarding the insurability of a crop.
254. Cf. A.E. Alie & Sons, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 897 F.2d 591 (1st Cir. 1990)
(criticizing Azar); Rider v. United States Postal Serv., 862 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). But
see Azar v. United States Postal Serv., 777 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1985) (Merrill doctrine held not
applicable to (unincorporated) U.S. Postal Service on facts similar to Merrill).
255. Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1992); McCauley v.
Thygerson, 732 F.2d 978, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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cies they are not subject to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the
FTCA.
All FGCs that enjoy sovereign immunity receive greater protec-
tion from suit than is available to a private competitor. This advan-
tage persists when the FTCA applies because the government waives
less than the full extent of private liability. As a counterweight, how-
ever, those same FGCs may be subject to constitutional restrictions as
federal actors. FGCs that enjoy sovereign immunity, Merrill protec-
tion, and are not subject to the FTCA, have greater immunity from
suit than is available to either private competitors or agencies-and
may not be federal actors subject to the Constitution.
Logically, sovereign immunity should go hand in hand with sta-
tus as a state or federal actor. The same policies that determine
whether constitutional restrictions apply to an entity should be used to
determine whether an entity is entitled to the special protections re-
served for the nation's agents. Although Congress could, by legisla-
tion, confer sovereign immunity on a private body, it makes as little
sense for courts to create a class of entities that have sovereign immu-
nity but are not federal actors as it would to create a class of agencies
that are federal actors but are ineligible for any immunity. The anom-
alous position of FGCs like Freddie Mac, combined with the wording
of the FTCA, has produced, in a minority of circuits, a peculiar result
which does not deserve wider acceptance and may, in fact, warrant
reversal. Unfortunately, this minority includes the D.C. Circuit, which
is where the majority of such cases are likely to be heard.2 56
E. Lessened Accountability to Congress
The Constitution provides that ordinary agencies are formally ac-
countable to Congress in at least three ways. First, what Congress
creates, Congress can destroy; that is, Congress can simply abolish an
agency.57 Similarly, Congress can restructure an agency or require it
to act in some manner. Second, Congress has the power of the
purse.2 58 Third, all civil officers of the federal government are im-
256. There is, however, no reason to deny to wholly government owned and controlled cor-
porations the full benefit of whatever estoppel rule applies to the government. Thus, Helm v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 18 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1994) (no estoppel against FDIC), and Kershaw v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 987 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (no estoppel against RTC),
were correctly decided.
257. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 534 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (Congress may
repeal tenure or salary of public officers); Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1890)
(Congress cannot be required to fund office not specified in Constitution). For the odd suggestion
that Congress cannot constitutionally abolish some administrative offices, see Richard A. Cirillo,
Comment, Abolition of Federal Offices as an Infringement on the President's Power to Remove
Federal Executive Officers: A Reassessment of Constitutional Doctrines, 42 FORDHAM L. REV.
562, 590-93 (1974).
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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peachable,2 59 which presumably includes the publicly appointed direc-
tors of an FGC. Congress's continuing oversight of agency behavior is
a fourth, informal and erratic, source of accountability. If FGCs are
public bodies, then they are subject to all of these congressional pow-
ers, although the power of the purse may have less influence over an
FGC with an independent source of income.2 0
Perhaps by design, private and mixed-ownership FGCs are signif-
icantly less accountable to Congress than agencies. Because they have
alternate sources of funding-debt, equity, or revenue from transac-
tions-Congress's power of the purse is lessened.26' In addition, be-
cause private directors of an FGC do not hold civil office under the
Constitution, they are not impeachable. Nevertheless, Congress's lev-
erage over FGCs contains both carrots-removing restrictions on an
FGC's activities and providing direct funding-and sticks-adding
new restrictions, subjecting the FGC to regulation, and abolishing the
FGC entirely.
1. Keeping It Out of Politics
Sometimes FGCs are created in an attempt to insulate an activ-
ity from the political process. Entrusting federal responsibilities, or
even just federal money, to corporations subject to varying degrees of
presidential and congressional control raises difficult questions of con-
stitutional and administrative law, such as when the corporation's ac-
tion should be characterized as federal action, and whether the corpo-
ration must observe First Amendment, due process, and other
restrictions in its dealings with the public.2 62
Another fundamental question is whether any justification ever
exists for keeping an activity that owes its inspiration and at least part
of its funding to the government "out of politics." For many years
there has been a consensus that certain areas of public life, notably
the money supply, should be insulated from direct political control
and entrusted to autonomous bodies such as the Federal Reserve
Board. Privately owned FGCs are far more independent than the Fed-
eral Reserve Board. The attempt to keep an FGC "out of politics"
259. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, § 3, cl. 6.
260. If a corporation is public then presumably its funds belong to the United States and
could be reprogrammed by Congress; ultimately the corporation could even be liquidated.
261. Indeed, the debates at the framing of the Constitution reflected the fear that the fed-
eral sale and disposal power might become, in Story's words, "a source of such immense revenue
to the national government, as to make it independent of and formidable to the people." 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1320, at 196 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. ed., 1991).
262. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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does not always succeed,26 a which is perhaps fortunate as "out of
politics" also means beyond the reach of democratic accountability.
2. Serving the Clients
FGCs are used to subsidize certain sectors of the economy. Once
the political decision has been made to give a particular group or ac-
tivity a federal subsidy, an FGC has political advantages as the vehi-
cle for delivery of the benefits. Because some FGC accounts are usu-
ally not included in the main part of the federal budget, the subsidy
may not be as visible, tending to reduce the opposition from compet-
ing interest groups. Because an FGC can operate outside the ordinary
bureaucracy, and often enjoys more freedom from congressional and
executive control than an agency, Congress also insulates the subsidy
program from future Presidents and, to a great degree, future Con-
gresses as well.
A federal charter that creates a self-sustaining corporation pro-
vides the enacting Congress with an almost unique means of insulat-
ing a program that benefits a favored group from future Con-
gresses.2 6" Using an FGC to deliver a subsidy has the additional
advantage of not requiring a direct federal expenditure, although it
almost inevitably involves indirect costs to the Treasury and compet-
ing private interests.
Ordinarily a statute establishing a new program can, at most, set
up an institution that will administer it and authorize funding for it.
A separate funding bill is then required to appropriate the money.
Funding bills typically appropriate money only for the coming year.
Thus, the agency remains on a short leash, and the program's benefi-
ciaries are dependent on future Congresses to approve the annual ap-
propriations. By contrast, a self-sustaining program has two advan-
263. The Legal Services Corporation (LSC), an FGC, is a case in point. Cf. Warren E.
George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 681 (1976) (dis-
cussing controversies over LSC policies); Bush Names Directors of Legal Services Corp., N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at A12 (reporting that, for third time in three years, President Bush made
10 recess re-appointments to LSC because Congress refused to confirm incumbents).
264. Of course, the House and the Senate are not the only parts of government that have an
interest in cutting out future Congresses. See supra note 16. This interest may, if anything, be
stronger in the executive branch:
Special constituencies and their patron committees in the Congress have joined forces to gain
independence from controls by the Executive. The Executive itself has sometimes (as when
Fannie Mae was given private status) taken the initiative in such efforts to placate these
constituencies or to reduce the apparent size of federal expenditures and deficits. Each new
enterprise or loan guarantee has been treated as a special case and new corporations were
created in an ad hoc manner disregarding prior experience and the rules of responsible gov-
ernment in which public funds must be properly accounted for by private officials.
NAPA, supra note 45, at 17. For a discussion of the ways in which legislators bind their succes-
sors, and an analysis of their reasons for doing so, see Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legis-
latures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 698-721 (1988).
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tages. First, its appropriations do not have to compete with other
programs for funds. Second, Congress can entrench a program so that
future Congresses must take strong affirmative action to kill it. Be-
cause the legislative process .makes it far easier to block legislation
than to secure its passage, an entrenched program requires only a
blocking minority in one House rather than enacting majorities and
presidential assent. The result is the rent-seeker's paradise: a one-time
victory is locked in virtually forever. Subsidy programs may benefit
from an additional degree of political camouflage if the general public
comes to perceive the FGC as a private body. A suitably camouflaged,
privately owned FGC has an enhanced capacity to capture rents with-
out attracting political opposition because the public is not as aware
that the rents are going to the private shareholders. 6
The ultimate entrenchment device creates a property right that
the government must buy back in order to cancel the program.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward established that a state's grant of a
corporate charter can be a contract vesting rights in the corpora-
tion.2 6 The effects of a federal charter are not any different except
that, unlike the State of New Hampshire in the Dartmouth College
case, the federal government may impair the obligation of con-
tracts,26 including corporate charters. In theory then, congressional
amendments to a private or mixed-ownership FGC's charter that
lessen the value of a charter could be characterized as a taking of
private shareholders' property compensable under the Fifth Amend-
ment. That is, if a vested right is diminished, shareholders may have a
right to claim compensation.2 66 To avoid such claims, Congress has
reserved the power to amend or repeal at will in many federal corpo-
rate charters.26 9
265. A large theoretical literature exists concerning rent-seeking through government action
or a government franchise. See, e.g., TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY
(James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) [hereinafter BUCHANAN]; MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley et
al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter ROWLEY]; Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and
Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 3 (1971).
266. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 641-50 (1819). But see
Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442 (1932); Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684,
690 (1899), overruled on other grounds, Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6, 17 (1917).
267. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 applies only to the states. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.25 (1985); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 723-33 (1984).
268. See I Op. Off. Legal Counsel 126 (1977); see also Hobbs, supra note 230, at 757
n. 116 (describing congressional restructuring of TVA). For a careful discussion of possible consti-
tutional limits to the federal government's power to renege on contracts, including Due Process
Clause limits, see Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The
Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 936-44 (1990).
269. E.g., "The Bank shall have perpetual existence unless and until its charter is revoked
or modified by Act of Congress. The right to revise, amend, or modify the charter of the Bank is
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An FGC in which the government owns no stock also has a po-
tential source of leverage over Congress that agencies lack. Agencies,
and corporations in which the federal government owns stock, are not
allowed to expend their funds to lobby Congress or make campaign
contributions. Private FGCs, even those in which the federal govern-
ment appoints directors, are not so constrained. 270 Thus, creating a
private corporation with a source of funding not only creates a pro-
gram that can be protected from future Congresses, it also creates one
with special means of advancing its own interests. For example, when
the Reagan administration indicated that it was considering making
Fannie Mae fully independent, 271 Fannie Mae established a political
action committee to oppose the Reagan administration initiatives.272 It
also took out more than $100,000 worth of newspaper advertisements
to "raise housing as an issue in this election year." Fannie Mae's
chairman reportedly told congressmen that if they severed Fannie
Mae's links to the government, he would make sure that they had to
"run for reelection on a platform that you just made it more expensive
to buy a home. '27 1 Contributions to federal candidates must be dis-
closed and are relatively easy to monitor. A more insidious problem is
the ability of some FGCs to make contributions to private advocacy
groups which then lobby Congress on the FGCs' behalf.274
Fannie Mae, the oldest GSE, is a privately owned FGC that con-
centrates on the secondary mortgage market. The President appoints
just over a quarter of its directors.2 75 Fannie Mae earned about $1.6
billion in 1994, giving it an after-tax return on equity of 24%, which
specifically and exclusively reserved to the Congress." 12 U.S.C. § 3011 (1988) (charter of Na-
tional Consumer Cooperative Bank).
270. 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1988). This prohibition on lobbying with appropriated moneys ap-
plies to any "officer or employee of the United States or of any department or agency thereof,"
id.; agency is defined to include "any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary
interest, unless the context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense."
Id. § 6.
271. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DaV., 1987 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, ch. 3-4 (1989), cited in CBO STUDY, supra note
57, at 16 n.9. The President's Commission on Privatization also recommended that Fannie Mae
should be fully privatized and that during a transition period it should pay fees for federal attrib-
utes, increase equity-to-asset ratios, and satisfy SEC registration requirements. PRIVATIZATION,
supra note 126, at 38.
272. STANTON, supra note 26, at 5, 120.
273. Fran Hawthorne, Fannie Mae Flexes Its Muscles, INST'L INVESTOR, Nov. 1988, at
131.
274. See H.R. REP. No. 206, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 114-15 (1991) (dissenting views of Rep.
Jim Leach: "The committee's judgment on the housing provisions of the bill unfortunately was
clouded by the endorsement of the approach favored by Fannie and Freddie by a variety of ac-
tivist consumer groups which without notification to Congress became recipients of substantial
contributions from the two GSEs."). Both direct lobbying by FGCs and lobbying via in-
termediaries may fit the profile of rent-seeking behavior.
275. 12 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Fannie Mae currently has a board of 18
directors, five of whom are appointed by the President for one-year terms and the remainder of
whom are elected annually by the common stockholders. Id.
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compares well to the average return on equity of 14.9 % for all FDIC-
insured commercial banks and 16.4% for the Standard & Poor's
(S&P) 500 companies."' 6 Fannie Mae's profitability rests heavily on
its ability to borrow more cheaply than any private competitor. 77 Es-
timates vary, but the consensus is that Fannie Mae saves somewhere
between 30-75 basis points in borrowing costs compared to an AA-
rated private borrower. 278 About half of this pricing advantage is
thought to come from the implicit federal guarantee. 7 9 Fannie Mae's
sheer size is a factor as well: Size creates economies of scale. More-
over, size, when coupled with an ever-increasing number of mortgage-
backed securities (MBSs) and other outstanding obligations, enhances
the secondary market for those obligations. In turn, a strong second-
ary market provides an incentive for acquiring more obligations.2 80
The implicit government guarantee can be viewed as a subsidy to
Fannie Mae. The only direct costs to the Treasury, however, are the
contingent liability if Fannie Mae defaults and the government de-
cides to fulfill the market's expectation of an implicit guarantee. In
addition, Treasury borrowing costs may increase due to the perception
276. See supra note 187 (describing FNMA profits in 1990 and 1994).
277. See, e.g., GAO CREDIT STUDY, supra note 25, at 28 (noting importance of market's
perception of implicit guarantee in determining advantageous pricing of GSE debt).
278. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 10 n.6 (citing studies seeking to measure value of
GSE's borrowing advantages). One would expect a comparison between FGC debt and AAA, not
AA, bonds because of the implicit federal government guarantee they enjoy. However, available
studies use AA bonds as their benchmark because the AA rating is the rating most commonly
held by mortgage backed securities. Id. at 126. One basis point equals 0.01 %. JOHN DoWNES &
JORDAN GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 31 (2d ed. 1985).
279. S&P defines an AA rating, its second highest, as "having a very strong capacity to pay
interest and repay principal and differs from the highest rated issues only in small degree." TREA-
SURY GSE STUDY, supra note 26, at A-2. A recent report states that Fannie Mae mortgage-
backed securities are priced about 30-40 basis points below AA-rated private mortgage-backed
securities. STANTON, supra note 26, at 76-77, although Hawthorne, supra note 273, at 125, sug-
gests the savings may be as much as 50 basis points ( %). The Treasury estimates that Fannie
Mae saves somewhere between 35-75 basis points. 1990 U.S. BUDGET, supra note 26, at 11-229.
280. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 13. Recently, the Treasury Department asked S&P to
rate Fannie Mae's financial safety and soundness on the assumption that it was cut off from any
further federal cash. S&P gave Fannie Mae an "A-" rating. TREASURY GSE REPORT, supra note
26, at A-36. An "A" rating is defined as having "a strong capacity to pay interest and repay
principal although it is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circum-
stances and economic conditions than debt in higher rated categories." A plus or minus suffix
signifies "relative standing with the ... rating category." Id. at A-2, A-3. S&P rated four other
GSEs as follows: The Farm Credit System was rated at "BB." S&P defines BB as having "less
near-term vulnerability to default than other speculative issues. However, it faces major ongoing
uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial or economic conditions which could lead to
inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and principal payments." Id. at A-2, A-5. The Federal
Home Loan Bank System was rated at AAA, which S&P defines as "[c]apacity to pay interest
and repay principal is extremely strong." Id. at A-l, A-18. Freddie Mac was rated at A+. Id. at
A-25. Sallie Mae was rated at AAA. Id. at A-46. This suggests that Fannie Mae's actual borrow-
ing advantage over comparable private sector borrowers may be even greater than 30-75 basis
points. See also supra note 26.
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that GSE debt is a relatively good substitute (substitution cost).281 No
study has measured the effect of GSE debt on the market for Trea-
sury bonds, but estimates based on more general empirical work sug-
gest an increase of no more than 2.5 basis points in the Treasury's
short-term cost of borrowing for every $100 billion of GSE debt is-
sued, and negligible long-term effects.2 82
Measuring how much of the federal "subsidy" to Fannie Mae is
passed on to mortgage borrowers, who are presumably the intended
beneficiaries of the subsidy, is a difficult exercise, but studies suggest
that the existence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the secondary
market ultimately lowers mortgage rates by up to 50 basis points.2 8 3
Further evidence that Fannie Mae passes on at least a significant
fraction of its lower costs to primary lenders comes from studies dem-
onstrating that Fannie Mae's entry into new product markets in the
securities field has lowered interest rates in those markets. 84
The difference between the estimate of Fannie Mae's borrowing
advantage (30-75 basis points) and the estimate of the benefit to con-
sumers (25-50 basis points) suggests that while borrowers are getting
the lion's share of the savings, either Fannie Mae and/or primary
mortgage lenders are benefiting from a rent of up to 50 basis points
(one-half percent) on mortgage loans. This rent originates, at least in
part, from the investment community's perception that Fannie Mae
debt has an implicit federal guarantee. Given that Fannie Mae is ex-
pected to issue more than $121 billion in mortgage backed securities
in 1996,285 even a quarter of a percent spread adds up to $300 million.
In fact, the Treasury has estimated that the various federal advan-
tages granted to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together are worth
some $2 to $4 billion per year. 86
Borrowing at near-Treasury rates, and in some cases enjoying im-
portant efficiencies of scale made possible by their monopoly or near-
monopoly position in particular credit markets, GSEs can, if they
choose, pass on their savings to the groups to which they lend. Pri-
vately controlled GSEs, however, have no obligation to do so. A pri-
281. Other costs also may fall on Fannie Mae's competitors in the securities and secondary
mortgage markets, some of which may indirectly affect the Treasury. The lost opportunity to sell
the federal guarantee to the GSE represents a further indirect cost to the Treasury.
282. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 18-19. Although the Treasury does not deny the
theoretical possibility of a substitution cost, the Treasury does not agree that sufficient evidence
exists to show that it is significant. TREASURY GSE STUDY, supra note 26, at 47-52. The estimate
of 2.5 basis points represents the estimated cost to the Treasury above the increase it would have
suffered had it issued the same amount of debt itself. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 19.
283. 1990 U.S. BUDGET, supra note 26, at 1-229.
284. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 137-39 (summarizing empirical work to date).
285. See 1996 BUDGET APPENDIX, supra note 80, at 1119.




vately owned GSE can keep much of the profit from its intermedia-
tion for its shareholders and investors.
The evidence that one GSE, Sallie Mae, did not pass on any of
its gains to its ostensible clients-student borrowers 287 -was so damn-
ing that the Clinton administration decided to cut out the middleman
and have the government begin to make student loans directly) 88 In
the case of Fannie Mae, which is the largest GSE, a significant frac-
tion of the interest rate differential goes to its private shareholders,
who receive annual dividends and who benefit from retained earnings
as their stock appreciates. These gains are an amalgam of a rent and
a return on the shareholders' investment, but it is difficult to say
which element predominates. The efficient markets hypothesis sug-
gests that shareholders should bid up the price of Fannie Mae stock to
a level at which it provides no better risk/return combination than
other shares.2 89 Similarly, although bond holders receive a higher re-
turn than Treasury bill holders, they bear the risk, however minimal,
that the GSE will fold and the government will not mount a rescue.
The small premium over T-Bills presumably reflects the market's esti-
mate of the value of this risk. Thus, although Fannie Mae benefits
from a rent, if the financial markets are efficient then neither current
lenders nor investors in Fannie Mae's equity in the secondary market
necessarily benefit from it.
Whether purchasers of the original issue of a GSE's equity se-
cure a rent by purchasing shares may depend on the conditions under
which the equity is issued and, in some cases, whether investors have
the foresight or good fortune to hold their shares long enough. If the
shares are issued on the open market, investors should bid up the
shares to a point at which there is no rent to be had. If shares are
issued to a limited class of persons, however, the reduced market may
create a potential rent.2 90
287. See STANTON, supra note 57, at v, 11; see also infra note 298 (explaining how Sallie
Mae avoids bearing any risk). Recent reforms to Sallie Mae's loan authority may change this.
288. See 1995 BUDGET ANALYSIS, supra note 26, at 142-43 (summarizing new program);
Dean Foust, Sallie Mae: Still a Big Woman On Campus?, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at 160.
289. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM
COMMON STOCKS (2d ed. 1983).
290. Freddie Mac provides an example of a related phenomenon. Freddie Mac used to be
owned by the Federal Home Loan Bank System and its members, and was governed by members
of the FHLB Board. In 1989, the FIRREA reforms made Freddie Mac an independent, privately
owned entity managed by an 18 person board (5 appointed by the President and 13 elected by
common shareholders) but subject to regulation by HUD. See 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). Freddie Mac now has a statutory mission that is virtually identical to Fannie Mae's, and
the two are effectively competitors in the secondary mortgage market. In 1984, Freddie Mac
issued preferred nonvoting stock that could be held only by S&Ls. In 1988, the Freddie Mac
board relaxed the ownership restriction, raising the value of the stock held by S&Ls from $50/
share to more than $100/share almost overnight. See Nathanial C. Nash, Freddie Mac Clears
Stock Sale, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1988, at Dl. This windfall, however, was not a classic rent
No. 3]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Several public choice theorists have suggested that rents derived
from government benefits will be dissipated totally by socially waste-
ful expenditures to capture them. 91 Once a GSE has secured the
right to a rent it does not need to go back to Congress; its relative
insulation from congressional control and its lack of effective competi-
tors render it relatively immune from the competition that could dissi-
pate its rent.2 92 Investors, however, face the misfortune of having to
compete with each other and, at least in the secondary market, may
well be unable to enjoy any of the rent.
Some of the rent may go to the GSE's employees, although this
fact alone may not differentiate it from an ordinary managerial
firm.2 93 Fannie Mae recently paid its retiring chairman a $20 million
lump-sum pension payment, in addition to his $7 million annual sal-
ary-a payment it justified by saying that he had turned the company
around from losing $1 million per day to earning $1 billion a year. "
Fannie Mae's special stock plan for presidentially appointed directors,
designed to "reinforce the mutuality of interest between such directors
and the company's stockholders," may give those directors an incen-
tive to prefer the stockholders' interests over the public's. 295
In the case of Sallie Mae, which Congress established to make a
secondary market for student loans at a time when private lenders did
not want to invest in them, 96 few of the benefits of the government
because it did not result from an unproductive activity; if anything, the change made the second-
ary market for Freddie Mac shares more efficient by allowing everyone to participate.
291. See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in BUCHANAN, supra note 265, at
97; Gordon Tullock, Back to the Bog, 46 PuB. CHOICE 259 (1985). Strict neoclassical economists
challenge the view that an expenditure aimed at capturing a rent can be characterized as wasteful
given that it is an argument in someone's utility function. See, e.g., Michael A. Brooks & Ben J.
Heijdra, In Search of Rent-Seeking, in ROWLEY, supra note 265, at 27.
292. If there were such an expenditure to secure a GSE charter, it would have to be a one-
time expenditure comparable to the present discounted value of Fannie Mae's charter. There is no
evidence of any such expenditure.
293. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 217. Civil service pay and promotion laws and regu-
lations do not apply to Fannie Mae. 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
294. Cindy Skrycki, Fannie Mae Chief Gets $27 Million Handshake, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Apr. 4, 1991, at 9 (regarding chairman Maxwell's retirement). Subsequently, Mr. Maxwell de-
clined an additional $5.5 million payment for the company's performance after his retirement that
became due to him under a long-term incentive clause in his employment contract. Mr. Maxwell
stated that he feared payment of the additional millions could persuade Congress to restrict the
pay of Fannie Mae executives. Albert B. Crenshaw, $5.5 Million Declined by Ex-Official: Fannie
Mae's Maxwell Feared New Pay Fight, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1992, at Fl. Fannie Mae stated it
would "commit" the funds to low-income housing. Id. In context, "commit" appears to mean
"loan at our usual rate."
295. STANTON, supra note 57, at 26 (quoting FANNIE MAE, PROXY STATEMENT DATED
MARCH 27, 1987, app. C at 1); Ronald Moe & Thomas Stanton, Government-Sponsored Enter-
prises as Federal Instrumentalities: Reconciling Private Management with Public Accountability,
49 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 329 n.33 (1989).
296. Investors were leery of student loans because student loans are risky and expensive to
service. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 242-43. Sallie Mae has cut service costs and enjoys impor-




guarantee reached the students who were the purported benefi-
ciaries.2 7 In addition to benefiting from an implicit federal guarantee,
Sallie Mae deals primarily in loans that are insured by the govern-
ment, which means it faces little if any credit risk. Indeed, the govern-
ment pays a substantial, explicit subsidy to the lenders from which
Sallie Mae purchases loans. 98
FGCs make a politically attractive vehicle for delivering subsidies
because the absence of an actual appropriation makes them appear
costless. If the long-term substitution cost to the Treasury is indeed
negligible as some studies suggest,299 and the subsidies do indeed
reach their intended beneficiaries, FGCs impose no direct costs on the
public.
Regardless of the extent of their direct costs, however, FGCs
clearly create two types of opportunity cost and a contingent risk for
Congress and the taxpayer. First, because an FGC must ordinarily
borrow at a rate slightly higher than the Treasury, the public that the
FGC is designed to serve pays a premium for funds compared to what
it would pay if the debt were guaranteed by the full faith and credit
of the United States. Second, to the extent that private investors pro-
vide the equity for a GSE and receive dividends as a return, the tax-
payer (or the would-be beneficiary of the program) loses sums that
might have been available had the government provided the equity
capital.10 The contingent risk arises from the fact that the govern-
ment might rescue a GSE that fails.
3. The Contingent Risk. The Next S&L Crisis?
The separate personality of an FGC not owned and controlled by
the federal government almost certainly means that the federal gov-
ernment has no formal, legal obligation to make good the debts of an
297. STANTON, supra note 57, at 1 (Sallie Mae "keep[s] most of the benefits for sharehold-
ers rather than passing them on to lower the interest rate on loans it funds.").
298. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 31, 244. Because Sallie Mae deals almost exclusively in
student loans that have been guaranteed by the government, it bears almost no risk. See 1991 U.S.
BUDGET, supra note 220, at 242. Any remaining risk is immediately swapped away. STUDENT
LOAN MKTG. CORP., SALLIE MAE ANN. REP. 1990, at 17. At the end of 1986, Sallie Mae had
purchased $8 billion in guaranteed student loans and provided advances to help fund another $6.5
billion. Sallie Mae also has branched out into many unrelated businesses, e.g., financing home
equity loans. STANTON, supra note 57, at 4. It also has subsidiaries, such as Minnesota Guarantor
Servicing, Inc. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 251. Sallie Mae even bought a savings and
loan, STANTON, supra note 57, at 13 & n.48; see also FRANCES J. LEAZES, JR., ACCOUNTABILITY
AND THE BUSINESS STATE 81-82 (1987) (discussing Sallie Mae's evolution), prompting Congress
to enact limits on Sallie Mae's diversification, prohibiting ownership of a bank, S&L, savings
bank, or credit union. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 259.
299. See supra note 282.
300. The opportunity cost is set off by the use value of the funds that government did not
have to make available initially. In a perfect world the present value of these two sums would be
identical at the time the GSE is created.
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insolvent FGC. Nevertheless one GSE has encountered difficulties
since World War II, and the government has responded by authoriz-
ing up to $4 billion to rescue it.0 1 Given the size of most GSEs, the
political pressure to rescue a failed GSE again almost certainly would
be overwhelming. The practical consequence of this political reality is
to weaken Congress's power of the purse by holding the nation poten-
tially liable for unauthorized debts-debts that may have been in-
curred to increase private profits rather than to further a public pur-
pose set by Congress.
GSEs carry less capital than comparable private financial institu-
tions.302 Either GSEs are not subject to capital requirements,30 8 or the
current rules are antiquated; they fail to provide for GSE expansion
into new types of business, such as guarantees. As a result, GSEs tend
to hold lower capital levels than do regulated financial entities. The
lower capital ratios allow the GSEs to benefit from increased leverage
on the funds they control, which may either increase their ability to
fulfill their public purposes, contribute to the GSEs' profits, or both.30 4
The financial risk from all but a few GSEs appears, however, to
be negligible, and even the GSEs most at risk are not in great dan-
ger. 0 5 The S&L crisis was caused in large part by the perverse incen-
tives produced by federal deposit insurance. The managements of
troubled S&Ls knew that the government insured a large majority of
their depositors' money at a cost that did not account for the riskiness
of an individual S&L's behavior. A failing S&L thus had an incentive
to take desperate, risky measures, and its depositors did not have an
incentive to prevent it. When property prices fell and took the S&L's
assets with them, these S&Ls, given their incentives, reacted ration-
ally, plunging deeper into debt and ultimately incurring losses that
exceeded the sums available to the FSLIC.
In theory, the essentially limitless access to cheap borrowing
could create an incentive for a GSE's management to borrow reck-
301. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 69 (discussing rescue of Farm Credit System); see also
supra note 220 (discussing reasons for FCS insolvency).
302. Private financial institutions that issue securities or guarantees similar to those issued
by GSEs are subject to safety and soundness regulations; the most common type of safety and
soundness regulation is a capital requirement. In theory, requiring a financial enterprise to hold a
certain level of capital discourages excessive risk taking by ensuring that the owners have some-
thing to lose. If nothing else, capital requirements postpone insolvency. See 1991 U.S. BUDGET,
supra note 220, at 251. Increasing the amount of capital that an enterprise must retain reduces its
gearing, or debt-to-equity ratio, thereby reducing its ability to make financial commitments such
as loans or guarantees and (assuming its business is profitable) reducing its profits.
303. Capital requirements are rules requiring an institution to hold a particular percentage
of its assets in liquid or low-risk reserves. For many years Sallie Mac and Farmer Mac had no
minimum capital levels, GAO FRAMEWORK, supra note 187, at 9, but this has now changed. See
20 U.S.C. § 1087-2(r) (Supp. V 1993) (imposing modest capital requirements on Sallie Mae).
304. Alternately, the lower capital requirement may increase the rents available to be paid
out. See supra text following note 264; see also supra note 265.
305. See supra note 26.
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lessly once it reaches a point where it has little or no capital left to
lose. 808 Currently, however, only one of the GSEs is arguably low on
capital, and this moral hazard seems a remote specter.8"' Unlike the
S&Ls, which were numerous and dispersed, and therefore difficult to
monitor, only a handful of GSEs exist, making them relatively easy to
monitor. Indeed, the Treasury argues that GSEs pose a greater threat
than did S&Ls precisely because there are so few of them-the five
largest GSEs alone have obligations that exceed the total deposits of
the more than 2000 insured S&Ls. Mismanagement by a small group
of private persons could, the Treasury argues, expose the government
to (moral) obligations as large as the S&L bailout.808 Implicit in the
Treasury concern is a legitimate fear that because there is no supervi-
sory power over most GSEs' safety and soundness, under the current
regime a GSE could become insolvent, or at least sufficiently capital-
poor to be subject to moral hazards, long before Congress could or-
ganize a response.
4. Inadequacy of the Government Corporation Control Act
Congress's previous attempt to control FGCs was, at most, a lim-
ited success. At the end of World War II, the United States had
sixty-three wholly owned and thirty-eight partly owned FGCs as well
as nineteen noncorporate credit agencies and hundreds of military-run
enterprises.309 In response to this proliferation of FGCs, inconsistent
accounting standards, and a general lack of federal control and ac-
countability,310 Congress enacted the Government Corporation Con-
trol Act (GCCA).811 The GCCA required the liquidation of FGCs
chartered in the District of Columbia and not reincorporated by, or
pursuant to, an act of Congress within the next two and a half
years.312 It subjected all existing FGCs to a new regime of audit and
budgetary control.
From its inception, the GCCA distinguished between wholly
owned government corporations and mixed-ownership corporations.
Wholly owned corporations were subject to much tighter control.
They submitted an annual "business-type budget" to the President to
306. See supra text accompanying note 206.
307. Of the GSEs intended to be self-sustaining, only the Farm Credit System is arguably
in any danger. See supra notes 26, 280.
308. TREASURY GSE STUDY, supra note 26, at 2.
309. WALSH, supra note 175, at 29.
310. See, e.g., Oliver P. Field, Government Corporations. A Proposal, 48 HARv. L. REV.
782 (1935) (describing problems caused by wide variation among then-existing corporations).
311. Pub. L. No. 79-248, 59 Stat. 597 (1945) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105,
9101-09 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter GCCA].
312. GCCA, supra note 311, § 304(b), 59 Stat. at 602.
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modify as he saw fit and then transfer to Congress, 318 and were sub-
ject to periodic audits. 314 The GCCA gave the Treasury the power to
set the terms and price of any debt issued by most FGCs.83 1 (In prac-
tice, however, the Treasury does not exercise this power except to in-
sure that GSE debt is not issued on dates that would conflict with
Treasury issues.) Mixed-ownership government corporations were free
to make their own budgets, although the GCCA contemplated presi-
dential recommendations that mixed-ownership corporations return
government capital to the Treasury." 6
The orderly approach of the GCCA reflected the administrative
theory of the day, which held that the corporate form should be re-
stricted to predominantly commercial government programs. 3 7 Chaos
quickly returned, however, as Congress exempted the majority of
FGCs created after 1945 from all or part of the GCCA. 18 And al-
though the GCCA also prohibits the creation or acquisition of new
FGCs by the executive branch without specific legal authorization,31 9
at times this rule has been ignored. 20
Although the GCCA brought temporary order to the oversight of
the FGCs within its purview, it did little to resolve the basic issue of
where FGCs fit into the legal order. Labelling some FGCs as "pri-
313. 31 U.S.C. § 9103(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The first year's audit covered 58 FGCs
with combined assets of $30 billion. E. LESLIE NORMANTON, ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUDIT,
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN ECONOMIES 157 (Raymond Vernon & Yair Ahoroni
eds., 1981).
314. GCCA, supra note 311, § 105, 59 Stat. at 599. Amendments adopted in 1982 to the
GCCA require the Comptroller General to perform triennial audits of all corporations it covers
and report to Congress, the Treasury, and the President. 31 U.S.C. §§ 9105(a)-06(a) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
315. 31 U.S.C. § 9108(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Mixed-ownership government corpora-
tions are exempt "when the corporation has no capital of the Government," id. § 9108(d)(1), as
are certain other listed corporations. Id. § 9108(d)(2).
316. GCCA, supra note 311, § 203, 59 Stat. at 600.
317. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
318. See, e.g., MOE, supra note 34, at 41-42 (discussing various corporations exempt from
GCCA); Harold Seidman, Public Enterprise in the United States, in 1 ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND
CO-OPERATIVE ECONOMY (1983) (17 out of 30 of the corporations created by Congress in a 15-
year period were exempt from the GCCA).
319. GCCA, supra note 311, § 304(a), 59 Stat. at 602, amended by Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96
Stat. 1042 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 9102 (1983)).
320. The most flagrant case is probably the creation of the Federal Asset Disposition Ad-
ministration (FADA), which was established as a Colorado corporation by an agency that appar-
ently lacked congressional authority to do so. See 1988 Op. Com. Gen. B-226708.3 (1988), availa-
ble in 1988 LEXIS 1587, Genfed Library, Comgen File (concluding that Federal Home Loan
Bank Board "acted improperly" by establishing FADA; and that FADA employees are not fed-
eral employees because they fail to satisfy criteria in 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a) despite being "engaged
in the performance of federal functions"); 134 CONG. REC. E1185-86 (1988) (remarks of Hon.
Paul E. Kanjorski) (alleging FADA was established to evade pay caps, personnel ceilings, and
"budgetary and legal constraints"); see also LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE 144 n.28
(1991) (describing FADA as having potential to achieve best of both worlds by "carry[ing] out
governmental functions, but be able to attract the specialized skills in asset management and
disposal that required private sector salaries" but having "early leadership . . . insensitive to the
political nuances of Washington"); Harold Seidman, The Quasi World of the Federal Govern-
ment, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1988, at 23, 26 (summarizing controversy over FADA).
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vate" and others as "mixed-ownership" may provide a congressional
finding of fact or declaration of policy as to how certain FGCs are to
be treated in the courts, but the categories themselves bear little rela-
tion to the FGC's relations with the government. There is no reason
why, for example, a "mixed-ownership" FGC in which the govern-
ment owns no shares should be treated differently than a private FGC
with some directors appointed by the President.
The result has been confusion: sometimes FGCs are held to be
public, 2' and sometimes they are held to be private or partially pri-
vate. 2' Indicia of publicness include whether the FGC's staff is in the
civil service, and whether the FGC is directly controlled by an
agency823 or by government directors. 24 Indicia of privateness may
focus on the FGC's activity. For example, FGCs engaged in market
transactions, such as foreclosing on a mortgage, usually succeed in
repulsing due process and other constitutional claims as well as claims
that they have a duty to behave like an agency. 85
F. Lessened Accountability to the President and Regulators
If an FGC is public, then its relationship with the President and
with the executive branch is, at a formal level (i.e., discounting politi-
cal constraints), essentially hierarchical. The President does not con-
trol private firms; instead, the agencies that the President controls
have wide regulatory powers. FGCs, however, are often less closely
regulated than their private counterparts. The result in some cases is
321. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995) (Amtrak federal
actor for First Amendment); Gaubert v. United States, 499 U.S. 315, 319 (1991) (FDIC subject
to FTCA); Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958) (fraudulent crop loan applica-
tion made to the Commodity Credit Corporation is a claim against the government within the
False Claims Act); McCauley v. Thygerson, 732 F.2d 978, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Freddie Mac
considered "a federal.entity" for employment relations and hence subject to narrower promissory
estoppel); Rust v. Johnson, 597 F.2d 174, 178 (9th Cir.) (state foreclosure on property subject to
Fannie Mae mortgage was impermissible exercise of state power over "property of the United
States"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 964 (1979); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478, 483 (6th Cir. 1977) (FHLB subject to APA); Rocap v.
Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Fannie Mae subject to FOIA amendment affecting
"Government controlled corporation[s]"); Ackerley v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 1519, 1520-21
(D. Wyo. 1990) (FDIC is subject to FTCA).
322. Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Radio Free Europe
is not a "government controlled corporation"); Warren v. Government Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 611
F.2d 1229, 1232-34 (8th Cir.) (Ginnie Mae foreclosures are not government action), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 847 (1980); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356, 358-60 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Fannie Mae acts are private action); Reconstruction Fin, Corp. v. Langham, 208 F.2d 556, 559
(6th Cir. 1953) (district court had jurisdiction over employment claim because RFC employee is
not federal government employee).
323. See, e.g., Rainwater, 356 U.S. at 591 (noting that Commodity Credit Corp. is subject
to supervision and direction by the Secretary of Agriculture and that all Commodity Credit em-
ployees are deemed Department of Agriculture employees).
324. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. 961.
325. See supra note 322.
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that the President, and the executive branch as a whole, lack both the
direct authority and the regulatory authority to ensure that FGCs ac-
complish their statutory objectives.
1. Attenuated Accountability of Publicly Appointed Directors
The President has formal control over most federal agencies.3 2 6
In modern practice, the constitutional concept of a unitary executive
headed by the President is sufficiently flexible to permit the existence
of independent agencies headed by officials whom the President ap-
points to fixed terms during which he ordinarily cannot remove them
without cause. Even with this significant exception to the President's
otherwise plenary power over the top officials in the executive branch,
the hallmarks of the President's executive primacy include his power
to appoint all, and remove nearly all, principal officers in the executive
branch. In Bowsher v. Synar, as in earlier cases, the Supreme Court
emphasized the close connection between the power to remove an offi-
cial and the power to control her. 27 The President's appointment and
removal power is the formal foundation of agency accountability to
the President, just as Congress's ability to change an agency's powers
by statute, and its power of the purse, are the formal foundations of
accountability to Congress. The FGCs that are wholly owned by the
United States and have a majority of directors appointed by the Presi-
dent are just as accountable to the President as are traditional agen-
cies-however much or little that may be. FGCs over which the Presi-
dent lacks this control are probably not agencies for constitutional
purposes; they are more analogous to private firms.
If a federal officer is appointed improperly, or if the statute creat-
ing the office contains an improper removal provision, then her office
must be categorized as outside the executive branch. In Buckley v.
Valeo, the Supreme Court ruled that the Appointments Clause 2 ' does
not allow the legislative branch to usurp for itself the President's ap-
pointing authority.32 9 Buckley also made clear that the Court was pre-
pared to declare void all actions by an agency headed by an invalidly
326. Some agencies, for example the Federal Trade Commission, are "independent." This
independence is often attacked as being bad policy, or even unconstitutional, on the grounds that a
democratic form of government requires that the public executive power should be exercised by
persons ultimately accountable to an elected official, usually the President, and thus in some way,
however attenuated, accountable to the people. "[Olne of the weightiest objections to a plurality
in the executive ... is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility." THE FEDERALIST
No. 70, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1960). See generally Strauss, supra
note 164.
327. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 728-32 (1986); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-60 (1982) (plurality opinion); Weiner v. United States,
357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
328. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
329. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127-28 (1976) (per curiam).
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appointed official, 80 a point reiterated in Bowsher.33 1 Article II of the
Constitution provides the only alternatives to presidential appointment
by authorizing Congress to vest the appointment of "inferior Officers
• . . in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments."832 The Supreme Court also upheld the judicial ap-
pointment of a special prosecutor, whom the Court described as an
"inferior officer."333
If a corporation is a public body like an agency, its top officials
must be officers of the United States, or at least inferior officers of the
United States appointed in the manner set out in Article II. Ordin-
arily, the statute creating an FGC sets out the method of appointment
of all the directors. The appointment of directors by the President
often makes the post subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
Clearly, however, whether the corporation is seen as public or private,
and regardless of the percentage of the government's shareholding,
the government's directors hold public office as defined in United
States v. Hartwell: "An office is a public station, or employment, con-
ferred by the appointment of government. The term embraces the
ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties."3 34 As public offi-
cials, public directors must be appointed in conformity with the Ap-
pointments Clause, that is, either by the President (with the advice
and consent of the Senate, if required) or by another official in the
executive branch. 5
The Hartwell definition of "public office" is distinctly preferable
to that suggested in Osborn, where Chief Justice Marshall airily
stated, "It will not be contended, that the directors, or other officers of
the bank, are officers of the government."336 The Hartwell definition
330. See id. at 142.
331. 478 U.S. at 726-27; see also Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding that participation of members of
Congress in committee with power to veto decisions regarding local airports violated separation of
powers).
332. U.S. CoNsT. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
333. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that the independent special prosecu-
tor is an "inferior official" because she can be removed, albeit only for cause, by the Attorney
General and thus is in some sense a subordinate official rather than one directly responsible to the
President); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (holding that Congress may insu-
late inferior officers from dismissal by President); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132 (explaining
distinction between officer and inferior officer); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-10
(1879) (same).
334. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867) (concerning a clerk to
the Assistant Treasurer); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 (describing the phrase "Officer of the
United States," in context of Appointment Clause, as an "appointee exercising significant author-
ity pursuant to the laws of the United States"). But see Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 310
(1941) (holding that officers and employees of TVA were not within meaning of the term used in
criminal statute enacted before TVA was incorporated).
335. U.S. CONST. art. II., § 2, cl. 2.
336. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866-67 (1824) (Mar-
shall, C.J.) (dictum). Interestingly, at the time Osborn was decided, qualified immunity had not
yet been invented and public officials were at least as subject to common-law liability as private
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contends exactly that. The Hartwell view should be applied to public
directors of FGCs. Otherwise, if public FGC directors are not public
officials, appointment in conformity with the Appointments Clause is
meaningless. Theoretically, Congress could authorize the Speaker of
the House, or a congressional Joint Committee, to appoint directors of
an FGC.3 7 The consequences would devastate presidential power.
This possibility, however, is remote because the Supreme Court
subsequently ignored Marshall's dictum regarding the directors of the
Bank of the United States. Instead, in Springer v. Philippine Islands,
the Court essentially applied the Hartwell definition of a public office
to a wholly owned government corporation."' 8 The Court held that
voting stock to appoint directors in a government corporation, whether
viewed as a sovereign or a proprietary action, is an executive act that
only an executive official may perform.339 This principle is equally ap-
plicable to all federally appointed directors, even if the government
owns no shares in the entity.
Presidential appointment of all of a corporation's directors by
and with the consent of the Senate clearly complies with the Appoint-
ments Clause's requirements for officers of the United States. By con-
trast, the selection of even a fraction of the directors by private stock-
holders (or worse, members of Congress3 40) may so violate the
separation of powers as to make the corporation illegally constituted.
The Appointments Clause contemplates presidential appointment, ju-
dicial appointment, and appointment by officers in the executive
branch. Whether one views directors as principal officers or inferior
officers, no reading of the Appointments Clause, however broad, could
conceivably encompass the appointment or election of an "officer of
the United States" by private citizens. To escape unconstitutionality,
therefore, any corporation with one or more directors appointed in a
manner that does not conform to the Appointments Clause must be
something very different from an agency-it must be a private body.
Indeed, in 1962 Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy opined that
citizens. See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs,
44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972). Chief Justice Marshall noted, but did not decide, the appellants'
argument that the Incompatibility Clause, which prohibits a member of Congress from serving in
the executive branch, did not apply to the directors of the Bank. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, para. 2.
337. Another possibility is an FGC whose directors are drawn from Congress itself. See
infra note 401. If the directorship of an FGC is not a public office, presumably, although not
inevitably, it is not a "civil office" for the purpose of the Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 6, para. 2.
338. 277 U.S. 189 (1928) (Sutherland, J.); see also Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991) (Stevens, J.) (dic-
tum) (citing Springer with approval). The Springer Court, although addressing the Philippine
Organic Act and not the U.S. Constitution, based its reasoning on federal separation of powers
grounds. See 277 U.S. at 200-01.
339. Springer, 277 U.S. at 203-05.
340. See, e.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 274.
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presidentially appointed directors of COMSAT, a fully private FGC,
did not meet the Hartwell test and thus were not officers of the
United States and were not impeachable.83' Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions make this view very problematic. If the corporation is
a private body, the Senate's participation in the appointment of even
one of its directors probably violates the strictures of Chadha, which
require that all congressional action affecting private rights requires
action by both houses of Congress and presentment to the
President.342
The President's removal power derives from both the Appoint-
ments Clause34 a and the constitutional injunction that the President
"shall take care that the laws [are] faithfully executed." 4 This
power has limits: Congress may insulate certain high officers from re-
moval without "cause," although precisely which posts and for what
cause are not clear. Humphrey's Executor v. United States was the
first of several cases that sought to draw a line between officers who
had "purely executive" functions and whom Congress could not there-
fore insulate from presidential removal and another, ill-defined class
of officers with different functions. 4 5 Subsequent courts struggled
with nomenclature such as "quasi-executive" and "quasi-legislative"
to describe these other functions, but these terms were neither clear
nor free from criticism. 346 In Morrison v. Olson,34" however, Chief
Justice Rehnquist abandoned the effort to draw a bright line when he
wrote that "the determination of whether the Constitution allows
Congress to impose a 'good cause'-type restriction on the President's
power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether or not
that official is classified as 'purely executive.' "348 Rather than relying
on "rigid categories, 3 49 the Chief Justice defined the "real question"
as "whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they
impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty, and
the functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that
light." 350
Most statutes providing for presidential appointment of directors
to FGCs are silent about removal. Courts should follow the cases re-
341. Communications Satellite Corp., 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 165 (1962).
342. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983).
343. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 318 (1903) (explaining that the "right of
removal [is] inherent in the power of appointment"); Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230,
259 (1839).
344. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988).
345. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
346. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 171, at 1348-49.
347. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
348. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 691.
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lating to independent agencies and find at least a "good cause" re-
moval power in the absence of a congressional statement to the con-
trary.351 If the FGC is private, courts should not assume that the
entity's corporate status entitles the nation's directors to any more in-
dependence from the "shareholder," i.e., the government, that selected
them. If the FGC is public, the directors constitutionally cannot have
any more independence than other federal officers. Indeed, in the only
modern case to review the removal of an FGC director, the Sixth Cir-
cuit treated the wholly owned nonstock TVA as an ordinary agency
and its directors as no different from executive officers who serve at
the pleasure of the President. 52 The Sixth Circuit determined that
the TVA "exercises predominantly an executive or administrative
function ... it is predominantly an administrative arm of the execu-
tive department" and that the TVA director's argument that the TVA
resembled an independent agency failed.3 53
2. Private Directors Not Accountable to President
Privately appointed directors (and publicly appointed directors if
one follows McCulloch instead of Hartwell) are not public officials.
Even if they owe their office to the statute chartering or funding the
corporation, their appointment remains a private affair, dictated by
351. In Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958), the Supreme Court unani-
mously refused to imply that the President had the power to remove a member of the War Claims
Commission without cause when the statute was silent about removal. The Court has never had to
decide whether to imply "good cause" removal. The decision in Weiner rested heavily on the
"quasi-judicial" adjudicatory role of the Commission. See id. at 355. Even if the classification of
functions in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Weiner has survived Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), most, if
not all, FGCs perform functions that would have to be classified as executive if indeed they are
governmental at all.
352. Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 115 F.2d 990, 992-93 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 701 (1941). President Roosevelt attempted to replace TVA director Morgan before the
incumbent's nine-year term expired. Morgan argued that because the TVA statute gave only one
ground for removal-engaging in political appointment or promotion of an employee-the Presi-
dent lacked the authority to fire him. Seeking to come under the rule set out in Humphrey's
Executor, which held that the FTC's status as a "quasi-legislative" body entitled its commission-
ers to protection from dismissal without cause, Morgan argued that TVA more closely resembled
the FTC than a normal agency.
353. The Sixth Circuit also stated that the TVA lacked the "quasi-legislative" functions
that had insulated the FTC from the otherwise sweeping presidential power to dismiss officials in
Humphrey's Executor. Morgan, 115 F.2d at 993-94. Morgan apparently failed to argue that
TVA's corporate form and independent legal personality offered him more protection than af-
forded to what are now known as independent agencies. Combined with TVA's relatively unusual
nonstock corporate structure, Morgan's failure to raise this argument limits the importance of
what would otherwise be the major modern case determining the relationship between FGCs and
the President.
More recently, President Nixon removed a director of Fannie Mae appointed by President
Johnson; newspaper reports suggested that the removal was motivated by the director's attempt to
continue sending Fannie Mae's local foreclosure business to firms with connections to the Demo-




private shareholders. The separation of powers concerns, particularly
fear of legislative aggrandizement, that animate recent decisions lim-
iting Congress's involvement in the appointment process (such as
Chadha), simply do not apply. Absent specific statutory authoriza-
tion,""' the President cannot remove directors whom he does not ap-
point, if only because the removal power derives primarily from the
appointment power.
3. Weak Programmatic Control of Private and Mixed-Ownership
FGCs
FGCs not controlled by the government are, theoretically, subject
to the same federal regulatory powers as ordinary private firms. In
practice, however, their public purpose, their links to the government,
the existence of the implicit guarantee, and their general uniqueness
have all combined to exclude many FGCs from the same degree of
federal regulation as comparable private firms. States are unable to
fill the regulatory vacuum because, absent legislation to the contrary,
a federal charter gives a corporation the same immunity from state
regulation as enjoyed by the federal government itself. Most FGCs
thus exist in a regulatory environment characterized by a relative ab-
sence of oversight and programmatic control at any level of govern-
ment. Similarly, FGCs, even those heavily involved in the financial
markets, face little overt regulation. For example, whether the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act,3 55 the Freedom of Information Act, 856 or
the Debt Collection Act 57 applies is rarely clear.3 58 One thing that is
clear, however, is that the FGCs involved in the financial markets are
not required to comply with the SEC registration requirements or
safety and soundness rules (minimum levels of capital) required of
their purely private competitors.
FGCs ordinarily are created to achieve a public purpose, but in
many cases the federal government does not monitor their activities in
an organized fashion. The extent of federal agency oversight over
FGCs varies enormously. At one extreme lies the wholly owned FGCs
that are little more than departments of an agency; at the other lies
FGCs that are subject to little if any oversight. Congressional over-
354. The FNMA Charter Act gives the President the authority to remove privately elected
directors. See 12 U.S.C. § 1723(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
355. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5 U.S.C.).
356. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
357. 31 U.S.C. § 3717 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring agencies to assess interest and
penalties on debts owed the United States unless otherwise governed by statute, regulation -or
contract).
358. See GAO PROFILES, supra note 16, at 236-51 (table showing FGC's views of which of
25 acts applicable to agencies apply to them).
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sight and GAO audits are the only monitoring devices that apply to
all FGCs. These are week reeds at best. Congressional oversight is
notoriously uneven; GAO audits are more predictable, but are limited
to information provided by the FGC. And, the audits focus on balance
sheets rather than the degree to which FGCs are fulfilling their public
purposes.
Fannie Mae, for example, has statutory responsibilities to provide
funds for loans for affordable housing. The legislation giving Fannie
Mae that duty also gives HUD oversight responsibility; but HUD's
actual powers over Fannie Mae are unclear.8 9 HUD has argued that
it can issue regulations that would require Fannie Mae to make par-
ticular types of loans.36 0 Fannie Mae, however, disagrees,361 and HUD
has never overcome Fannie Mae's resistance. 862 Sallie Mae is the most
extreme example, as no federal agency even claims the power to regu-
late Sallie Mae. 363
Without some form of routine programmatic control, neither the
federal government nor the public are adequately positioned to deter-
mine whether FGCs are meeting their goals, be they the efficient pro-
vision of goods and services, provision of nonmarket goods, or the ex-
ploitation of a government-granted monopoly. The piecemeal
authority that characterizes the programmatic regulation of FGCs
also may make it difficult for the government to do anything if it de-
termines that an FGC is failing to serve the purposes for which it was
designed.
G. Deficit Politics
FGCs excel as a device that Congress and the President can use
to disguise the size of federal expenditures, and in particular, evade
debt ceilings such as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget require-
ments,3 6" or a hypothetical balanced budget amendment. Charging ex-
penditures and borrowing to private and mixed-ownership government
359. See 12 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Previously, the Secretary of HUD
could require that a "reasonable portion" of Fannie Mae's mortgage purchases be "related to the
national goal of providing adequate housing for low and moderate income families, but with rea-
sonable economic return to the corporation," id. § 1723a(h) (1988); however, in 1992 that lan-
guage was repealed. Id. § 1723a(h) (Supp. V 1993).
360. STANTON, supra note 26, at 59.
361. Id. at 60.
362. HUD Hearings, supra note 234, at 211-12 (statement by Alfred DelliBovi, Deputy
Secretary, HUD, that existing HUD powers are inadequate).
363. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 35.
364. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-119, tit. I, 101 Stat. 754, amended by Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.




corporations can be hidden "off budget." 8 5 Using this device, FGC
spending and borrowing easily avoids triggering the deficit reduction
process, and also protects it from external triggers, thus making FGCs
the vehicle of choice for borrowing without the constraints of budget
targets. 6
Three of the eleven GSEs-the Financial Assistance Corporation
(FICO), 867 the Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation
(FAC), 3 68  and the Resolution Funding Corporation
(REFCORP) 8 6-- are unlikely to turn a profit, are not truly designed
to be self-sustaining, and are, in fact, little more than an accounting
trick, one that has justly been called the budget gimmick of the
1990S.370 Although the details of each differ, Congress has created
these entities to borrow now, at near-Treasury rates, guaranteeing the
debt with future income streams and, in the case of REFCORP, with
the Treasury guaranteeing the interest payments.71
The use of an FGC to fund or manage an activity that would be
funded or managed by an ordinary federal agency but for budget
365. See supra note 81 (defining "off budget").
366. For a description of the deficit reduction process, see COLLENDER, supra note 81, at
17-29. Passage of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat.
1388-1573, changed the focus of the deficit reduction process from borrowing to spending, al-
though some borrowing caps remain in place. COLLENDER, supra note 81, at 19-38.
367. FICO's purpose is to fund the recapitalization of insolvent savings and loans without
having the cost counted on-budget. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 2. "FICO represents an
extreme use of a government sponsored enterprise to provide an off-budget federal subsidy whose
costs to taxpayers will be deferred for many years." STANTON, supra note 57, at 4. FICO was
established August 28, 1987, by the FHLBank Board (an independent agency whose FICO-re-
lated functions were later assumed by a new independent agency, the Federal Housing Finance
Board) pursuant to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Recapitalization Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 585 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)) (FHFB shall charter FICO "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law").
FICO issues debt and nonvoting capital stock. Proceeds were formerly used to purchase FSLIC
securities and are now placed in the FSLIC Resolution Fund, id. § 1441(c) (Supp. V 1993), in
order to help close insolvent S&Ls. FICO is under the general direction of the FHFB. GAO
STAFF STUDY, supra note 60, at 32.
FICO is less private and less independent than most GSEs. Although the GAO views FICO
as a mixed-ownership government corporation, see GAO PROFILES, supra note 16, at 120, it is in
fact a nonstock federally owned corporation, see 12 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). FICO
is run by a three-person board consisting of the Director of the Office of Finance of the Federal
Housing Finance Board and two persons appointed by the Federal Housing Finance Board from
among the presidents of the 12 FHLBanks (themselves mixed-ownership GSEs, see supra note
61). Id. § 1441(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
368. FAC was created by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 in order to bail out the farm
credit system (FCS). See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 2, 78-79. It is managed by the board of
directors of the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation, which is a private Farm Credit
System institution. Unlike most other GSEs, its debts are backed by the full faith and credit of
the United States. GAO STAFF STUDY, supra note 60, at 44. FAC is, technically, private. It
appears, however, to be closely controlled by an agency, the Farm Credit System Financial Assis-
tance Board. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 79-80.
369. REFCORP was created in 1989 to assist in the refinancing of the savings and loan
system. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 208-09.
370. See William G. Gale, The Budget Gimmick of the 1990s, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1989,
at A19 (referring to REFCORP, FAC & FICO).
371. 12 U.S.C. § 1441b (Supp. V 1993).
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targets and/or political concerns about the size of the official budget
deficit imposes both financial and moral costs.
1. Financial Costs
Because FGC debt is not backed by the full faith and credit of
the United States, the FGC borrows at a rate higher than that availa-
ble to the Treasury, although lower than the rate available to compa-
rable private borrowers. As a result, the activity costs more to fund
than it would have had the Treasury borrowed the money itself.37  In
the case of the $15 billion borrowed by FICO, for example, the differ-
ential has ranged between 50 and 110 basis points,17 1 suggesting that
had FICO (a relatively small GSE) been funded directly by the Trea-
sury, the borrowing costs for its activities might have been reduced by
as much as $165 million per year. Applying a similar differential to
REFCORP, the cost to the taxpayers would be over $0.5 billion per
year for every $50 billion borrowed. Despite complete government
ownership, management consisting of high government officers serving
ex officio as directors, and an explicit federal guarantee on its interest
payments, REFCORP pays a premium to borrowers over comparable
T-bill rates.3 74 If the Treasury guarantees an FGC's debts, whether
explicitly in the case of REFCORP and FAC,a73 or implicitly in the
case of FICO, it might just as well borrow the money itself through
the Treasury at the lowest rate. The accounting trick increases the
program's costs in exchange for nothing more than (false) bragging
rights about meeting budget targets.
In the case of REFCORP, the accounting problem is com-
pounded by the way that the sham GSE uses the funds that it bor-
rows. REFCORP's borrowings are transferred to the RTC, a "mixed-
ownership" FGC that is actually wholly owned by the federal govern-
ment, is on-budget, and is charged with recapitalizing insolvent
savings and loans." 6 REFCORP receives a claim against future reve-
372. The only valuable thing the taxpayer receives in exchange for this expenditure is the
right to wait until the FGC fails before deciding whether to bail it out. This seems a very small
benefit given the nature of the costs and the widespread belief that defaults are politically
unacceptable.
373. See WHITE, supra note 320, at 145 n.32.
374. See id. at 184; William Keeling, Hold-up in Nigerian Bank Debt Agreement, FIN.
TIMES, June 13, 1991, at 4 (noting Nigeria sought to substitute higher-yielding REFCORP debt
for Treasuries as collateral in restructuring agreement). T-bills are more widely accepted and
known than RTC bonds, but given the size of the REFCORP issue, it is hard to believe that the
difference is great enough to justify the existence of a spread.
375. The complexities of FAC's funding and borrowing are outlined in GAO STAFF STUDY,
supra note 60, at 45-46.
376. Notwithstanding the fact that "no Government funds may be invested in" the RTC, it
is treated, for purposes of the GCCA, as a mixed-ownership government corporation that has
capital from the government. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993); see also 31 U.S.C.
§ 9101(2)(L) (Supp. V 1993) (defining RTC as mixed-ownership). For a summary of the RTC's
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nues. The government treats the payment by REFCORP to the RTC
as revenue, even though the money has been borrowed (at higher than
Treasury rates) and the RTC is obligated to pay all of it back plus
interest.a" Thus, the two federal corporations together are used to un-
derstate the true federal debt twice-once when borrowing is ignored
and again when it is treated as revenue.
Congressional opposition to the use of FGCs as an accounting
sham to evade the budget targets provoked controversy over whether
REFCORP debt should be on- or off-budget for Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings purposes. The Bush administration wanted all $50 billion of
the funds for the savings and loan "bailout"3 7 8 to be off-budget fi-
nance in order to keep down the official budget deficit. A significant
faction in Congress wanted it on-budget but would have exempted it
from the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings ceiling. In a Solomonic but illogi-
cal compromise, Congress labeled $20 billion of REFCORP's debt on-
budget borrowing and the additional $30 billion as off-budget . 9
2. Moral Costs
The practice of hiding costs off-budget, in the hope that either
voters will not notice or Congress can postpone actual appropriations
until the bonds issued by the FGC become due, is, dishonest and cyni-
activities, see Wayne M. Josel, The Resolution Trust Corporation: Waste Management and the
S&L Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S339 (1991) and David W. Adams, Is the Power of the RTC
Unlimited?: Federal Preemption of State Banking Law, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995 (1991).
377. See Lescher & Mace, supra note 24, at 533 (REFCORP payment to RTC treated as
federal collection). The government arguably is not responsible for the RTC's debt to REFCORP
or for REFCORP's debts to its lenders. Under FIRREA, however, the government is directly
liable for interest payments on REFCORP debt that are not met by its income from the RTC's
activities.
378. Lawrence White argues convincingly that the term bailout is highly misleading be-
cause almost all of the funds expended to rescue insolvent S&Ls are funds that the FSLIC was
obligated to pay depositors in the event of the S&Ls' insolvency. See WHITE, supra note 320, at
160-64. The linchpin of this argument, however, is that the United States was responsible for the
FSLIC's debts. No one seems to have seriously considered that the United States would have let
the FSLIC fail, although the FSLIC was, before its demise in 1989, "a body corporate." 12
U.S.C. § 1725(c) (1988) (repealed 1989). This may reflect a legal judgment that because the
FSLIC was also "an instrumentality of the United States," id., the government remained liable
for its debts despite FSLIC's separate legal personality. More likely, however, it represents an
understandable political judgment that the insured depositors had legitimate expectations which
the government had a moral obligation to honor, and an equally understandable economic judg-
ment that failure to do so might trigger a liquidity crisis.
379. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1441b (Supp. V 1993)); see also
COLLENDER, supra note 81, at 12-13. The FGCs created to provide funds to troubled financial
sectors, such as the S&Ls, have also imposed organizational costs on the government. They either
started from scratch, leading to charges of confusion and mismanagement at least initially, see,
e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION: UNNECESSARY LOAN
SERVICING COSTS DUE TO INADEQUATE CONTRACT OVERSIGHT (1991), or were cobbled together
out of existing agencies and/or FGCs and suffer from complicated lines of authority.
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cal. 380 It both poisons the political process and reflects a poison al-
ready present within it. By hiding the true cost of public decisions
nothing valuable is gained, and indeed, we probably lose a lot. If
spending and deficit reduction targets are valuable then they should
not be undermined by subterfuge; if the targets are unrealistic, it does
not follow that FGCs promote the best use of the extra funding. In
either case, the GSEs are used to accomplish by subterfuge something
that politicians dare not do directly.
The only argument in favor of using FGCs to hide the true cost
of federal programs is that necessary programs that otherwise would
not survive the deficit reduction process are made financially possible.
Even if this dubious argument is valid, the financial costs of this sub-
terfuge are high.
III. REFORM
FGCs as a class are less accountable than any other type of do-
mestic civilian federal government entity. Constitutional, statutory,
and regulatory controls are unclear, weak, or nonexistent. Both presi-
dential and congressional control are stunted, except in the case of
wholly owned FGCs. Courts are uncertain whether to treat FGCs as
public or private. FGCs also cause both macro- and microfinancial
problems. The three largest macro effects, each of which affects the
federal budget, are:
(1) the contingent risk imposed by the implicit guarantee;
(2) the additional cost (borne either by the Treasury or by the
beneficiaries) of borrowing for a public purpose at a premium over
Treasury rates; and
(3) the misuse of certain GSEs to hide the budget deficit.
The most critical microeconomic problems are:
(1) the lack of incentives for FGCs to be efficient;
(2) the danger that shareholders, management and/or debt-hold-
ers are collecting rents at the public's expense; and
(3) the effects that FGCs have on existing and would-be private
competitors.
The trillions of dollars borrowed, lent, and insured by the GSEs
are a source of special concern because the sums involved are so large.
First, although GSEs benefit from an implicit guarantee, they none-
theless borrow at slightly over Treasury rates, imposing an extra, and
arguably unnecessary, cost on their activities. Second, investors' un-
derstandable reliance upon the implicit guarantee suggests that the
Treasury would face intense pressure to rescue a GSE were one to
380. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEAS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE LAW (1985) (discussing
costs of dishonesty in public life).
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become insolvent. Taxpayers face the contingent risk that, in the
event of a major management blunder, the government may be called
upon to make good on debts it played no part in incurring and from
which taxpayers may have derived little if any benefit. The implicit
guarantee also arguably creates a moral hazard for GSE management
once capital levels fall. Third, private shareholders or management
may be appropriating profits that could go to the beneficiaries of the
FGC, or that-had the corporation been designed more care-
fully-could go to the taxpayer. Fourth, GSEs have advantages de-
nied to private competitors (although they also face some special
restrictions).
A. Limited Aims of Recent Reforms
From time to time Congress worries about FGCs, but it consist-
ently focuses only on the first of the six problems identified above.
Rather than confront the accountability problems common to all
FGCs, in 1992 Congress focused on the contingent risk that some
GSEs pose to the Treasury and imposed capital requirements as a
device to head off insolvency.3 81 This reform has reduced the already
small risk of a problem that, had it occurred, would have been very
expensive to cure. Much remains to be done.
The major recent reform is the Federal Housing Enterprises Fi-
nancial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992,382 which unified and
slightly tightened the capital adequacy requirements for Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks.3 83 The new regula-
tor, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, is located in
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. It monitors cap-
ital levels according to risk criteria spelled out by Congress.884 The
criteria are not particularly onerous, and Freddie Mac and Fannie
381. To be fair, Congress also took a small nibble at the fifth problem identified above when
it added to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's statutory duties to support lower income housing, 12
U.S.C. §§ 4561-89 (Supp. V 1993), and allowed the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight to prohibit excessive compensation for directors and staff of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
the Federal Home Loan Banks. Id. § 4518.
382. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1301, 106 Stat. 3672, 3941 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4501
(Supp. V 1993)).
383. See 12 U.S.C. § 4503 (Supp. V 1993). Congress also has imposed a capital adequacy
requirement on Sallie Mae, although it was highly prosperous. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2(r)(4)
(Supp' V 1993).
A rejected proposal, S. 1621, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), would have created a super-
regulator for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Sallie Mae, the FHL Banks, Farmer Mac, the Farm
Credit Banks, the Banks for Cooperatives, and the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation.
The GAO endorsed creating a super-regulator for a similar list of GSEs. GAO justified its exclu-
sion of Connie Lee based on its being subject to state insurance regulation and to private market
discipline. See GAO FRAMEWORK, supra note 187, at 17.
384. See 12 U.S.C. § 4611-14 (Supp. V 1993).
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Mae easily have passed review every quarter to date,38 5 although the
regulator found the Federal Home Loan Bank System "basically"
safe and sound. 886 If one of these GSEs had failed its capital ade-
quacy tests, it would have been required to submit a capital restora-
tion plan; if found "significantly" undercapitalized, a conservator
might be appointed to take over the management of the enterprise.8 '
Capital adequacy rules have some virtues because they can func-
tion as a type of early warning device. Because Congress is not known
for its rapid reaction time, having a mechanism in place that rings an
alarm well before a GSE is in danger of needing an expensive bailout
is useful. Capital adequacy rules also are attractive because the rules
are easily patterned after existing bank regulation. 88 Specifying dire
consequences if a GSE falls below a minimum capital ratio intention-
ally creates an incentive for management to avoid taking too much
risk.389 A capital floor also protects against a GSE that may feel
tempted to engage in increasingly risky behavior as insolvency looms,
because the capital floor is reached while the GSE still has something
to lose.
Capital floors also have costs. The higher the floor, the less a
GSE is able to leverage its funds, which raises its costs. Establishing
the capital floor level is thus the critical issue. If it is too low, then by
the time the alarm is triggered it will be too late for Congress or
regulators to react. If it is too high, it imposes a needless cost on the
GSE, thereby reducing the benefits that can flow to its public purpose
without achieving any corresponding gain. 90 Although GSEs cur-
rently operate with low capital ratios, nothing indicates that these ra-
tios are inadequate;3 91 the fear is that a GSE might, through manage-
ment failure, lose a great deal of money either suddenly or quietly,
and Congress would not react until it was too late. Because GSEs are
very profitable-despite being in the home and agricultural mortgage
business during a recession-and use their profitability to build up
385. See, e.g., Mortgage Developments, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1190 (June 19,
1995), available in LEXIS, Banking Library, Bnabnk File (summarizing office of Federal Hous-
ing Enterprise Oversight second Annual Report to Congress); OFHEO Says Freddie Mac, Fannie
Mae Met First-quarter Capital Standards, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 62, at 1070 (June 20,
1994).
386. Nicolas P. Retsinas, HUD's Report on FHLB System, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, June
20, 1994, at 4.
387. 12 U.S.C. § 4616 (Supp. V 1993). For a lucid discussion of the conservator's powers
and duties see Carrie S. Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises Are "Too Big to Fail":
Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 992, 1016 (1993).
388. See, e.g., Stanton, supra note 213.
389. See GAO FRAMEWORK, supra note 187, at 9.
390. The GSEs have argued that Congress, not an agency, should set any capital adequacy
standards applied to them and that standards should be based on stress tests which seek to model
the GSEs' ability to weather a financial crisis rather than on traditional ratios.
391. Most parties to the debate over capital adequacy rules appear to agree that the GSEs
are currently healthy and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. See supra note 26.
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their capital levels, one might ask why capital adequacy is Congress's
top reform priority. The answer, of course, is that having just "bailed
out" the S&Ls, Congress was understandably anxious to avoid further
bailouts of any kind. And because the S&L model provided the impe-
tus for the change in the regulation of GSEs, the Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 borrows lib-
erally from the regulatory scheme used to reorganize insolvent
banks-"'
B. Proposals Rejected by Congress
As part of the omnibus legislation designed to reform the finan-
cial industry, Congress instructed the Treasury and other agencies to
consider the risks posed by the GSEs and to make proposals for con-
trolling those risks. The resulting proposals included a variety of inge-
nious "early warning mechanisms," other than capital requirements,
all designed to signal Congress that a particular GSE is in financial
trouble. Congress rejected this proposal. Other suggestions rejected by
Congress included complete privatization, so that markets no longer
perceive an implicit guarantee, and replacing the GSEs with ordinary
agencies.
1. Warning Mechanisms
Private markets (ideally) price the bonds and shares of ordinary
corporations on the basis of all the available information. The market
price thus reflects the market's collective conclusion as to the firm's
prospects. These prices are arguably the best available barometer of a
corporation's prospects. This pricing method, however, does not apply
to GSEs because the markets rely on an implicit federal guarantee
and therefore pay little, if any, attention to a GSE's actual financial
condition.
Early warning mechanisms rely on market-oriented techniques to
monitor the GSE's financial prospects. An early warning mechanism
either gives Congress the long lead time needed to craft a legislative
response, or it carries an automatic, administrative response such as
firing the management and bringing in a conservator.
392. See Lavargna, supra note 387, at 1016. As the Act does not go into great detail about
what a hypothetical conservator should do (perhaps relying on the in terrorem effect of the possi-
bility), Lavargna offers to fill the gap by proposing a "best interests of the enterprise" standard.
Id. at 1035. This suggestion, however, fails to give sufficient weight to Congress's mandate that
the conservator act to rebuild the enterprise's capital as a first priority. To the extent that this
prime obligation gives the conservator any leeway, surely the best standard in light of the GSE's
public purposes would be the "best interests of the public," and particularly the groups whom the
enterprise is designed to serve rather than the interests of the enterprise.
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a. Ratings
One proposal is to pay rating agencies, such as Standard &
Poor's (who are presumably experts at assessing financial risk) to is-
sue regular credit ratings of the GSEs based on the assumption that
no federal rescue is available. 9 ' Unfortunately, evidence suggests that
credit ratings of debt issued by private firms are a lagging indicator of
the financial health of those corporations.394
b. Risky Subordinated Debt
A more ingenious solution, also considered by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), would require GSEs to issue risky subordinated
debt. The function of these securities is akin to a canary in a coal
mine: if the debt is subordinated, and hedged with strict loan cove-
nants that make it clear that investors will not be repaid if the GSE's
income or other measures of financial soundness fall below a fixed
point, then holders of this debt will have an incentive to pay close
attention to the GSE's financial health. If the price of the risky debt
on the secondary market falls, Congress will have a reliable indication
that investors are concerned about the GSE's balance sheet.3"5 Al-
though this appears to be the simplest solution to administer, each
GSE would have to issue a substantial amount of subordinated debt to
make the secondary market large enough, and liquid enough, to make
the scheme work. 96 An additional complication is that even the most
sensitive canary only provides effective protection in a coal mine if
someone who is capable of prompt and effective action is there to hear
it. Whether Congress is such a body is open to question. Combining
risky subordinated debt with automatic and draconian consequences if
the debt falls below a certain value (perhaps computed relative to a
market index) creates a powerful and self-executing incentive for
GSEs to avoid excessive risk. Overly draconian consequences, or stan-
dards that are too high, might create excessively cautious behavior,
diluting the effectiveness of the GSE.
393. CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 50-55.
394. Id. at 54 (citing Mark I. Weinstein, The Effect of a Rating Change Announcement on
Bond Price, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 329 (1977)).
395. See id. at 55-56. An alternate scheme would require the GSEs to issue puttable subor-
dinated debt with loan covenants specifying it would be worthless if the GSE's capital fell below a
certain standard. Id. at 56-57. Investors could redeem their investment at any time and would
have an incentive to exercise their put options if they thought the GSE was in trouble. Id. at 57.
396. CBO also warned that the IRS might treat the interest payments on the debt as
equivalent to dividends on preferred stock, increasing the return investors would require to be




Privatization means more than selling off the government's
shares. The federal government already requires GSEs to retire or
purchase the government's shares, but this has failed to persuade the
markets-or even the government itself-that there is no implicit
guarantee. Full privatization would require a credible commitment to
allow GSEs to fail. GSEs therefore would lose the feature that cur-
rently makes their securities most attractive to investors. In exchange,
however, the GSEs could be granted new charters, allowing them to
diversify beyond the very narrow businesses to which they are cur-
rently restricted.
Nevertheless, new charters might fail to communicate a credible
commitment to allowing a large GSE to fail. Congress has previously
shown a willingness to help out major private corporations, such as
Lockheed and Chrysler, and it is doubtful whether it would let the
dominant player in a sensitive credit market collapse. What Congress-
man is going to put a quarter of the nation's home mortgages at risk?
The creation and continued existence of a GSE is itself a testament to
the political importance of the constituency that it serves. Formal
privatization alone is unlikely to change this basic political reality un-
less some action is taken to break up the GSE as well as privatize it.
3. Converting FGCs to Agencies
If convincing privatization is impossible, the next-best solution
may be to give up and turn GSEs into ordinary agencies, like most
wholly owned FGCs are already. Conversion to ordinary agencies
would have pedestrian, but valuable, advantages. Most important,
agency status GSEs would borrow at the Treasury rate, thus eliminat-
ing the current premium paid to investors to induce them to hold GSE
debt instead of Treasury securities. All other things being equal, the
GSE could carry out its current activities at lower cost. GSE activities
also would have "on-budget" status, eliminating the opportunity for
deficit politics. In addition, conversion to agency status would provide
a clear, if not necessarily ideal, answer to whether GSEs are public or
private. Agency status presumably would subject GSEs to the APA,
FOIA, and other federal statutes and rules designed to provide fair
and accountable government.
The disadvantages of this proposal may outweigh its benefits.
Turning GSEs into agencies amounts to a confession of failure-an
admission that the hoped-for efficiencies of the private sector cannot
be imported into a public setting. Indeed, to the extent that GSEs
already take advantage of their freedom from one-year budget cycles,
personnel ceilings, and salary caps, and have realized management ef-
ficiencies, conversion to ordinary agency status risks losing these ad-
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vantages. Finally, the repurchase or confiscation of privately held
shares would impose a significant one-time cost: about $3 billion in
the case of Fannie Mae alone.3 97 To the extent that some GSE holders
have vested rights in the continuation of the charter, they might con-
ceivably have a takings claim above the current market value of their
shares."' 8
C. Some Moderate Proposals
The regulatory proposals Congress has considered in recent years
have been narrowly focused on heading off the hypothetical insolvency
of the GSEs and thus have ignored most of the important issues that
relate to both GSEs and FGCs in general. There is some reason to
doubt the urgency of the problem Congress is trying to solve. Al-
though a GSE default is conceivable, it would require serious manage-
ment failure. Congress's focus on capital adequacy results from its
failure to anticipate the S&L crisis-a textbook case of once bitten
twice shy. In fact, other than the three sham entities created to pro-
vide off-budget finance,3 99 the GSEs appear to be healthy.""°
Rather than being in danger of failing, strong evidence suggests
that GSEs are too successful. The GSE's enormous profits in the
midst of a nationwide property and agriculture recession suggests that
they are being too cautious and may therefore be concentrating on
profits at the expense of their public purposes. Alternately, those same
profits may be a sign that the GSEs' special advantages are allowing
their private shareholders to reap a nearly riskless profit, in which
case the public incurs an opportunity cost and private competitors
face being crowded out.
The grab bag of proposals that follow does not purport to be a
perfect solution to each or all of the problems discussed in this article,
but it may provide a starting point for a more comprehensive solution
397. See id. at 169 (value of stockholders' equity).
398. An arguable claim might be mounted on the theory that the investor believed that the
shares would appreciate at a rate greater than that offered by alternate investments. The investor
would either have to argue that she thought markets were not efficient, or that her preferences
were somehow peculiarly served by investment in a GSE and that no perfect substitute existed.
399. See supra note 370 and accompanying text (discussion of REFCORP, FAC, FICO).
400. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 62-64; GAO GSE STUDY, supra note 76, at 6-9.
The least sound GSE is the Farm Credit System. See supra note 280. Stress tests performed by
the (nonsham) GSEs themselves suggest that they could survive an economic shock as severe as
the Great Depression. See CBO STUDY, supra note 57, at 162-64, 168-73 (summarizing results).
Although these tests are now accepted as valid in principle by the CBO, the GAO, and the Trea-
sury, the assumptions on which they are based have been questioned. See Martin Mayer, Another
Favor for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 23, 1991, at 10 (alleging that
stress tests assume that GSEs would stop lending in a depression); see also CBO STUDY, supra
note 57, at 162-63 (least severe stress tests assume lending during economic crisis will level off to
steady-state rather than continuing to grow).
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to both the legal and financial problems posed by the proliferation of
FGCs.
1. Accountability
The biggest single problem with FGCs today is not their finances
but the lack of accountability when they use their powers.
a. Internal Governance
Clearer rules are needed regarding the appointment and duties of
both public and private directors. To avoid doubt, Congress should
declare that any person appointed with the Senate's advice and con-
sent is an officer of the United States. These officials should take an
oath of office, should be subject to impeachment, and should serve at
the pleasure of the President unless the statute creating the office ex-
plicitly limits the President's removal power."' 1 The statutes creating
individual FGCs should set out the duties of public directors. The
GCCA also should contain a general statement outlining the extent to
which public directors are expected to represent national interests and
their duties toward Congress and the President. To increase the odds
that FGCs are influenced by the political process rather than the
other way around, FGCs should be forbidden from making political
contributions or giving money to political action committees.
At present no general rules define who should vote the govern-
ment's shares in mixed-ownership FGCs. A clear rule should be de-
vised to ensure that the ambiguity does not silence the government's
voice. The existence of such a rule may be more important than its
content.' 2
In addition, no clear rules currently define private shareholders'
rights. Here, however, the need for reform may be less pressing, as
private investors seem perfectly willing to purchase shares in FGCs
under the current regime. In addition, presumably the courts are ca-
pable of making federal common law to fill in whatever gaps exist due
401. In addition, none of the FGCs' officers should be legislators. The body is undoubtedly
unconstitutional if they are. See Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 267 (1991). The Smithsonian, which has a
Board of Regents composed of Chief Justice of the United States and the Vice President (who
serve ex officio) plus three Senators appointed by the President of the Senate, three members of
Congress appointed by the Speaker of the House, and nine persons appointed by joint resolution of
Congress, is thus illegally constituted, although whether anyone has standing to say so is open to
doubt. Cf Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) ("Parallel to the case before
us, Congress long ago established the Smithsonian Institution, to question which would be to lay
'hands on the Ark of the Covenant .... ") (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
402. Because the mixed-ownership'FGCs in existence today are either wholly owned by the
government or privately owned with a minority of statutory public directors, the absence of such a
rule has no immediate consequences.
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to the absence of a federal equivalent to most state corporate law. The
legislative effort involved in agreeing to a complete federal corporate
code may be more trouble than it is worth.
b. Accounting for Federal Powers and Benefits
The more that an FGC has federal powers or benefits not availa-
ble to an ordinary corporation, the greater the need for the corpora-
tion to account for its use of those powers or resources. The GAO and
the corporations themselves should estimate the cash and present val-
ues of the federal benefits made available to the corporation. The
GAO, or some other agency, also should estimate the opportunity
costs to the government of providing those benefits rather than selling
them on the open market. In addition, each FGC should report to
Congress on the performance of its public mission. Although annual
reports do little by themselves, they provide a convenient excuse for
Congress to hold hearings to monitor the FGC's performance; in turn,
the threat of hearings gives FGCs reason to believe they have to ac-
count for their actions. " "a
c. Enforcing Public Goals
Private control of FGCs and competitive pressures are likely to
produce efficiency gains. As the experience of the GSEs demonstrates,
the price of private control is a loss of interest in providing benefits,
especially pecuniary benefits, to persons other than shareholders and
creditors. Thus, if FGCs are to provide such benefits, either regula-
tions or incentive/penalty structures must force them to do so.
Whatever the extent of government's ownership-even zero-any
FGC that enjoys public powers or benefits (and especially those en-
joying an implicit guarantee) should pay for them, either in cash pay-
ments to the Treasury or in kind, by providing benefits to the target
group the FGC is designed to serve. FGCs that pay in kind should be
forced to provide benefits, such as lower mortgage interest rates, to a
(hopefully deserving) client group other than the owners. Regulation
alone is probably not the best solution: most FGCs exist because Con-
gress determined that a program required a federal instrument with
more flexibility than the average agency.
403. If FGCs are not going to be forced to operate in an environment that forces them to
deliver benefits to target groups, then the FGCs should be required to pay for the advantages they




Regulation is a blunt and familiar tool. HUD has been asserting
or seeking regulatory authority over Fannie Mae for many years but
has failed to impose rules requiring Fannie Mae to devote more of its
resources to lower and middle income family housing. The same is
true in varying degrees for all other profitable GSEs except for Sallie
Mae, which currently has no regulator.0 4 Although not necessarily
wise, it would not be difficult to write rules requiring profitable FGCs
to devote a portion of their resources to specific activities even though
they did not necessarily maximize profit. Ordinary administrative
sanctions, i.e., fines and other penalties, would back up these rules.
ii. Incentives
A less tried, but probably more fruitful, avenue is to create incen-
tive/penalty structures designed to mold FGC conduct. For example,
Congress could limit Fannie Mae's loans to wealthier households by
requiring proportional lending based on loans to lower- and middle-
income families. Because larger loans tend to be more profitable, once
the two are tied together, profits will motivate Fannie Mae to increase
the less profitable line of activity. Unlike some regulatory solutions,
such a ratio does not require Fannie Mae to make unprofitable loans
unless it is certain that these losses are outweighed by the gains on the
other more profitable business. Alternatively, targets could be set and
then enforced by restricting management pay increases, or levying a
surtax on dividends, if the targets are not met.
One danger that must be avoided is self-dealing. Congress should
not create FGCs controlled by the groups they are intended to benefit.
The classic bad example is the Farm Credit System, which is coopera-
tively owned by its borrowers. In the past the Farm Credit System
allowed lax loan standards to farmers, which resulted in the insol-
vency of the FCS system in the mid-1980s.' °5
2. Financial Issues
The most effective cure for all the FGC-associated financial
problems is to increase FGCs' exposure to market discipline. Achiev-
ing this end without sacrificing the purposes for which FGCs are cre-
ated is surprisingly difficult.
404. Minimal capital adequacy regulation was introduced by the Student Reform Act of
1993, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2(r) (Supp. V 1993).
405. See 1991 U.S. BUDGET, supra note 220, at 240.
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a. Creating Market Discipline
Market discipline has several forms including the existence of (or
possible entry into the market by) other entities providing similar
goods or services, procurement from competitive suppliers, lack of fa-
vored access to labor and capital, absence of rents or monopoly profits,
and the threat of takeover if management underperforms. FGCs that
operate in potentially competitive markets benefit from factors that
radically reduce the degree of potential competition. For example, the
implicit guarantee gives access to credit at rates below those available
to private competitors and allows a much higher degree of leverage
than markets would likely permit a private firm. 40 6 And, dominance of
a particular market may create an economy of scale.
Each of these benefits is double-edged. Every benefit that allows
the FGC to deliver a product at lower cost simultaneously allows it to
benefit the group it is designed to serve and to undercut any private
competitor. (A third possibility is that the price advantage can be-
come a rent that is shared between management, shareholders, and
perhaps debt-holders.) At least at the microeconomic level, it is prob-
ably impossible to remove or restructure the FGCs' benefits in a man-
ner that levels the playing field with private firms without removing
the very qualities that allow FGCs to provide subsidized goods and
services. Take away an FGC's implicit guarantee and you take away
its access to cheap credit and its ability to leverage itself far beyond
what would be permitted for an ordinary firm. The removal of the
implicit guarantee levels the playing field, but does so at the expense
of the "subsidy" that the FGC is designed to deliver.0 7
The only way to impose stiff competitive pressures on FGCs short
of replacing them with private firms is to create several FGCs with
identical powers and missions and have them compete with each
other. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are already competitors (or
oligopolists), and neither appears to have been damaged by it. Creat-
ing a larger number of equally situated competitors might erode econ-
omies of scale, but it would also erode both the rents and the market
share held by existing GSEs. In time, competition also should reduce
the size of large GSEs to a point where they are no longer too big to
fail. A more radical option would be to break up the largest GSEs,
analogous to the break-up of the Bell system. Giving the existing
406. Currently GSEs enjoy special exemptions from certain federal securities laws. The
Bush administration proposed removing these exemptions. 1992 JOINT REPORT, supra note 58, at
34.
407. It may well be that the nation as a whole would be better off if there were no subsidy
at all; that, however, is an argument for the abolition of all FGCs. This article is concerned with




shareholders shares in each of the new firms created by the break-up
would remove possible takings problems.
Competition provides the greatest discipline when firms are at
risk of failure, although the profit motive should provide considerable
incentive for efficiency even in the absence of this danger. Currently,
FGCs with an implicit guarantee face little if any risk of failure. In-
creasing competition and shrinking market share might increase the
risk that the Treasury would have to make good an FGC's losses; the
potential expense is a powerful objection to a policy designed to in-
crease the risk of FGC failure. Thus, if the implicit guarantee is re-
tained for FGC's financial advantages, those FGCs whose competitors
are created for them must be required to adopt an "early warning"
debt scheme to signal the approach of a financial problem." °8
b. Division of the Spoils
Recently, private and mixed-ownership FGCs have proved highly
profitable for their owners,'40 9 their debt-holders, and their directors
and employees. Neither the shareholders nor the debt-holders have
profited unfairly; with the exception of shareholders of GSEs like
Freddie Mac whose stock was not available on the open market, 10
shareholders, in say Fannie Mae, have just been shrewd. Similarly,
purchasers of Fannie Mae bonds can demand a small premium over
Treasury bills because the federal guarantee is, after all, only implicit.
Nevertheless, to the extent that an FGC is created for a public pur-
pose and that the engine of an FGC's profitability, e.g., increased lev-
erage on borrowed funds, is fueled by its government connection, the
Treasury (or the intended beneficiaries) should be entitled to a share
of the profits.
Dividends on the government's shares are one means of allowing
taxpayers to share in the profits, but this approach has a number of
problems. It does not apply to corporations in which the government
owns no shares. 11 It also works poorly if FGCs choose to retain earn-
ings rather than pay dividends. Ordinary investors can buy and sell
their shares at will; but, as the ultimate insider, the government is not
in a good position to play the market, if only because government
trades risk sending undesirable signals to other investors. If the gov-
ernment sells, for example, the market may decide that the govern-
408. See supra part III.B.1.
409. One exception is Sallie Mae, whose stock has languished since the federal government
changed the terms by which Sallie Mae administers guaranteed student loans.
410. See supra note 290.
411. Often the government owns no shares because it has sold them. The FGCs and their
current owners can hardly be blamed for this quite likely mistaken policy decision unless it could
be shown that they made campaign contributions to sponsors of privatization.
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ment believes that the market has peaked. This might cause other
investors to follow suit and might even cause a small panic. Because
the government cannot realize its gains easily, the government might
be better off holding shares only in start-up FGCs and requiring the
FGCs to repurchase these shares according to a fixed schedule. If the
government continues to provide benefits other than start-up capital
but is unable to ensure that the benefits pass to the target group, then
the fiction that the FGC exists for a public purpose is not worth pur-
suing. In such cases the FGC either should be fully privatized or the
government should charge for the benefit according to its best esti-
mate of the market price.
3. Legal Status
The GCCA 12 vision of FGCs as being either private, mixed-own-
ership, or (one presumes) an agency is simplistic. It has been under-
mined in two ways. First, from time to time Congress creates FGCs
with a formal status at odds with their reality. Calling entities such as
REFCORP and RTC "mixed-ownership" when, in fact, no private
ownership or control exists, distorts the GCCA categories beyond rec-
ognition. Second, the sheer diversity of existing FGCs makes it un-
helpful to force them into such unilluminating categories. The
GCCA's concentration on audit and budget is too modest. The time
has come to update the GCCA and to give it some teeth.
With respect to auditing and classifying, the GCCA's focus
should move away from congressional labels, e.g., public, mixed-own-
ership, private. Instead, the GCCA should adopt a far more contex-
tual approach, taking into account several factors, including the locus
of control, the FGC's profit-making status, and the extent to which
the FGC benefits from special advantages unavailable to its private
competitors. The classification of FGCs as either public or private is
particularly important because it determines the type and availability
of redress to persons who believe that they have been wronged by an
FGC.
a. Actual Control
The degree of actual federal control should determine how FGCs
are classified, not the label Congress has given them. Indeed, when
creating FGCs Congress should acknowledge that any FGC controlled
by the government is an agency for constitutional purposes. In prin-
ciple, any FGC owned or controlled by the government should be sub-
412. See supra notes 308, 311 and accompanying text.
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ject to most of the rules applicable to other agencies; in particular,
FGCs should be subject to the Freedom of Information Act. If a com-
pelling reason exists to exempt a government owned or controlled
FGC from portions of, say, the Administrative Procedure Act or the
FTCA, the exemption should have a "sunset" provision limiting its
duration, at the end of which the entity would either become an ordi-
nary agency or become private, or at least mixed-ownership.
The term mixed-ownership should be restricted to corporations in
which the government holds a noncontrolling minority interest.
Despite this government interest, these corporations should ordinarily
be treated as private for constitutional and commercial purposes be-
cause they are not bodies whose actions display "a sufficiently close
nexus" to the government to "be fairly treated as [the actions] of the
government itself."
b. Profit or Nonprofit
The GCCA fails to distinguish between nonprofit and for-profit
FGCs. The type of rules appropriate for the internal governance, ac-
counting, and external supervision of an FGC should be based on
whether it primarily provides nonpecuniary and external benefits, or
whether it produces significant profits for shareholders. A nonprofit
FGC may not wish to be self-sustaining, but a for-profit FGC aims,
ideally, to return capital plus a profit. In the case of for-profit private
and mixed-ownership FGCs, Congress should clearly specify the cir-
cumstances under which the bankruptcy code applies, thus possibly
lessening the effects of the implicit guarantee. Although all FGCs
benefit from monitoring to ensure that they fulfill their public pur-
poses, the potential for conflicts of interest are probably greater for
for-profit FGCs if only because directors' and shareholders' renumera-
tion criteria are imperfectly aligned with the corporation's public mis-
sion. The GCCA should reflect this reality, rather than imposing the
least-strict reporting requirements on private FGCs.
c. Sovereign Immunity and Private Interests
The legal status of FGCs is not simply an arcane issue of separa-
tion of powers but has important day-to-day consequences for private
citizens. Persons who contract with FGCs are entitled to two sorts of
protection which are currently absent. First, they are entitled to know
whether the entity with which they are dealing is a public body or a
private corporation because this characterization affects their rights
and remedies, and thus their legitimate expectations. If Congress and
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the courts apply the tests set out above, then such persons would have
greater guidance than is currently available. 13
An FGC with sufficient independence to avoid being a federal
actor does not deserve sovereign immunity and should not benefit
from the Merrill doctrine. Courts should apply the same test for sov-
ereign immunity as they do for federal actors. Only FGCs that are
federal actors should have sovereign immunity. If courts are not will-
ing to adopt this identity then Congress will need to amend the defini-
tion section of the FTCA41" to make it clear that the sovereign immu-
nity of all FGCs that might be considered public is waived to the
same extent as that of federal agencies.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Federal government corporations are not evil per se; nor are they
a panacea for inefficiency in government. Because they do not fit in
with superficial, but commonly held, views of what government de-
partments are like, the risks they pose too often are ignored. The ob-
scurity in which federal government corporations operate allows them
to have the best of both worlds and to avoid both the accountability
mechanisms designed to reign in government and the laws and rules
that regulate private firms. Congress has failed to come to grips with
these issues.
Before Congress and the administration create more federal gov-
ernment corporations-whether to regulate boxing, modernize air
traffic control, jump-start small business, or anything else" 1 5 -they
would be wise to reconsider (dare one say reinvent?) the fundamental
rules governing this potentially useful, but also potentially dangerous,
administrative device. Perhaps some day a future administration, des-
perate to achieve further improvements in government operations, will
embark on a program of radical privatization. If so, that administra-
tion is likely to transfer some functions to federal corporations, either
as a political compromise, or as a way station to full privatization.
413. Admittedly, there is a risk of complexity when an FGC changes over time. The risk is
at its maximum in the (hypothetical) case of a mixed-ownership FGC with dispersed share owner-
ship. In such a case, the FGC might be private for some matters and public for others. Were
Congress to create such a beast, it would be wise to provide a default rule-preferably "public"
status.
414. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
415. The Bonneville Power Administration is a recent aspirant to accountability-free status.
It began a campaign to become a federal corporation, estimating that it could save several million
dollars in staff costs alone. Its proposal is a little more brazen than usual as its draft legislation
would exempt it from all civil service laws, including whistle-blower protection and conflict-of-
interest laws, and insulate it from everything from jury trials to the Freedom of Information Act.
See Maria Williams, Bonneville Power Wants to Be on Its Own-Agency Says It Would Save
Money, but Critics Wary of Its Autonomy, SEATTLE TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1994, at B3.
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The ground rules for such corporations need to be sorted out well
before that day comes.
Already, FGCs raise serious concerns about the placement of
public power in private hands. Relatively modest reforms, however,
can handle the problems. The United States has a long tradition of
entrusting decisions of national importance to the market-to private
persons and to private corporations-decisions that in other nations,
such as France or Japan, are guided by the state.411 The problem has
less to do with the choice of a corporate form than the way in which
that choice is implemented.
M6st of the primary legal and financial problems with FGCs to-
day could be solved by taking these basic steps:
(1) The legal status of many FGCs needs clarification along the
lines described in this article. Identifying a corporation as either pub-
lic or private instead of letting many get away with being a bit of
each will force compliance with either the APA or private (and, usu-
ally, tax) law relating to firms. Either way, FGC accountability will
increase. Other issues also need to be defined, particularly the position
of the public director in the private firm.
(2) The public is entitled to reap its fair share of the profits when
FGCs benefit from public powers, public funds, or an implicit debt
guarantee. If an FGC makes profits it should pay taxes and, if the
government owns shares, it should pay out dividends on those shares.
If the government does not own shares, the FGC generally should pay
for its privileges.417
(3) For-profit FGCs must have similarly situated competitors, be
reincorporated as nonprofit, or, if possible, terminated and restarted as
government-owned corporations so that any monopoly profits pass to
the Treasury. Government chartered copycat, publicly owned, com-
petitors would provide the best solution in some cases.
Reinventing Government involves at least as much fine-tuning of
rules as reinvention.' 18 Given the government's importance to the na-
tion's economic and social well-being, a little tune-up goes a long way.
This article proposes preventive maintenance reforms designed to
shape the environment in which federal government corporations op-
erate. These suggestions harmonize with Reinventing Government's
emphasis on increasing government accountability, although they do
not achieve it in precisely the same way. Alas, the odds of adopting
416. See ANDREW SCHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE POWER 298-301 (1965).
417. For an example of how this might work in practice, see 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2(n)(7)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (charging Sallie Mae an "offset fee" of 0.3% per year for loans that it
makes, insures or guarantees subsequent to August 10, 1993).
418. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National Performance Review's
Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 DUKE L.J. 1165 (1994).
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these reforms before they are needed is slim, because regulatory re-
form most often happens only in reaction to a perceived crisis. Chang-
ing that dynamic, to anticipate the problems outlined above instead of
reacting to them after it is too late, would signal a truly reinvented
government.
